Address

before the Society of the Arty of the Tennessee

vol. 8

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Plate of Burtonville

etchings of Corot's Campagn
Ladies and Gentlemen:— Comrades of the Army of the Tennessee:—

In this annual address, we will attempt to place before you a few sketches to remind you of the operations of the Army of the Tennessee, in and near the last two battles which our great leader fought in North Carolina; they were indeed the last of the War for Sherman's column.

We had reached Fayetteville, N. C. and the Cape Fear River. Slocum, with his two army corps, the 14th and 20th was behind his crossing at the city. Our army, the 15th and 17th Corps, had a good bridge across the Cape Fear, a mile below, and were encamped west of the River at convenient distances behind the bridge. Of course we had some troops beyond the river, as advance guards, with cavalry and pickets handsomely covering our front. In this position we remained for nearly three days, from the 13th to the 16th of March, 1865.

Sherman had, some days before, expressed his desire to communicate with Wilmington, as he was confident that with his 23rd Corps, after the Battle of Nashville, had come around by rail, and had by this time secured Wilmington.
Thereupon, the daring Captain Duncan had selected two enlisted men, the same that had with him floated down the Ogeechee through the enemy's lines two months before to bring our army and navy into conjunction. These men, sergeant Amick, 15th Illinois cavalry and George W. Quimby, 32nd Wisconsin, loaded with as much mail matter as they could carry without suspicion, had set off boldly across the Carolinas for Wilmington. Later Sherman had caused another scout to float down the Cape Fear River. The first party succeeded in getting through in forty-eight hours, whereupon, a small river steamer immediately started up the River for Fayetteville. Immediately after the first brisk excitement of our skirmish with Hardee had subsided, and his forces were well over the Cape Fear, we heard the shrill whistle of a steam tug coming from below. It proved to be the message-bearing vessel from Wilmington. Not long before the vessel came in sight, fortunately for its safety, Blair's men reconnoitering along the River banks, had come upon a Confederate steamer and captured it. The day before our departure one of our gun-boats, carefully working up-stream reached position, and soon other steamers arrived. With them came the coveted mails; also sugar, coffee, shoes and forage, - most welcome supplies. The returning steamers bore from us our sick to better accommodations, and carried
mail matter for the entire command. The remaining spaces were occupied by our white refugees, that had been gathering and increasing from Columbia to Fayetteville. Here it was that we organized that motley column of freed people that we set in motion towards the promised lands of Sea Island cotton. Using our soldiers, whose time had expired, we put a guard and wagons, with enough supplies, ahead, and a sufficient guard in the rear. That main body in the middle of the road beggars my description. Here was a sample family: An old grandmother scantily clad, bent with years, with a long staff in her right hand wearily keeping up her pace; near by a negro father, face deeply seamed, head and beard already grizzled; to his right, the mother with bandanna, turbaned head, having clinging to her meagre skirts, several boys and girls with their bright, half-scared eyes and wooly pates. All were in rags or patches, thickly set on; a stout boy of fourteen, with his broad mouth full of white teeth is trudging along, by a rope halter, pulling after him a large, dingy white, reluctant mule, saddled with shapeless bundles of every size. Farther back, you behold other groups, some before and some behind country wagons of odd construction. Here is an old-fashioned sulky, with rounded bottom, hauled by a horse in fair condition, but with harness partly leather, partly rope,
and the rest chains. All the goods and chattels of a non-descript, poor white family, seven or eight in number are piled into this vehicle. On the seat is the poor, timid, wretchedly clothed wife, hiding her face far back in her deep grottoed sun-bonnet, holding her baby in arms while a two-year old, white haired youngster crouched at her feet. There are dotting this column all along horses so old and thin that they stagger, mules of all sizes and conditions, and a few donkeys that made known their sorrows by their usual harmonies, while jolly pickaninnies are piling on their bundles and dragging them along.

It took at least forty minutes for this singular column to pass a given point. There was in the air the music of a multitude, the cries of children, the shoutings of drivers, the snatches of jubilee songs and prayerful ejaculations; and above all the murmur could be heard the shrill whistling and singing of saucy youngsters of negro refrains. It was the outbubbling of young hearts which no circumstances can ever repress. Comrades will recall that phenomenal refugee army, some 4,500 strong, which passed them near Fayetteville on the road, leaving behind the much lauded contentment of slavery, and hopefully marching to the promised fields of freedom. Those human hearts, at whatever cost, greatly
preferred the freedom.

Looking ahead toward Goldsboro and Raleigh we were sure that Joe Johnston, called back, was somewhere in our path. So that, now, the entire command under Sherman's instructions, stripped for battle; the trains, except wagons absolutely essential, were thrown back, kept well together and placed under special escort and covered, of course, by a good rear guard.

From the Cape Fear

Before setting out, let us delay a moment to reproduce such a picture of the country before us which was photographed upon our minds at the time. If we connect Fayetteville with Averysboro northward by a right line, then Averysboro with Smithfield to the northeast, and Smithfield southward with Goldsboro, and then join Goldsboro with Fayetteville, we have an oblong, four-sided figure. The distance from Fayetteville to Goldsboro is fifty miles. The other three distances are about twenty-five miles each. This oblong figure is the terrain which covers the manoeuvres and the two battles of Averysboro and Bentonville. Bentonville is a point as near the middle of this terrain as you can place it.

Slocum's column had preceded mine, and was west of Averysboro. Our wing resumed its march from Fayetteville the 16th of March. Sherman's mind, fully determined, was
to pass from the Cape Fear to the Neuse River, making Goldsboro
his objective point. He greatly desired to make connection
with Schofield and Terry, coming from the sea, at or near
Goldsboro, before fighting a general battle. Slocum went by
way of Kyles Landing, aiming for Bentonville. Kilpatrick's
cavalry was clearing the way on Slocum's left and front. The
day we started, the 16th of March, Slocum found a large Con-
federate force, still under Hardee and not Johnston, thrown
across his way. Slocum says: "Kilpatrick came upon the
enemy behind a line of entrenchments. He moved his cavalry
to the right while Jackson's and Ward's two divisions (infantry)
of the 20th Corps were deployed in front of the enemy's line." Slocum continues: "General Sherman, who had just joined me
at that time, directed me to send a brigade to the left in
order to get in rear of the entrenchments, which was done, and
resulted in the defeat of the enemy, and in the capture of
McBeth's Charleston battery and 217 of Rhett's men."

A little later, Hardee's men made a firm stand
covering themselves with strong breastworks a short distance
in the rear of the first entrenchments encountered. Slocum
carefully skirmished up to the new position and went into
camp in front of the Confederate line. In these operations
there had been severe skirmishing and several sharp encounters.
between regiments and brigades of the opposing forces. Slocum's closing words concerning this battle are: "During the night, Hardee retreated, leaving 108 dead for us to bury, and 68 wounded. We lost 12 officers and 65 men killed and 477 men wounded. Such is the brief record of the Battle of Averysboro. The Confederate commander, General Johnston, says concerning this battle: that Hardee was informed by Hampton, his cavalry commander, that our Army of the Tennessee had already crossed the Black River, so that his left was substantially turned. This made him abandon his position in the night and march back toward Smithfield as far as a place named Elevation. The work of our wing in pressing forward so as to pass beyond Averysboro was all the part we bore in that sharp conflict.

Now follow the preliminaries of the last engagement, namely, the Battle of Bentonville. A glance at my four-sided terrain suggests the simplicity of what we call strategy. Just north of Burlington, Vt, the city where I live, is a field fenced in where a ferocious bull is usually found feeding or in a surly way watching for an opportunity to vent his fierce spleen upon some man or animal who may venture in his way. One day, toward evening, as he stood on the north side bellowing and pawing the dirt he caught sight of a workman who had cleared the fence on the south side and was innocently crossing
the field. There are few trees midway. The bull made a rush for the man who had just time to escape his horns and clamber up a tree. Here the bull continued to hold the man a prisoner till another man, coming from the east, was crossing the field. He saw the bull and made towards his flank. As the animal turned to face his new enemy the workman dropped quickly from the tree, the two together being too much for his majesty, the bull drove him to cover. This is about the strategy of Bentonville. Johnston is represented by the bull, Slocum by the workman and Howard by the other man coming into the field.

General Johnston's instructions from Richmond he received the 23rd of February, 1865, at his residence in Lincoln, N. C. They were: to concentrate all available forces and drive Sherman back. This was undertaken by General Johnston with the full consciousness that the Confederates could have no other object in continuing the War than to obtain fair terms of peace. "For the Southern cause must have appeared hopeless then to all intelligent and dispassionate southern men." Johnston hastened to gather from all quarters what fragments he could. He had with him in a short time the veteran Generals Hardee, Hampton, Cheatham, Stewart, Stevenson and Stephen D. Lee. He probably had, for naturally
there were no more accurate reports, from 20 to 25 thousand men. His whole attention was bent upon Bentonville, through which village Slocum would have to pass on his way to Goldsboro; therefore, while Goldsboro was so plainly Sherman's objective point, Bentonville was Johnston's.

During the 18th of March, Slocum's wing was slowly continuing its advance toward Bentonville. Our wing, on the same day, was moving along a road farther south, and from the character of the country, to go around some swamps we were obliged to separate more and more from each other, till toward night Logan again bore to the northward to encamp about 11 miles south of Bentonville, while Blair was far back following some crooked roads in the vicinity of Troublefield's Store.

Slocum's entire command was northwest of us, and straight across the columns were probably not more than six to eight miles apart. We had but little resistance all day on our front, and that came from the habitual worrisome source, the Confederate cavalry. Our roads, during the march, fair enough before we touched them, had a bad under-crust, and were soft and springy in places, so they inevitably elongated our column.

It was near noon while I was watching the work of one of General John E. Smith's division repairing the road, when I heard the roar of cannon, apparently in the direction
of Bentonville. Suspecting that Slocum was attacked, Major Osborne, my chief of artillery, was hurried off to pass to my rear division, Hazen's; and caused it to counter march to Slocum's aid, by taking any convenient cross road at hand. Osborne was also to hurry on to Slocum and explain what had been done, and to call for more force if the action demanded it. Not long after this, a conflicting report came to us, namely, that Slocum had met only cavalry which he was driving back. This news made us believe that Johnston would rush to our front, and if possible hold the road at Cox's Bridge over the Neuse. We were further told that Slocum had obtained possession of the Smithfield wagon-road north of Johnston, therefore Cox's Bridge road was the only practicable one for the Confederates to pass over in an easterly direction. Lieutenant Colonel Strong, our chief of staff, hastened off with Colonel Weaver and his 10th Iowa infantry to secure that bridge. He found only Confederate cavalry there, drove them away, took the bridge and the cross-roads near by, and rapidly fortified the position. Soon, however, we found that our reports were not true. Slocum had met something besides cavalry, and he was not holding the Smithfield road north of Johnston. Heavy firing northwest of us continued and increased, and we very much feared from the sound and from a report
brought by Lieutenant Foraker that Slodum's column was having a hard battle indeed. This young officer, Foraker, is now the greatly honored senator from Ohio. On Foraker's arrival, General Sherman caused Hazen's division, already turned back towards Slocum, to hasten its march.

Taking for a moment the Confederate side; Johnston was holding points between Smithfield and Bentonville with all his force. Wade Hampton, commanding his cavalry, fell back as Slocum advanced. General Joseph E. Johnston, quickened by the news from Hampton, that our wings were so separated and divergent as to render a junction difficult, did just as he had done before, particularly in 1862, at the Battle of Fair Oaks. He rushed forward, struck a portion of the Union army, Slocum's wing, temporarily isolated, and sought to crush it before possible help could arrive. The ground chosen by Hampton, which Johnston came forward to occupy the morning of the 19th, was along the Clinton road, with high ground and good artillery positions near at hand on the west. It was a position substantially at right angles to Slocum's approach. A better position for a sudden descent and attack could not have been selected. Bragg's command, Polk's division, held the left, near Slocum's road, Hardee the centre and Stuart the right, while Hapton's cavalry covered the front and flanks.
Hardee, having farther to march than Johnston estimated, was replaced by part of Hampton's cavalry pending his arrival. Such was the arrangement. Now let us pass to Slocum's front. General Carlin's division of the 14th corps, during the morning of the 19th of March, was moving steadily toward Bentonville, probably in the usual column of fours, covered on front and flanks by active skirmishers. The Confederate cavalry became more stubborn than usual; so much so that Carlin sent his division into line. So far to the left that the watchful corps commander, General Jeff C. Davis, deployed Morgan's division to the right of Carlin. All this deployment was intended to force back the Confederate cavalry, or uncover Confederate infantry and artillery, if they were there. It was this Union force which pressed Hampton's cavalry so hard that it hastened back, according to orders, to give space to Johnston's battle lines. Hampton being out of the way a fearful Confederate fire opened at once at short range against the whole 14th corps advance. At first, Carlin's men were considerably shaken. Perceiving a growing disorder, the Confederates, those to the right of the Slocum road, suddenly took the offensive. They advanced in line against Carlin's left. We can imagine some trepidation and some breaking here and there even in the old 14th corps; but Slocum's men were
veterans, and such men rally quickly after a sudden onslaught or surprise. While the sharp fighting was going on in the outer front, the 20th corps and those of the 14th not engaged, arranged and barricaded a new line about half a mile to the rear of the point of attack. Johnston puts it in this way: "Some distance in the rear, there was a thick wood of young pine, into which the Federal troops were pursued, and in which they rallied and renewed the fight." Johnston's language would imply a partial defeat. Slocum owns up to an enforced retreat to the position already prepared, but says with praise that the retiring troops were handled with skill and fell back without panic or demoralization, taking places in the line established." In a short time before this second position the hot engagement was renewed. But this time, the opposition was too strong for Johnston's men to overcome. They charged again and again, but finally retired beyond range, doubtless hoping to renew the assault at daylight in the morning of the 20th; but during the night Johnston learned that we had reenforced Slocum by one division, and that my entire command was approaching Bentonville from the east by Cox's road, so that a new position became necessary for the energetic Confederate for he had to face both Slocum's column and ours. Johnston chose well the new position, and put his forces there. It was a kind of bridge-head with bended line, having Benton-
ville behind it, covering the crossing of Mill Creek, and thus holding the Smithfield road.

Sherman compares this position of Johnston to the letter V, with the point towards our center and the sides at right angles to our converging roads. Our officers on close examination had found it a convex curve, with the convexity toward us. The curves, however, were made up of irregular and broken lines so located as to secure a thorough defence of the village and the road of retreat. During the 20th of March, our army closed up to Bentonville, driving in the Southern Confederate cavalry before us. Logan went into position next to Slocum and Blair deployed his divisions to the right; and thus we embraced the works of the Confederates. The whole line ran from right to left: The 17th, 15th, 14th and 20th corps, with proper reserves covering each flank. Sherman sent Kilpatrick's cavalry far to the left. Early in the morning of the 21st of March, the 17th corps made a reconnaissance. General Mower was sent with two brigades to penetrate the thickets and search out the enemy's left. He worked his way through a swampy area where there was abundant wood and thick underbrush. With his usual eagerness, Mower pressed out beyond support a little too far to the north, becoming with his two brigades separated from his corps. He struck, evidently some points beyond the enemy's left flank. Coming upon
a reserve rear guard which he at first drove before him. The Confederate commander, seeing what was upon him, made a counter attack with a larger force upon Mower's front and flank. He thus forced him to withdraw, and General Hampton says that that withdrawal was in great haste, in fact a complete repulse. Hampton is doubtless right; but as soon as an appeal came from Mower, Blair was ordered to support him with his whole corps, and Logan was directed to make a diversion by advancing and seizing the skirmish rifle pits along his front. All this was done and well done; but just as Mower was again confidently leading a connected column against the same Confederate flank with better prospects of a complete success, then it was that General Sherman called him back. Sherman also withdrew Blair's entire command, after which counter movement there was nothing more except a little cannon firing and skirmishing between the lines. Our General's final action created much feeling at the time, and some severity of criticism. One reason he gave was that Mower was apt to be too rash and he thought he was acting of his own motion; another that he had over estimated Johnston's force; and still another, which was doubtless the governing reason at the time, that there had been bloodshed enough, and that Johnston would surely retreat northward and leave him, Sherman,
to go on and complete his connections and establish his new base of supplies. None of these reasons fully satisfied our officers at the time, but events were already ripening which very soon made us glad that this last battle had not been pushed to an extremity and made more bloody. During the night of the 21st, Johnston hurried away, making his usual clean retreat. Our aggregate loss, as we gave it, was 1604. Johnston's, as he rendered it, was 2,343.

General Slocum accounted for 358 prisoners captured, General Howard for 1287, making 1625 in all; whereas, General Johnston acknowledges but 653, a difference of 872 in the count.

It is easy to see that the Confederate organizations at that time were too broken and too mixed up to admit of accurate estimates or accounts. General Sherman, in speaking of this last battle, has remarked: with the knowledge now possessed of his (Johnston's) small force, I committed an error in not overwhelming his army on the 21st of March, 1865.

The Confederate General Hardee had but one son, Willie, whom I knew when a little boy. He was scarcely sixteen when he joined a regiment of Texas cavalry, a few hours before this battle. During one of the charges Willie Hardee was among the foremost. He was struck and wounded. His wound
proved to be fatal. General Hardee's daughter, Anna, wrote me from Hillsboro telling me that her brother had died of his wound at the house of a Mr. Kirkland in Raleigh, and she besought me, recalling old times, for protection for her Kirkland friends. I hardly need say that it was a pleasure to do anything that might properly be done to soften the asperity of war.

During the evening of the 21st, doubtless with a view to deceive us as to their intentions, the Confederates made fierce charges upon our lines. Ostensibly to retake their skirmish rifle pits which we had seized; this work was intermittent at dark; but our cannoniers continued to fire their projectiles from time to time during the whole night, lodging them as they believed, somewhere within Johnston's camps. Instantly at dawn, we found our front clear of adversaries. We took up the pursuit, soon ran upon their rear guard, and skirmished with it for more than a mile along the Smithfield road. Then, drawing off, we returned to Bentonville and prepared to resume our march. Thus ended the last battle in which our Army of the Tennessee was engaged. It was completed the morning of the 22nd of March, 1865.
Goldsboro, reached at last by all the army was Mecca. We remained quietly in camp eleven days. The 12th, that is the 4th of April, 1865, Sherman, who had been to City Point, had an interview with General Grant, President Lincoln and others, and had been made cheery by abundant praise, was already returned to us in high spirits. The next day, the 5th of April, he issued a confidential order which showed that Grant and he had planned a new campaign. Our part was to thrust ourselves between Joe Johnston and Robert E. Lee. Our new base was to be along the Chowan River with sub-depots well arranged. Our first objectives, in the direction of Grant's left flank, were Welden and Warrenton, North Carolina, with a design of seizing the crossings of the Roanoke without delay.

Sherman carefully appointed the lines of march for the right and left wings, and a central route Schofield in reserve, while Kilpatrick was to watch our exposed flank with his cavalry, and get across the Roanoke as soon as possible. The navy was to move up the coast to cover our bases proper, till we reached Grant's army, or its neighborhood. All hearts were filled with renewed courage, and we were on the eve of marching, the 6th of April, when some startling news at once put a different face upon all matters that concerned us. This was the news:

Lee's army was rushing with considerable disorder for Danville, and Grant's forces were exerting themselves to their utmost to head off
the fleeing Confederates. Sherman at once turned toward Raleigh. At Smithfield there were more good tidings announced in a note from our commander to the effect that he had a dispatch from Grant, that Lee had surrendered to him the 9th inst. at Appomattox Court House, Va., his entire army. The last paragraph of Sherman's note was inspiring:

"Glory to God and our country, and all honor to our comrades in arms toward whom we are marching!"

A little more labor, a little more toil on our part, the great race is won, and our Government stands regenerated after four long years of war."

The next day we held Raleigh and located Johnston's army near a crossing of the Haw River. We were in ardent preparation with cavalry well out toward the west to overtake and capture Johnston's Confederate forces. It took till the evening of the 16th to be in readiness for a general movement, but Johnston had already sent in an invitation to suspend operations. Sherman had assented to an interview to take place at Durham Station, at that time Kilpatrick's headquarters.

The morning of the 17th had come. As Sherman was boarding the train for Durham Station a telegraph operator ran to him with a message in cipher. It contained the fearful news of President Lincoln's assassination and of the attempts also to kill Mr. Seward and other members of the cabinet. Sherman was greatly startled. As no one but the operator
and himself knew of the purport he concluded to postpone the announcement
till his return from Johnston. Cautioning the operator not to divulge
the news, he stepped aboard the train and went on to fulfill his engage-
ment. Sherman and Johnston met at the house of a Mr. Bennett, a
farmer. Separating themselves from their staff officers, the two gen-
erals passed into a side room. As soon as they were there face to face,
Sherman showed Johnston the telegraphic message from Washington. Sherman
says: "The perspiration came out in large drops on Johnston's forehead,
and he did not attempt to conceal his distress."

After Sherman's return to Raleigh, he published the news.
Speaking of the assassination, he declared that he knew that the great
mass of the Confederate army would scorn to sanction acts, but he believ-
ed it the legitimate consequence of rebellion against rightful authority.
The effect upon our soldiers was not what had been feared. Their sorrow
seemed to overwhelm them for a time, and there appeared little thought
of revenges. The instinctive feeling was quite universal that the
work of assassination was the act of a few madmen.

The 18th of April, Sherman made another visit to Durham
Station. General Blair and myself accompanied him thither. Taking with
him his personal staff, he went again to the same place of appointment
some distance from the station to meet the Confederates. It was at
that interview that the first terms of Johnston's capitulation were
drawn up. Speaking of the paper, Sherman says: "I wrote it myself,
and announced it as the best I could do, and they (the Confederate officers) readily assented." There were clauses in the agreement which recognized existing state governments, whose legitimacy was to be determined by the Supreme Court, and others that defined political rights and franchises. These caused a furor of opposition from Washington, as soon as Sherman had submitted them for approval. President Johnson disapproved the agreement, and Grant was ordered to resume hostilities, and further to increase the sting of disapproval, Grant was instructed to proceed at once to Sherman's army and direct operations against the enemy.

We all remember how Grant came, and how wisely he allayed asperity; but his strong friendship could not remove Sherman's chagrin. It was not because his terms were disapproved, but because he had been so publicly and cruelly denounced to the whole country by the War Department. Sherman was encouraged by the friendship of Grant to go back to Johnston where new terms, without political reference, were arranged. As soon as Sherman had returned to him at Raleigh, Grant carefully read over the memorandum of agreement, put his own approval upon it, and then, leaving us the next day, took the same to Washington. That day, the 26th of April, Halleck promulgated from Richmond his startling order: for the 6th Corps to proceed southward, wherein he advised to push forward as rapidly as possible and obey no orders of Sherman. His instructions also to General Wilson, commanding the cavalry, who was hurrying southward, were: "To obey no orders from Sherman." "In the
light of these dispatches a great commander like Sherman, having three armies at his disposal, and not even relieved from duty, was deeply stung by a gratuitous insult. I wrote at the time to a friend "I am deeply sorry at the abuse General Sherman is getting at the hands of the press. He meant right, and the reasons for offering generous terms are not rightly set forth by the press. How easy it is to impute wrong motives!"

After years of experience and reading, and with a deep-seated antipathy to what was called state sovereignty, I am still of the opinion that Sherman's terms ought to have been quietly received by the President and the Secretary of War and returned to him for modification. Had they gone originally to General Grant, at that time so full of sympathy and wisdom, he (Grant) would have quietly, without parade, have brought about the essential changes, as he did, and so secured the magnificent results attained.

One can hardly help believing that the desire at Washington at the time was in great measure to repress Sherman's extraordinary popularity with the country at large; and probably give greater eclat to the last blow aimed through Sherman against the shrewd Confederate leaders who were attempting, in Johnston's capitulation, to save a part of the dire cause for which they had been in rebellion for four years.
Comrades, These last two battles and the surrender of Johnston's army constitute a tale, I am aware, a hundred times told. But when I look upon the old flag, or rather upon the new one, with forty-five stars in it, and think of all which it emblazones, and when I think of the political struggle through which we have just passed, where it appeared to me that the honor of that flag was again at stake, I cannot help feeling that the oftener we present to the people the sacrifices and the achievements of our comrades in the Army of the Tennessee, and the brighter we keep the record of the grand old past, so much the stronger will the friends of the republic be made for resisting all encroachments, all tendencies to disintegration, all blows aimed at the unity and integrity of our Nation. It is the Government we fought for, simple and complete in its constitutional construction, which our children must preserve to future generations. Men will rise with new projects. It is easy to imagine some social state far in advance of our attainment under the stars and stripes; and wild, undisciplined, inexperienced leaders will point to a paradisical constitution where there will be no more poverty, no more sorrow, no more corruption, no more monopoly, no more selfishness; but our loyal descendants must not listen to such transcendental theorizing, nor yield to untried socialistic dogmas; but adhere with tenacity to the Old Ship of State. Yes, it is that Old Ship of State which our fathers built so wisely and so well, which endured the storm, nay the terrific gales, from Bull Run to Appomattox and which is to-day sound and full-rigged, and capable of
Colonial
enduring to the end of time, in spite of the weaknesses and follies of her friends, or the fierce and treacherous assaults of her foes.

"Sail on, (Fair Ship) to breast the sea!
Our hearts, our hopes, are all with thee,
Our hearts, our hopes, our prayers, our tears,
Our faith triumphant o'er our fears,
Are all with thee,- are all with thee!"