Remarks at Frum Birthday Banquet held at Brooklyn N.Y.
April 28, 1880

No. 19.

Inscribed

Vicksburg
To form the most meagre idea of a military campaign one must understand the nature of a country. The Mississippi river from the mouth of the Arkansas to Vicksburg, a distance of two hundred miles in a straight line, and of over four hundred by the sinuosities of the current, flows through a region of most extraordinary features. When the great river overflows vast regions are flooded, often from sixty to a hundred miles in breadth; branches start out from the main river from different points, and winding and twisting, re-unite, as in the Yazoo, and flow back into the main river.

From these side currents Bayous, often fringed with high banks and entanglements of vines and timber in all shapes, find their way, in and out, through fertile districts. Again like Lake Providence, west of the Mississippi not far from the mouth of the Arkansas, there are channels and cuts and bayous sweeping off westward and southward so as to bring all the surplus spring-water back into the Red river and thence into the Mississippi. The Mississippi has immense bends like that of Vicksburg where, apparently, a short canal may cut off a city from navigation. In the spring many roads that are dry in the summer become slummy and almost impassable, sometimes they are overflowed, and so all movement upon them has to be suspended for months. Vicksburg was built upon a high bluff of some twenty miles in extent, more or less. We may call the upper part by the Yazoo, Haines' Bluff, and the lower part, though not within the Vicksburg defenses proper, Grand Gulf; these bluffs and sort of promontories vary from fifty to two hundred feet in elevation. In the spring of 1863, Vicksburgh was occupied by the army of General Pemberton who held Haines' Bluff above, Grand Gulf and Port Gibson below. His army was about thirty thousand strong.

He had a thorough system of fortifications, well manned with cannon and well supported by infantry. Considering the nature of the cour-
try, above and below, it is no wonder that Jefferson Davis pronounced Vicksburg the "Gibraltar" of his Confederacy. General Grant at the same time approaching from above had an army proper for field service of about fifty thousand effectives, and a naval force, under Admiral Porter, of ... vessels, besides abundant transports and barges. Four plans of operation presented themselves. The first to cut off Vicksburg by a canal so situated as to enable vessels to pass through it without being exposed to batteries at Vicksburg.

The whole world pressed him to undertake this plan of operation; the canal was dug and partially finished, when in a day the gigantic Mississippi obstructed the issue, came in to demolish his work, and at the same time the Confederates, by their counter-plans, obstructed the issue. The second was to break through the Yazoo Pass and come through various channels into the Yazoo, take Port Pemberton and operate against Haines' Bluff in the rear of Vicksburg.

The results of this effort brought some fruit; frightened Mississippi farmers, but evidently was postponing the final object of the campaign. The third which was to pass into Lake Providence through the bayous and small streams, out into the Red river, and so cooperate with Banks coming up from Louisiana; with him cross the Mississippi below, take Port Hudson, and then sweep back again to the rear of Vicksburg. This plan does not seem to have been seriously considered. It was too long and too difficult, and would only serve for some contingent operations. In fact it would but transfer the Vicksburg problem to the Port Hudson problem with no greater chances of success. But all the trials during this wonderful springtime of naval men and army men, developed their strength of energy and brought to the surface their skill when finally the actual plan was adopted, namely, to move two corps, by land, down the west side of the Mississippi to points opposite Grand Gulf; to have Grierson
To our Allied Forces, a common interest to unite at every Agreement.

Our American forces must maintain and be prepared for the plans of operation.

The force on the left and particularly the 7th Corps in the area of the town.

The force on the right, with the 17th Corps, are prepared for amphibious landings.

You and operate minor landing zones, stick to the area of Agreement.

the manner of the Allies provides some limited firepower support.

but firepower must necessarily be on the left of the operation. The right wing can be taken into the area of operations.

The personnel of the Duke come out from the town with this plan and go to

Montmartre, Paris, and from there to Paris. This plan does not seem to have good results.

Our position is that you are not doing all the capabilities of your own resources and only use to some extent from captured and

the Agreement program to the Paris region begins with a clearer view. We cannot consider that

the Agreement program has not been already. The German forces begin their advance of enemy

time of war and may not have the same objectives. On the other hand, the enemy front line your unit to the nearest planning

and may substitute, namely to your own. By land, you are the meeting of

of the Agreement to Lonely, to use all units, to plan resistance.
with his cavalry sweep through Mississippi from Corinth southward, cut railroad communications, destroy bridges, supplies and all public property, while the gallant Admiral was moving his fleet of gun-boats, transports, and barges by night down the swift Mississippi to encounter a terrible fire from all the forts, after which the army, to bombard Grand Gulf and transport Grant and his troops across from west to east to a practicable landing.

Such was the plan, laughed at by Confederates, opposed strongly and conscientiously by every prominent officer of Grant's army, yes, opposed by his close friend and best adviser, General Sherman, yet faith the colored man had told them, truly, there was a practicable road. Then the battle of Port Gibson; "Grand Gulf fell of itself; then Champion Hills; then Jackson; then Big Black. To relieve the pressure at the place of crossing Sherman and Porter had made a demonstration above, at Haines' Bluffs and then with extraordinary swiftness Sherman's force had returned to Milliken's Bend; descended the river, crossed to Grand Gulf and participated in the Jackson campaign. The forces of the enemy that Grant met were, first, the able Confederate General Johnston with his relieving army, which had advanced as far as Champion Hills. In two battles it was beaten and driven beyond the chance of return. Big Black was Pemberton's desperate fight for Vicksburg. There were dreadful charges up the steep ravines often into the very out-works of the enemy; but Pemberton held his fort until hope of reinforcements had ceased. Yes, he held on till his supplies were exhausted and then knowing that it was useless to attempt to hold out longer, on the fourth day of July, 1863, he surrendered to Gen. Grant. The Mississippi was ours and the Confederacy severed, the one part from the other, beyond hope of recovery but there was a singularity in his planning; a remarkable persitency in his operations, and an ability in every
direction, now clearly demonstrated Napoleonic in character.

We do well to cherish the memory of such a man whom God helped more than men. Yes, let us rejoice yearly at this festival which marks the day of his birth.
Vicksburg
Reply to toast at
Grant's Birthday Banquet
at Pansy - April
14 - 1890.

Grant Special
[Handwritten notes and signatures]