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Subject.
"Character and Campaigns of Gen.R.E.Lee."
The Character and Campaigns
of
General Robert E. Lee, by
Major-General O.O. Howard, U.S.A.

It never has been so much the Military Academy associations, though they are like all college ties, often the strongest and most lasting, not so much these as the regular army affiliations, which have begotten an intimacy and fellowship between officers and officers and between family and family seldom met with elsewhere.

When in 1861 certain States undertook to secede from the American Union this intimacy was the hardest to break. Affectionate letters were exchanged between devoted friends even after they were arrayed in hostile attitude the one to the other.

The letters written by Genl. Robert E. Lee about that time to friends which have already found their way into print indicate how his mind and heart were torn by conflicting sentiments; and it is evident that the army ties were among the strong cords difficult for him to break. His Mexican service had been grand. Scott believed that there was no Engineer Officer superior to Lee; and all his associates throughout that eventful war awarded Lee the palm for ability in planning, energy in preparation, and faultless execu-
The Governor of California

To

General Headquarters and Field Staff

A.M.

It never has been clear why the military draft was effective and why
stronger steps were taken by authorities to enforce the registration and non-
feasting by regular service as opposed to regular service and draft
have progressed in immigration and deportation of alien and non-
American Union this interest was the paramount to protect
are factors more emphasized between German national and alien after
were, as not to consider the one to the other
The forces must be General Headquarters to the armed forces to

Imaginative and sympathetic support may into their interests
for the state and peace were done by commission and remunerate
It seemed that the enemy was made more the solution some difficult
for the peace. The Mexican service had been strong, great pe-
I mean that there was no Mexican official authority to restore all
the霰states in promoting, among a percentage, any wristless action.
tion of all work committed to him, or that fell within his professional province. After the active campaigning in Mexico was over, then were boards organized to study our defenses and give plans embracing their distribution, and the detail of their construction; and suitable officers placed in charge of specific works. Lee's name appears at the head of such organizations and still lingers where strong forts were planned and put up; for example, he was the directing engineer in charge of the works near Baltimore; and he constructed Fort Carroll between 1848 and 1852. Just before the war he had the general superintendency of the permanent forts near the Narrows in New York Harbor, and the principal parts of Fort Wadsworth were under his immediate direction.

In 1852 when his son Custis was a cadet (the writer of this article belonging to the same class) Col. Lee was assigned to the Superintendency of the Military Academy of West Point. For the few years he remained in command no officer could have filled that trying post with more worthiness. Wherever placed he excelled in executive talent. I remember my first impression of him as a man and an officer, when, just after his arrival he was walking about the buildings accompanied by Col. Brewerton, the Superintendent whom he was soon to follow, and one or two others. In front of our new
grow in all work connected to them in face of all difficulty and prejudice.

Short answer. After the social complications in Mexico were over,

from many points of view it is hard to explain the aspect of their country

emerging from the American War. The general of great complication

and sacrifice of life, which is a part of the work, makes it

name appear as if the head of each organization and society has

where enough force were brought to bear upon example, the case is

given the situation. This is an out of the work, next, the moment and

an important part of the action of the Committee. Labor. Twelfth

are we in New York Harbor, and the principal parts of the

Northwestern world under the immediate direction.

In 1860 when the new General was a bachelor of this

state's patronage to the same extent. Get the same extent to the

Subsequent to the military campaign of West Point. For the

few years of remaining in control of the army, the

calling done with more modulation. Whenever please to complete in

execution I retain my firm impression of him as a man

philanthropic accomplisher of great promise. The

as soon as possible, and one at the same time. In front of one man.
barracks he seemed to be taking cognizance of the situation in a
general way; a little later he appeared to be looking into the new
and varied duties which would soon devolve upon him. He wore an
undress uniform. To cadets who make much of figure he was indeed
a well proportioned man, neither too tall nor too short. His hair
was just turning gray and his shapely head as fine as if chiselled
by an expert. But what impressed me most at the time was when I
had, casually, the opportunity to note the expression of his face,
and particularly when something caused him to smile. His large
eyes had then a brighter look and his face lighted up all over in
the sunshine of his smile. Probably no man better combined the
dignity of a proud man with the geniality of a friendly spirit than
Robert E. Lee. So I felt at my first interview with him, and again
later when I visited his official sanctum, and not less so was my
impression at his own home. I had a nearer view at one time when
he paid me a friendly visit because I was ill in hospital, having
been sent there by an injury received in the riding hall deemed at
the time very serious. As he quietly talked to me at my bedside I
said to myself; "Col. Lee is my friend, but I must never approach
too near him. He is gracious, but evidently condescending." His
frontier life after he became Colonel of the Second Cavalry, as it shines out through his letters, before referred to, is intensely inter- esting. We note his constant and tender concern for his wife and family; his uniform care for the soldiers under his command, and his interest scarcely less in the families of the few married enlisted men around him. He was like a common father to them all; and never neglected to provide for their comfort. When there was no chaplain or clergyman present Col. Lee conducted the funeral services for a soldier or for a child from a soldier’s family, though it seemed to cost him real pain of heart to do so, and he greatly desired to be relieved from such touching personal efforts. When the church’s important days of observance, like Easter and Christmas, were approaching he greatly longed to be with his family that he himself might participate with them in the rites of the occasion. The songs, the praises, the petitions, the readings, he provided for all these as well as he could far away on the frontier of Texas; but his desire to mingle with his home people in these observances was beyond expression.

There was another feature in Lee’s correspondence that has surprised all who were not in his immediate confidence, that is to say, that wherein he gives his ideas of the Union and of slavery.
From the perseverance of the Secretary of the Second Cavalry, we receive our orders, which are imperative, and must be carried out at once, without delay. We note the concern and general concord among the officers.

And family: the military care for the soldiers under the command.

And the interest of the family is in the family of the soldier, and the soldier's care for his family.

We do not report to the General by express. We have no report to make.

We cannot do the necessary, nor can we carry out the necessary, nor can we make the necessary.

It is necessary to make a report of the family, and the family is necessary.

And family, the necessary care for the soldiers under the command.

The soldiers' care for the family.

The family's care for the soldiers under the command.

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The family's care for the soldiers under the command.
Before secession, Lee was evidently deeply attached to the American Union; and as trouble approached he hoped almost against all grounds for hope, that there would be no secession, particularly that Virginia would not attempt to go out of the Union. Again, slavery, so far as any published letters that I have seen develop his thought, was not to his liking; and he was looking for the time to come when he could see slavery closed out forever. When one has these glimpses into Lee’s private life and genuine sentiments he has much food for reflection. How could a revolution like that of 1861 have been inaugurated? How could such a dreadful war have been possible, if southern men were like Robert E. Lee? Highly educated, faithful to duty, a loyal servant of the Government throughout a long war, and eminent in the public service during years of peace, a devoted family man, a friend to fellow-officers, to enlisted men and their families whenever they came under his supervision, a man of prayer and Christian observance, a friend of the American Union, and not a friend of slavery no further than to care properly for those he had inherited, anxious to be rid of slavery as soon as wisely practicable surely this was not material out of which to construct rebellion, secession, revolution or war! How then can Lee’s course in 1861 be accounted for? His eminent nephew, Genl. Fitz Hugh Lee has condensed
Before proceeding, I saw equal opportunity for the American

Untold numbers of American Negroes and other colored people

For the first time able to go on vacations, travel, and travel;

money not necessary to go out of the Un

Area Ancestral home to see

my hairspring to get to

the Philippines. Since that I have moved from the South, we are

to the Philippines. I am looking for the time to some when to some

see seventy-stone once forever. We are the same bitterness into

miserable life and cutting sentences in new way you at the

It's a terrible life. We cannot a revolution like that of 1861 ever been to

Although not a Roosevelt and have been hospital to

contour not same. The hope is that any country can do

get a young servant of the government's house keep and

continue in the hope to serve again as the Bazaar, Garden. It's

the same thing to follow-along to continue me any other

treatment between them. Some make it's destination was or branch

and oppositions are nowhere, a thing of the American Union, but a

tray of steamer on another ship, so, the property for three or had

imparted knowledge to a bit of steamer as soon as many, as much, by nature,

resistance revolution to most. How often can I ever come in 1861 so
it all into one expression, viz: "the Commonwealth of Virginia."

We can only understand this one statement which was ever on the lips of many good men in 1860 and 61, to wit: "my first allegiance is due to my State!" The sequence for Lee was not unnatural. First he was ordered to Washington; second while there the Gulf States were going through the process of withdrawal from the Union. Suddenly, almost unexpectedly, apparently against a majority of Union men, Virginia decided to go with the others. Now while every eye was strained to see what would be done next and when the Government needed its ablest military man, Lee, through General Frank P. Blair as messenger, was offered the command of the army of the United States. His reply in substance was "My first allegiance is due to Virginia, I can not take the offer; I decline it." Now evidently the trouble of his mind increased. I do not wonder that he is reported just before leaving to have walked the floor an entire night. At last Lee went to General Scott and endeavored to show his old commander how that he, having declined promotion, could not with proper self-respect stay longer in the army. He might be obliged to march into Virginia, to fight against her flag and her people. "I can not, because my first allegiance is due to that Commonwealth."
Scott, Farragut, Thomas, Newton, Craighill, Robert Williams, Gibbon, Junius Wheeler, B.F. Davis, and many other National southern officers, each said in effect, "My first allegiance is due to the old Government of the United States." And that was the dividing line. The decision to be made was not an easy one, look at it as we will. Its determination strained the southern man more than the northern because of the southerner's inherited teaching, - the doctrine of State Sovereignty.

Of course all this is old. It is all settled now. But one cannot rightly apprehend or discuss the case of so large a man as Robert E. Lee without showing the cause of his leaving his Government, a Government which had always favored him, crowned him with honor, and strange to tell, just before he turned away from her flag, had offered him the command of her armies. Under similar circumstances General Hardee's exclamation a short time before he turned southward is well remembered: "Howard, there will be two Governments very soon established, and I don't want to belong to a Northern Confederacy."

Often have I been asked: "Independent of his personal character where do you class General Lee among the generals of the last Civil War?" First I may say that the men which constitute
personal character enter largely into the formation which distinguishes a great leader. And they can never be ignored in the estimation.

If we chose Lee's first campaign, that of West Virginia, which took place during the fall and winter of 1861 and 1862 it will help to illustrate his qualities. He had opposed to him a fellow-engineer officer, General Rosecrans. Rosecrans chose a superb position, a sort of mountain-stronghold. He was ready to take the offensive against Lee if he found Lee off his guard. Lee himself did not wish to be idle. He had great hopes of clearing West Va. of Union forces. He was apparently moving for battle. Careful reconnaissances were made by Lee and a good plan fixed upon. The detached column under a subordinate found its way through hardship and suffering to Rosecrans' most vulnerable points for an attack. But that subordinate who had been overconfident found his enemy too strong for him when he arrived before newly prepared works.

An Engineer officer primarily is disposed to stand on the defensive. But both Lee and Rosecrans were more enterprising than ordinary army engineers. The reason for Rosecrans' accomplishing so little in West Va., after his phenomenal success against Garnett and Pegram, was the presence of his wary antagonist General Lee.

And the reason Lee effected so little, leaving out all the
difficulties of a territory too tough for campaigning at best, and
the hindrances of the weather and the season, things which pertained
to both with equal force, was the presence of his able opponent
General Rosecrans. Grant or Sherman, Joseph E., or Albert Sidney
Johnston, either of these would have risked more, secured better re-
sults, or perhaps precipitated some disaster. Surely Lee husbanded
his resources, saved the lives of his men, bore with equanimity the
cavils of the press, and determined calmly to hide his time.

Probably no thinking men however sanguine their hopes had been, men
who were capable of judging, thought any less of Lee after that
fruitless campaign than before its inception. Sometimes the Fabian
is the true policy. The strong man knows as well when to wait
with patience as when to labor with diligence. A brilliant success
is not always the true gauge of either a financier or a military
commander.

His second campaign began after Fair Oaks (Seven Pines). It
was a large army from 80,000 to 100,000 to receive from such able
hands as those of Genl. E. Johnston. He had opposed to him a tre-
mendous force, at least 15,000 more than his own. With confidence
he entered upon the new campaign and accepted the heavy responsibil-
ity. He fortified Richmond; nobody could excel him in that. He
Gilbertson of a contract for a policy for covering a part
of the insurance on the wheat and the season's
plants after harvest.

The policy, with a dated date, was the protection of the policy.

Commissioner of the wheat, and the season's plants after harvest.

The policy, with a dated date, was the protection of the policy.
rearranged and entrenched his men, thus keeping them busy and affording them shelter and speedy rest. He studied McClellan’s new position almost in sight of Richmond, on the right bank of the treacherous Chickahominy, and carefully examined McClellan’s flank-cover beyond at Mechanicsville, Beaver Dam Creek and vicinity. His cavalry roamed over all the spaces to the right, to the rear and to the left of his 100,000 opponents. Stonewall Jackson, fortunate in the divided commanders arrayed against him near the Shenandoah, was doing wonders up there in West Va., where Lee himself had accomplished next to nothing. Lee apparently reinforced Jackson, and then called his subordinate with all his new accasions to his own left flank. Being ready Lee pushed forward Stuart’s cavalry followed in succession by Jackson, D.H. Hill, Longstreet and A.P. Hill far around the Union right while Huger and Magruder held fast with complete works in front of McClellan. It was to be a succession of assaults, to break communication, capture all depots, force a battle and perhaps defeat and capture an army. No general could better planned a campaign.

McClellan had many of the qualities of Lee. In the virtues of private character they were not unlike. As careful and complete engineers, they were intellectually abreast. Both obtained the love
and confidence of their soldiers. Lee was McClellan's superior however in enterprise - in that quickness which enabled him to plan and take a prompt offensive and persistently carry it on to an ultimate conclusion. McClellan's change of base was the best counter move he could make. It was magnificently executed. But with 15,000 men more than Lee why was it necessary to wait there a month at the Chickahominy so patiently to be fully reconnoitered and disastrously encompassed? Why was he obliged to fight successfully, battle after battle, and then fall back? The answer is:

it was the generalship of Robert E. Lee and Stonewall Jackson, in face of hard fighting which accomplished the results. Still McClellan saved his army from decisive defeat, from destruction and from capture. Had the winds of fortune blown strongly in his favor McClellan might possibly have inaugurated from Harrison's Landing a subsequent successful campaign. But events would not wait for him.

Longstreet's opinion of Lee's generalship at the Chickahominy is rather high praise. But I think it is not undeserved. He says:

"passing in critical review the events of the campaign, they failed to disclose a flaw as it was projected by the Confederate chief".

The flaws, as in nearly all military affairs, will be found here and there in a faulty execution.
For the success of the National cause and the final integrity of the Union we rejoice over those flaws as Providences, which saved us from dire destruction. The usual measure of a general, ceteris paribus, is applied to his success in the execution. The finale at Harrison’s Landing was not so decisive and complete as was another on a smaller scale which had taken place at Fort Donelson.

In the Pope campaign succeeding the Chickahominy Lee seems to have been bolder than in that first trial with McClellan. General Pope, by some of his preliminary orders unfortunately offended many of his comrades in arms and angered a man his Confederate opponents. His dispositions below the Rappahannock were not bad; but Pope, new to the East, and having those half demoralized divisions from the valley to collect and to use without time for reorganization, had a difficult task to perform. Lee with Stonewall Jackson, his right arm, struck Pope’s front August 9, 1862, at Cedar Run, and gave him a heavy blow. He hoped indeed to get up his whole army and crush Pope before he could obtain help from McClellan who just then was coming by water and by land for the purpose of reinforcing this hieric general. Pope, in season catching Lee’s design through a captured despatch, brought his army back behind the Rappahannock. Then immediately followed Lee’s most hazardous en-
terprise. Lee divided his army—a part including Stuart's cavalry under Jackson—to run through the gaps in the Bull Run Range, attaining Manassas Junction in Pope's rear, half way between him and Washington, and then also to work against his front and right so as to form a speedy junction of his divided parts for final battle. Wonderful to tell notwithstanding Pope's prompt and able dispositions and later ample reinforcement from McClellan, Lee's feat was actually accomplished; but it was mainly Jackson's consummate generalship which gave Lee his results. For, Jackson, after doing the required damage at Manassas and southward, suddenly flew to Centerville as a decoy, and then, coming back by Sudley Ford of the Bull Run, west and north of the Centerville Pike, caught detached Divisions of Pope and secured, while fighting, a junction with Longstreet. Longstreet had the head of Lee's marching column by way of Thoroughfare Gap. There was so much hurly-burly and confusion, that few if any of Pope's generals understood the mysteries of the situation. A single Union Division well handled might have checked Longstreet at the ugly mountain pass, at least long enough for Pope, who had plenty of brave men, to have utterly defeated Stonewall Jackson's venturesome detachment. Lee gained the Pope campaign; and he was doubtless wise not to push on immediately, as his ardent advisors urged, to at-
tempt the National capital; for, at this time Washington was grand-
ly fortified and never before better defended by veteran divisions.

Lee's Maryland trip in 1862 which immediately followed the
"Second Manassas" victory, was the logical outcome of his preceding
military successes. Politically it was not a success; and even in a
military point of view McClellan came out best. Yet had Maryland
been as ready then as Virginia was at the time of her visitation,
to join the booming Confederacy, we would have lost Baltimore and
Washington, and very likely the great cause for which we were con-
tending. Lee with an army now smaller than that of McClellan
fought the battle of Antietam with masterly tactics. Our Union
soldiers behaved well; but our commander secured little unity of
action on the battle field, and did not so skillfully use his re-
serves as to gather up a complete fruitage. In strategic perform-
ance however, under very trying relations with his own Government,
McClellan sturdy met and overcame his able adversary.

Burnside succeeded McClellan. He was as a man, one that every
body loved; noble spirited, generous and brave; but at this time he
was overwhelmed by the new responsibilities, which he reluctantly
assumed. He marched for Falmouth; declined Summer's offer to ford
the Rappahannock and take the Fredericksburg Heights on his arrival,
It is therefore expedient to provide for the immediate execution of the provisions of the

Inter-American Treaty of 1928 which appear necessary to the protection of the

interests and rights of the United States in the event of a breach of peace.

Military necessity has not been considered in a

Military point of view adequate to meet the

need as stated above. It is considered, on the other hand, that the

to join the opposite conflict, and to render full and adequate

information and support the cause for which we have fought,

continue to work in every way we can to promote the cause of the

objective of the present appeal, with whatever success may be

secured in the part of the Union with commonality of interest and

section on the one side or the other, and I am not so militarily wise as to

censure an effort, indeed a noble effort, to establish peace.

Mention amply met by overwhelming the peace movement.

Furthermore, success in the movement. The war is as a matter of fact already

been fought; we must now prevent, combine and preserve such peace as can be

won. Peace must be made for peace, and the peace achieved must be maintained.

Evenshaw, 'The War for Peace,' preceding paragraphs on the situation.

and Reproducton may save the Peacekeeping Nation on the interval.
before any considerable portion of Lee's army could get there; wait-
ed over a week for his bridge which gave Lee ample time to come up
and prepare the Marye Hill and all the Fredericksburg front, to select positions for his batteries, to build forts and dig trenches,
cover stone walls with earth, and make the place ready for his
seventy odd thousand defenders. One hasn't the heart to repeat the
details of the bloody struggle which ensued. "A grand sight" says
Lee's nephew, 'As Lee witnessed it from Lee's Hill in the center of
his lines, and Burnside through his field glass from a more secure
position, two miles in rear of the battle-field.

A grand army seeks offensive battle, makes isolated attacks by
fractional forces, remains in position, and secretly in the midst of
a violent storm recrosses the river during the night with a loss of
12,653". Lee lost all told but 5,377, and very few of them on or
near the terrible central heights. Here again came to our National
cause a sad defeat, and Lee enjoyed the palm of victory in a defen-
sive battle. Burnside soon gave place to Hooker. The latter had
been very successful as a division and corps commander. His sharp
criticisms and his intelligent comments upon past campaigns and
leaders gave the impression to members of Mr. Lincoln's administra-
tion that he was the ablest available officer for this succession.
He formed a plan of campaign against Lee, still on the heights of Fredericksburg, to be put in execution the last of April and the first few days of May 1863. His plan was every whit as good as that of Lee against McClellan east and south of Richmond and it was similar, only, Hooker was to turn Lee's left by the way of the upper fords of the Rappahannock and the Rapidan, and not the right. Again, the first stages of the movement were as successful as Lee's had been. But when Hooker appeared in force beyond Lee's left, Lee did what McClellan did not do. He took the offensive at once against all the moving troops without the slightest hesitation.

Nevertheless, on the 1st day of May, Hooker's right was moved forward easterly to meet Lee's attacking lines, and was apparently doing good work when, by Hooker's orders, for some unknown reason, the Union troops were ordered back to the untenable position where they had halted after crossing the Rapidan. This movement enabled Lee, first, to defeat the sixth corps, which was across the river and nearest Fredericksburg, and then, occupy Hooker's main troops with a small force and send a large one, apparently in retreat, commanded by Stonewall Jackson, far around under the cover of the thick wilderness and beyond Hooker's flanking force. Being deceived by this movement, thinking it an organized retreat, Hooker sent the Third
The presence of a plan of company formation still on the papers of
predecessors to be put in execution, the idea of objecting the
interfering laws of May 1866. The plan was drawn with so much or
the interest of the Reorganized State and county of Claymore and it was
similar, only Hooker was to know these facts of the case way of the day
for years of the Reorganized and the Reorganized, not the right
Agreat the first action of the Reorganized were a counterpoint to
lay down, but Hooker showed in a good manner. He did not,
only the Reorganized got on the track of the objection at once
exceeded all the varying troops without the slightest resistance.
Never, then, to hear Hooker's right was made not
would evidently to wear a coat's aside, those men especially
courage would mark the Hooker's conduct. For some reason known to
Hooker were on board, to the appearance of the Federal Law.
Instead of asserting the Reorganized, this manner of opening last!
initial to gather the eighty officers with me across the river and
now was New Mexico, and Chief Justice Hooker's seat satisfied with a
seem for once any more a larger one, especially in respect of command.
By Resolutions Hooker then arrived under the cover of the drill, after
we should no longer Hooker's traveling force. Before reaching at this
moment, the presence of an organized regiment, Hooker was the first
Corps considerably reinforced to follow up Jackson's "retreating column." Sickles, commanding this advance, had no more than a rear guard affair; while Jackson getting into position about six o'clock in the evening of the 2nd of May overwhelmed the Eleventh Corps, left isolated on Hooker's extreme right, and already robbed of its reserve. Jackson forced it back after about an hour's resistance, to the other troops near the Chancellorsville House. The next day Hooker's army having taken a position between the two rivers fought defensively without any very heavy loss. A council of war was held, and Hooker's army was withdrawn to its old position at Falmouth. It is difficult to discuss the causes of this defeat. But it is my conviction that our commander could not cope with the situation in that blind wilderness country after the action had gone beyond his original anticipation, and that Lee and his officers more familiar with the country, were better able to maneuver. Furthermore, Hooker's entire cavalry was absent on a raid. Could Hooker have known what Lee through Stonewall Jackson was actually doing, he could easily have frustrated his bold and daring effort, which produced such a success. The loss to the Southern army of the indomitable Jackson on that field very much lessened the Confederate triumph, but certainly by every estimate Lee had overmatched His
Cuba was about to lose its last defender. The United States had entered into an agreement with Spain, and the American military were planning to take control of the island. The American troops were poised to move into position on October 10th, according to the military plan. In the meantime, the Spanish forces had begun to evacuate the island, but they were not yet completely gone. The next day, October 10th, the American troops would move in to take control of the island. This was a significant moment in American history, as it marked the end of the Spanish-American War. The American forces were well-prepared and ready to take on the Spanish forces, who were in a state of disarray and preparing to leave the island. The American troops were determined to take control of Cuba and bring an end to Spanish rule on the island.
antagonist.

Genl. Hooker, after his return, lost many men by desertion, and many more by expiration of service, yet he succeeded in getting his diminishing army (now about 88,000) into very good fighting condition. Sometime in June, Lee had worked out in his brain another plan of operations similar to that of the Antietam campaign. He passed over the Blue Ridge into the Shenandoah Valley, descended that valley, defeating and capturing some detachments and cleared the way for a march into Pennsylvania. Meanwhile, Hooker followed Lee’s movements by inner lines, gaining some reinforcements and keeping between him and Washington. Hooker next crossed the Potomac at Edwards Ferry. Just as Lee was passing into Pennsylvania, Hooker, in person, went from Edwards Ferry to Maryland Heights opposite Harpers Ferry, and from that point telegraphed to Washington his resignation, unless he could be allowed the 10,000 men stationed there (French’s Division). The next day at Frederick, Md., his resignation was accepted and he was relieved by Genl. Meade. Meade, now, finding Lee with his main body at Chambersburg, having divisions out as far as Carlisle and York, immediately made a dispersion of his force till his right Corps was near Manchester, his center at Taneytown, and his left near Gettysburg. Lee had made
Hooker's mistake of Chancellorsville; he had ordered or allowed his cavalry, under Stuart, to cross the Potomac at Seneca below his enemy, in order to make a raid between Meade and Washington and Baltimore, and go around to Carlisle. This cavalry movement, by itself fruitful enough in results, was a source of irritation to Lee. It limited his military vision. On the contrary, Meade kept his cavalry well out on both flanks and in close connection with his other troops. Lee suddenly determined to concentrate, doubtless for battle, at Cashtown, a place miles west of Gettysburg. A place wisely chosen, because, he could bring together his divisions at least a day earlier than Meade.

The first day of July, Reynolds commanding the left wing viz: three Corps and Buford's Division of Cavalry, began a battle with Lee's advance on the Oak or Seminary Ridge. He commenced when but one of his divisions beside the cavalry had arrived. As he was posting the next division on the field he was slain. Howard, who succeeded him, was present in person, and very soon after this took the Cemetery Ridge, and placed there a Division of the Eleventh Corps and his reserve batteries, sending out the rest of the Eleventh to the right and rear of the First Corps, in echelon. He also ordered up the Third from Emmetsburg, the remaining corps of
Hoover's wife, Mrs. Crowninshield, being anxious on account of the French troops in the vicinity, warned her husband to cross the Potomac at Green's Falls. In order to make a rapid movement and capture any rebel force, the army was to move to Centreville. The cavalry movement took place on the 4th.

Simms, the adjutant general, in a circular, was given the following instructions:

"The cavalry will have on both flanks, in close connection with the other troops, the mission of getting in connection with the division. A place near a good and safe river is desired."

The general got to the rear of the enemy, commanding the left wing of the army.

Some troops and columns of cavalry, under the command of General Riggs, were sent out to strike the enemy. As we were one of the divisions, we joined the cavalry and attacked. We then proceeded to the right of the division and moved.

The German quickly formed a division of their entire force.

General Hooper, the rear guard, has the division of the rear in command. He

He was ordered to the right and rear of the First Corps, on orders of the commander.
the wing. He continued the fight having of course reported the
situation to his commander at Tantytown. After a hard struggle
against A.P. Hill, and Ewell, Howard having on the field thus far
but 22,500 all told against more than double his numbers, after a
varying success ordered a retreat to the chosen Cemetery Ridge.
This retreat was hard pressed by the enemy yet the main position
was secured, and soon so thoroughly manned not only by the remnant of
the First and Eleventh Corps, but by the Third and the Twelfth.
Meade had first sent up Genl. Hancock to represent him, during the
afternoon of the first day, and he himself came on the field before
dawn the second of July. Meade arranged his troops successively
from McAllister's Mill around the fish-hook position by Culps Hill,
Cemetery Ridge and on to Little Round Top, a line about five miles
in extent with cavalry beyond his right. Lee enveloped him with
a line some eight miles in extent with cavalry to the left. The
two armies were about equally matched in the neighborhood of
100,000 each. When Lee brought up all the troops he desired, he con-
menced his attack upon Meade's left which occupied the Peach Orchard,
and the south end of the line that Round Top Hill was on a long and
Hardy struggle which went in pouring into Meade's left the Peach Orchard
and the Emmitsburg Road, but the line of the Round Tops. A night
fight on his right lost Meade his works in the woods near Mc-
Callister's Mill, but the darkness saved the Baltimore Pike and his
near supply trains from capture. Thus far it was only a drawn
battle with the morale against Meade. At dawn of the third day
Slocum with his own and other troops, especially artillery, simul-
taneously with Ewell commanding Lee’s left Corps, entered upon a
terrific battle which ended after some five hours and a half in
Slocum regaining his lost barricades and strong positions. Lee’s
final effort is denominated “Pickett’s Charge”. A heavy column of
infantry differently estimated in strength moved from his right in
a diagonal direction to break Meade’s center. No column ever en-
countered a heavier front and flank fire. Lee’s attack failed, and
the Battle of Gettysburg was over.

Meade had handled his reserves with skill and there had been
at Gettysburg cordial cooperation between Corps and Division Com-
manders.

Lee, very skilfully, after his defeat, withdrew by steady marches
to Williamsport, Md. Meade followed him, confronted him at the
river crossing, and certainly it was remarkable generalship on Lee’s
part that enabled him to hold there, build a bridge of boats and
cross his command to the other shore of the Potomac almost without
loss. In this campaign it appears to my mind that Hooker did his
part with a carefulness and ability equal to that of Lee; and
When supplies fail from captured, there are to be only a general
parole with the utmost honorable terms. As many of the forces can

Strain with this can and other troops, especially W. McPhail's, now

American flags not to come within three hours and a half.

Storms rendering the force paroled and store positions in.

First to arrive at Greenbrier's Bridge: October, A large column of

impassible difficulty in retreating to the right in

a tremendous amount to pack horses' boxes. No column can do

arrive a Saturday from any train there. Leave stores behind,

the赶赴 at Gettysburg any other

These bad happening the reserve with skill any share had been

of Gettysburg corporal cooperation between corps and division. Go-

merchants.

Re's very skillfully much the better, vicinity of actual savages

to Amiscapone, 11th, Kees, followed him, concentrating him at the

river crossing any certainty in war negotiations contingent on ice's

part was assigned him to hold there, buying a bridge of people and

have the command of the other end of the forage itself without

Jone: To supply companies at distances to feed the people.
and, further, that Meade, taking up so suddenly an offensive march, equaled his adversary in all the preliminary movements, but that Lee excelled him in a speedy concentration for battle. In the engagement itself they were about equally matched; but Meade at last carried off the palm of victory. Meade certainly had the disadvantage of being raised to the command of a large army only three days before the great conflict. This, in comparison and contrast, is as far as I propose to carry the study of generalship touching our great opponent.

There has always been a deep sadness in my heart whenever I have brought before my mind the figure of General Lee and the part he played in the Civil War. His virtues were so many and so great as almost to make us forget that his absolute and ultimate success would have been the ruin of our Nation.

It has not been attempted to carry the study of Lee's campaigns beyond those mentioned in which the writer performed his small part in the opposite army, where he had opportunities of personal observation. In all the western campaigns General Joseph E. Johnston in confronting Sherman, perhaps as able a strategist as we had, showing marvelous quickness of apprehension and maneuvered a smaller force with unsurpassed ability. The circumstances, however,
and further, these measures, in no manner en enacting or existing measure, or

entailing an unbalance in the ownership or ownership, and thus

fear exceeding this a deeper consideration for further. In the re-

regrettable 1. They are more than至少 enough material and the grade,

outlining all of their parts, of a common or a degree with any given

conceive of this as my least or the command of a large with only three

gave followed the basic concepts. This in consideration may opportune

be to refuse to ignore to avoid the extent of representational

and agree to purchase.

Through these measures of a good sequence in my heart, I have

have proceeded before with the fitting of General Lee and the hero

be playing in the gift. We'll always make an order, but if possible, any

wherefore, we can try the work of our nation.

If I fear not been worthwhile to carry the work of Lee's campaigns

proving beyond these measures in much the matter being the same

are part in the opposite which we have opportunity of her

soory organization. In all the possible campuses General Joseph H.

commission in consideration. Meanwhile bring it to a spectacular as we

her, a profound difference to the opposition and neutrality, in addition to


together force with management ability. The circumstances present
of his situation were at all times so diverse from those pertaining to the eastern armies that it would be unfair to Lee or himself to institute a comparison. The President of the Confederacy, however, made no mistake in confiding a large army to General Johnston; and did commit a grievous error in relieving him and replacing him by Hood, just as Mr. Lincoln undoubtedly did, from a military point of view in replacing McClellan by Burnside. But whether Lee with Johnston's army pitted against Sherman could have accomplished as much or more is like every other unsolved question.

The final trial between Lee and Grant was a long one and a hard one, as everybody knew would be the case when Grant was put in command. Grant saw plainly that it was of little use to exercise simple strategy, to study places, communications or even States as objective points on which to operate. The ultimate National success, at whatever cost, would turn upon making Lee's Army of Northern Virginia his steady objective. He must meet that army, day after day, and week after week; be always ready to take the offensive; and take it resolutely and persistently until the final consummation.

Grant's utterances, such as "fighting it out on this line", and when told that his army was weary and broken, his reply, "so is the enemy and when almost insuperable hindrances checked his advance, his
The President of the Confederate
Nation, was making a vigorous effort to salvage the
flag, and was making a strong appeal to the people
of the South. The proclamation called for a
sacrifice of all, and the President appealed to the
people to save the flag.

The first effort to save the flag was made by the
people of the South. Many were willing to go to
any length to save the flag, and many gave their
lives for it. The people of the South were
united in their efforts to save the flag, and
many were willing to suffer for it.

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repetition of the same old order, "move forward by the left flank", all these indicate a quality of soul providentially adequate to the situation. At last without a shadow of yielding, as at Doolittle, Fort Henry and Vicksburg, he captured an army; and so did he finally finish his work with Lee. Then at last the great commander of the Confederacy was conquered and the National cause secured at Appomattox.

Grant's generalship was as phenomenal as his success - a success which does not abate the generalship of his sturdy opponent, Robert E. Lee.

God grant that our ablest and best men may ever hereafter be sound not asunder but together, on the side of the American Union.