

Asbill

No 17

Subject -
The Georgia Campaign of 1864
III Resaca

A. Beer

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11.-RESACA.

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~~Sometimes~~ times during the war it was difficult for certain journals to keep their correspondents with the army. If anything improper or calculated to give undue information crept into print and into circulation, the commanding general held the newspaper man nearest at hand accountable. Often he was banished from the front, or so treated that he could not successfully report.

Latterly in the war, correspondents obtained positions as additional aides, or some enterprising junior staff-officer undertook to write regularly to a public journal, thus doing double duty.

For example, Captain D. P. Conyngham, an Irish officer who published a book after the war, was in the Twenty-third Corps on General Judah's staff. He also corresponded regularly with the New York Herald. I mention him particularly because he was present at the battle of Resaca, and gives some characteristic pen sketches of some of the prominent actors in that battle.

That General Sherman, who had often been misrepresented by ~~the~~ correspondents, was not at this time very friendly to them appears in Conyngham's sketch of him. The evening of the 13th, of May, with ^{but} one staff-officer, General Sherman joined McPherson in Sugar Valley. Conyngham says, "He was anxious and nervous, as was evident from the fierce manner he pulled at his unlit cigar, and twitched that strange rough face of his". In another place he says, "He has little reserve in concealing his opinions of other officers". He had worked hard all night after his arrival near Resaca. Sherman was then greatly disappointed. With his intense confidence in McPherson and his Army of the Tennessee, he had believed that Confederate Johnston's force would now be driven into a broken and disastrous retreat; but by McPherson's pulling back to Sugar Valley the whole programme was changed. Now a big battle must be fought against an intrenched position.


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
I will give the scene just west of Resaca as the correspondent presents it. "Next day (the 14th, of May, 1864), wearied and sleepy, he sat on a log, beside a shady tree, to rest himself, and soon fell asleep. He had but a single orderly with him; some man in passing made an insinuating comment, for example, 'A pretty way we are commanded'. Sherman awakened by the noise of passing men overheard the remark: 'Stop, my man, . . . while you were sleeping last night I was planing for you, sir: and now I am taking a nap'".

A little later, when several generals had gathered around him, he was told that Johnston had evacuated the Rocky Face Ridge and Dalton, and that Kilpatrick had been wounded. I had the night before brought the first item of this news, so that Sherman already knew it ^{that Dalton had fallen.} Now reflecting upon the situation at Resaca, he said, "Well, we must get them out of this too. McPherson, had you held this position when you first occupied it, they (the Confederates) would find themselves in a nice trap". "General", replied McPherson, "I found my flank exposed and open to them by goods roads, whilst I had not a single road by which reinforcements could come up, if attacked; so I fell back to a stronger position". "Oh, pshaw!" said Sherman. "It can't be helped now, though".

General Thomas was with Sherman that morning. The lively captain looked upon ^{Thomas} ~~his~~ sturdy face and wrote, Major-General Thomas is quite the reverse of Sherman, both in manner and appearance. He is tall, stout, with brawny frame and shoulders. His head is slightly bent forward, as if drooping with care and thought". (This was temporary, for habitually Thomas's ^{2,} head was erect.) "His hair and beard, which he wears cut pretty short, are rather dark, and slightly sprinkled with gray. He is about fifty years of age and looks his age fully. . . As a general, Thomas is calm and cautious; does everything by rule; leaves nothing to chance.



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He makes his arrangements for a battle with caution and foresight, and is sure to have every column and division move with clock-work regularity, and strike at the proper time and place. Nothing disturbs or unnerves him".

I regard this as a fair picture of General Thomas as I saw him that morning when we were bringing our corps into position before Resaca, except the idea conveyed that he was a mere machine-man. His intellect was active enough while devising or planing^m, but firm and steady when a decision had been arrived at. He was thoroughly suborinate^d. He earnestly seconded General Sherman in all his undertakings, whether just in accordance with his judgment or not.

While these sketches were being offered and taken on ~~the most~~ a prominent point of observation between Resaca and Taylor's Ridge, the troops were struggling through the ravines and thickets into a position encircling Johnston's lines, which were already firmly established.

Joseph E. Johnston speaking of Resaca says, "The two armies (Sherman's and his own) were formed in Resaca^{front of} nearly at the same time; so that the Federal army could give battle on equal terms, except as to numbers, by attacking promptly, - the difference being about ten to four".

There is evidently a mistake in this statement. In all Confederate writings this claim of disparity of numbers is noticeable.

As General Polk had arrived, and the Confederate army at this place is admitted by Hood to have been then about seventy-five thousand, and as General Sherman's force was at first ninety-eight thousand seven hundred and ninety-seven, then being diminished by a thousand casualties at Rocky Face and vicinity, and increased by Stoneman's cavalry, which did not exceed four thousand, giving a new aggregate of about one hundred and one thousand seven hundred

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
I regard this as a fair picture of General Sherman as I saw him that morning when we were bringing our corps into position before Haines, except the idea conveyed that he was a mere machine man. His intellect was active enough while devising or planning, but firm and steady when a decision had been arrived at. He was thoroughly subordinate. He earnestly seconded General Sherman in all his undertakings, whether in accordance with his judgment or not.

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and ninety-seven, it is difficult to understand how Johnston can make it anywhere near two to one against himself. It is well, however, to remember, what we have before frequently noticed, that our opponents used the word "effectives", probably counting the *plus the enlisted artillerymen actually with their guns; whereas our officers* actual number of men carrying rifles and carbines, multitudinous and varied the duties might be. It is, therefore, plain that the disparity between the armies was not very great at the battle of Resaca. We ~~probably~~ could not possibly put into line of battle, counting actual fighting elements, more than four men to Johnston's three.

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With regard to "attacking promptly", that is easily said; but to attack at once on arrival at a new place is seldom practicable. To do so it should require an immediate and thorough knowledge of the strength and position of your opposing forces. On the 14th, of May, 1864, Polk with the ^{new} corps had already come up from below and formed to the right of the two Confederate brigades which had been ^{for some time} at Resaca, and ^{the} completely intrenched. For ~~the~~ defensive, in two hours' time that new line could have been extended to the Conasauga, making a beautiful front from the Oostanaula along behind Camp Creek. For defense, the position between these three streams—from the rugged nature of the ground, the materials at hand for obstructions, and the grand places for locating all his artillery—was to the Confederate commander as good as the Fredericksburg Heights to Lee.

Next to Polk's corps came Hardee's, and on Hardee's right the corps of Hood, which was faced west and north, near Huey's house, in a strong double line. Hood covered the railway and effectually closed every other approach from that quarter.


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it was easily reinforced from one part to another and from its reserves. As always in this campaign, this Confederate army was promptly marched into position and thoroughly intrenched.

On the other hand, our forces approaching Resaca through the Gap on the one side, and from Dalton on the other, had to feel for the enemy's picket lines and for each other in that blind, rough, broken, wild, tangled, unknown ^{region} region. It was near twelve o'clock of the 14th, of May, before we had formed solid junction, and then the lines had to be changed as we worried forward through troublesome ravines, wooded valleys, hills obstructed by crags, steep rocks, old logs, and undrebrush. Sometimes long gaps between brigades troubled the division commanders, and sometimes an astonishing overlapping of forces displaced regiments as they were advanced.

The 14th, ^{of May} then, was mainly spent in placing McPherson on our right near the Oostanaula, Schofield next, and Thomas on the left. My corps, the Fourth, ^{belonging to Sherman} reached the railroad and formed the flank, Sherman's extreme left, and was faced against the strong position of Hood. As the Conasauga bended off far to the east, it was quite impossible for my left regiments to reach that river, so that I was again forced to have the left of my line "in the air". But Stanley's excellent division stationed here, by refusing (drawing back) its left brigade and nicely posting its artillery, formed as good an artificial obstacle against Hood as was possible.

Let us now go to Sherman's southernmost troops, and for a time confine our ^{attention to the} operations ^{of} to the Army of the Tennessee.

It will be remembered that General McPherson, its commander, fell near Atlanta, before the end of this campaign, so that, being his successor, his dispatches and records fell to me. In making up my report, I said for the 9th, of May, "The command on the lead

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(General Dodge's Sixteenth Corps) pushed on, the cavalry in advance, till within about eight ^{and a half} miles of the town (Resaca), when Kilpatrick encountered considerable infantry force, in charging which he was wounded and obliged to leave the field." The date was an error. This wounding occurred in the manner and at the place described, but near noon of the 12th, instead of the 9th of May.

Kilpatrick sustained his usual reputation for boldness and activity in scouting, and for success in promptly clearing away the enemy's outpost. This wound, though severe, did not long detain him from the field.


The forward movement from the Snake Creek Gap was taken up and completed on the 13th, of May. One Corps, Logan's Fifteenth, was deployed, and General Veatch's division, ^{of} ~~of~~ the Sixteenth, brought up in support. The resistance of the enemy's skirmishers became ^{Resaca} greater and greater as Logan's lines neared Camp Creek. Coming to an open field, he discovered beyond the field a north and south ridge of land not more than a thousand yards distant.

This ridge was occupied by Confederate artillery, and supported by Confederate infantry, moderately intrenched. Quickly Logan had a battery well placed and put into action, and in a short time succeeding ^{ed} in silencing the opposing cannon; then his brave men, in line, sprang forward to clear the ridge and possess it. At this point, crossing the Resaca wagon-road, General Logan's entire corps took permanent position; and one division of the Sixteenth, under brave General Dodge, formed line on its right, and the whole front was speedily covered by breast-works and ditches. Resaca was now in plain sight, so that the town and the railway bridge near it were exposed to Logan's perpetual artillery firing.

General Sherman had instructed McPherson, just before the remainder of the army joined him, to work towards his left and forward,



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


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and make ^{an} effort to seize the railroad north of Resaca. To this end, during the 14th, of May, several demonstrations were made by McPherson's ^A army of the Tennessee to carry out Sherman's instructions, or at least to keep Confederate Polk's men so busy that they could not reinforce Hardee and Hood farther north, where, judging by the sound, hard fighting was going on against Thomas and Schofield. Logan says, "General Osterhaus (one of his division commanders) took advantage of the feints to attack the enemy's skirmishers in the heavily-wooded valley near the road. This was done in the most gallant manner. The bridge over Camp Creek (the stream which separated us from the enemy) was carried, and the Twelfth Missouri Infantry thrown forward into the woods previously occupied by the enemy, thus forming a living tete-de-pont, which (operation), in the ensuing movements, proved of great value. From this bridge-head the Fifteenth Corps, supported by the Sixteenth, both belonging to McPherson's command, made a further move, driving in Polk's advance from the high ground east of Camp Creek. The brigades most hotly engaged were those of General Charles R. Woods and Giles A. Smith. The new position was taken by them. It was most important, and Polk hotly contested the ground; yet McPherson's men held it under a hot fire, while their pioneers brought up the intrenching tools, which they, assisted by many willing hands in the infantry line, used so effectively that in a short time every exposed place was under the cover of fair intrenchments.

In the early evening, about 7.³₁₀, the Confederates made an organized and vigorous assault upon this new line, but they were quickly repulsed. In anticipation of this assaulting business, Lightburn's brigade had been sent to the right of Giles A. Smith's brigade, and other troops to the support of the brigade of General

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8
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These troops were in time to participate in the repulse already described, and Lightburn, for his promptitude and energy, received high commendation. A hundred prisoners were taken and some thirteen hundred Confederates were killed and wounded on that front in the skirmishes and in this combat.

The importance of McPherson's capture of the heights referred to, situated between Camp Creek and the Oostanaula, cannot be doubted, for the high ground spoiled both the railway and the wagon-road bridges, and caused the Confederates to lay a new bridge of boats farther up the river.

On this point, General Johnston says, "General Sherman was misinformed as to the taking of an important ridge by the advance of McPherson's whole line, and bloody repulses of Confederate attempts to retake it (this on the 15th); there were no such occurrences. But on the 14th, about dusk, the left ~~our~~ of our line of skirmishers-forty or fifty men- was driven from a slight elevation in front of our left, but no attempt was made to retake it". General Johnston was certainly mistaken, for there is no conflict in the reports. The number of the prisoners taken by McPherson, and the number of killed and wounded on his front, are too specific to make an error probable.

Besides the official reports, I have the words of a reliable correspondent of the New York Herald, who was present. He writes respecting McPherson's movement of the 14th: "He (McPherson) had thrown Logan's Corps across the creek and occupied the heights on the east bank of the stream overlooking the town. This movement had not been accomplished without hard fighting. The rebel batteries along the heights poured a dreadful storm of shot and shell upon Logan's advance. McPherson, in order to neutralize this,

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The importance of Meade's capture of the heights referred to, situated between Camp Creek and the Gettysburg, cannot be doubted, for the high ground spoiled both the railway and the wagon-road bridges, and caused the Confederates to lay a new bridge of boats farther up the river.

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had placed batteries on the heights on the west bank of the stream, annoying the rebel batteries and thus giving a chance to Logan to charge across the stream and take possession of the ridge of hills commanding the rebel position around Resaca."

Surely General Johnston must have been misinformed.

True, these heights were not within his continuous intrenched line, but they were important outworks, eminently so, when we notice that they so thoroughly endangered his railway communication with Resaca.

Before undertaking to detail the important part borne by General Thomas in the battle of Resaca, we will next follow the movements of General Schofield's command. It was usually called the "Army of the Ohio" but when, as now, separated from its cavalry it had but one army corps, the Twenty-third.

When McPherson, under his orders, was pushing straight for Resaca, the two Corps, the Twentieth (Hooker) and Fourteenth (Palmer), of Thomas's army, were to keep abreast of him on ^{his} the left, ~~of him~~. As soon as these two corps were in line the whole north and south front of Johnston was covered. But Camp Creek, the dividing line between us and our foe, at Palmer's left, made an abrupt up-stream bend towards the west, and the Confederate lines bent off in the opposition direction towards the Oostanaula. Schofield's columns swept in at this point, General Judah's division turning by a sort of right wheel on a pivot at the bend, and the energetic Cox's division, trying to keep up the right wheel, swept off leftward while continually changing front to the right.

Judah's men came up boldly, but were exposed to a double fire; every step forward brought them under the fire from Confederate batteries in elevated salients, which swept their line. Captain Conyngham gives a graphic account of Judah's advance. He says that before Judah reached an open space which divided him from

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
Surely General Johnston must have been misinformed.

True, these heights were not within his continuous intrenched
line, but they were important outworks, eminently so, when we re-
alize that they so thoroughly endangered his railway communication
with Hesse's.

Before undertaking to detail the important part borne by General
Thomas in the battle of Hesse's, we will next follow the movements
of General Schofield's command. It was usually called the Army
of the Ohio when, as now, separated from its cavalry it had
but one army corps, the Twenty-third.

When Johnston, after his orders, was pushing straight for Hesse's
the two corps, the Twenty-third (Hooker) and Fourteenth (Pomeroy),
of Thomas's army, were to keep abreast of him on the left of him.
As soon as these two corps were in line the whole north and south
front of Johnston was covered. But Camp Creek the dividing line
between us and our foe, at Pomeroy's left, made an abrupt up-stream
bend towards the west, and the Confederate lines bent off in the
opposite direction towards the eastward. Schofield's column
swept in at this point. General Judah's division turning by a
sort of right wheel on a pivot at the bend, and the energetic Cox
division, trying to keep up the right wheel, swept off forward
while continually changing front to the right.

Judah's men came up boldly, but were exposed to a double fire;
every step forward brought them under the fire from Confederate
batteries in elevated salients, which swept their line. Captain
Gonyngam gives a graphic account of Judah's advance. He says
that before Judah reached an open space which divided him from




the enemy " his first line was broken and fell back on his second. This rallied under the fierce storm of shot and shell and advanced, but was also broken". Judah then retired to the woods in his rear. Conyngham further says, "I was then acting aide on General Judah's staff. My horse was lamed by a piece of rock, splintered by a round shell, striking him in the leg, and I was leading him to the rear when I met Major (now Colonel) Wherry of Schofield's staff". The two held here quite a parley. Wherry wanted to know where were Judah's other aides. The captain pointed them out near a sheltering rock. "He (Wherry) rode over to them; they refused to go in (that is, on to Judah's front), and he turned to me exclaiming, 'What will I do?' 'Well, major, my horse is lame; ^udismount an orderly, and I will go in'. . . I went in (under fire to Judah's lines), accompanied by the brave, dashing Major Wherry. We succeeded in reaching Judah's position between the contending batteries, though shot and shell were all the time plowing through the ranks and mowing down the columns and trees around us".

The gallant captain was hurt and stunned for a time in carrying Judah's orders, but succeeded ^{at} in last in leading up Hovey's division - that is, Schofield reserve-to Judah's relief and support. Meanwhile Cox's division, somehow separated in the woods from Judah's, met the enemy boldly on his own front, seized his intrenchments, as he says in his book, "driving the enemy from them at a charge after a fierce ~~charge~~ struggle".

By the help of other troops General Cox's division was enabled to, hold its ground. His soldiers did as McPherson's men did later at Atlanta, ^{aligned} alinged themselves on the ~~outside~~ outside of the enemy's trenches and sheltered their front by the small embankment till help came.

I remember that swinging movement of General Cox, for I had a



I remember that swaying movement of General Cox, for I had a
went all help come.
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
HEADQUARTERS DIVISION OF THE PACIFIC,

Presidio of San Francisco, Cal., March 11, 1887.

At the first Bull Run my brigade was detained for several hours within hearing of the battle field. On an order coming suddenly my command was hurried from behind a screen of thick trees out into the opening. The sound of the cannon, the crashing of the shells, the dusting here and there in the air and the great heat of the day affected me as never before. I experienced the same effect again at this point while holding from a high ground Genl Cox's & Genl Wood's divisions going into battle.

The noise was deafening
 the missiles carried the idea
 of extreme danger to all within
 their ranges. And the air around
 for the time twice heated.

The effect was like that of a startling
 panorama of which one forms
 a part. Of a sense of danger, deep
 and strong, relieved by a magnificent
 spectacle & the excitement of the
 contest. The oppression of
 rarefied air greatly heated relieved
 by a quickened brain and nerves
 wrought up to a steady tension,
 who can describe it? At any
 rate moments like those are
 extraordinary glimpses of an extraordinary
 world, which leave impressions
 of interest and memory not easily
 explained.



1850


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good place for observation. It was the first time that my attention had been especially called to this handsome, gallant officer and ableman. He was following his troops, and appeared full of spirit and energy as he rode past the group of officers who were with me. I was then watching to find where his lines would finally rest, so as to deploy and support his left. This part of our work was exciting, for the air was already full of bursting shells and other missiles of death.

hissing

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1000*

had been especially called to this handsome, gallant officer and
 the enemy are on our left.
 Good place for observation. It was the first time that my atten-



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11. Resaca.
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the great number of men.

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Article

No 17

See next No for Conclusion


Subject

The Georgia Campaign of 1864

III Reason

3,500 words

Estimated



Paris

Nov 17
see also the first volume

The People's Republic of China

to Paris

11. - RESACA.

At times during the war it was difficult for certain journals to keep their correspondents with the army. If anything improper or calculated to give undue information crept into print and into circulation, the commanding general held the newspaper man nearest at hand accountable. Often he was ^{persecuted} banished from the front, or so treated that he could not successfully report.


^{The difficulties were lessened.}
Latterly in the war, correspondents obtained positions as additional aides, or some enterprising junior staff-officer undertook to write regularly to a public journal, — thus doing double duty. For example Captain D. P. Conyngham, an Irish officer who published a book after the war, was in the Twenty-third Corps on General Judah's staff. He also corresponded regularly with the New York Herald. I mention him particularly because he was ^{has} present at the battle of Resaca, and gives ^{many} some characteristic pen-sketches of ~~some of the~~ prominent actors in that battle.

That General Sherman, who had often been misrepresented by correspondents, ^{and became impatient over it} was not at this time very friendly to ^{newspaper men} them appears in Conyngham's sketch of him. The evening of the 13th, of May, with but one staff-officer, General Sherman joined McPherson in Sugar Valley. Conyngham says, "He was anxious and nervous, as was evident from the fierce manner he pulled at his unlit cigar, and twitched that strange rough face of his ". In another place he says, "He has little reserve in concealing his opinions of other officers". He had worked hard all night after his arrival near Resaca. Sherman was then greatly disappointed. With his intense confidence in McPherson and his Army of the Tennessee, he had believed that Confederate Johnston's force would now be driven into a broken and disastrous retreat; but by McPherson's

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Later in the war, correspondents obtained positions as additional aides, or some entertaining junior staff-officer undertook to write regularly to a public journal, thus doing double duty. For example Captain H. P. Gonyngham, an Irish officer who published a book after the war, was in the Twenty-third Corps on General Sheridan's staff. He also corresponded regularly with the New York Herald. I mention him particularly because he was present at the battle of Resaca, and gives some characteristic pen sketches of some of the prominent actors in that battle.


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pulling back to Sugar Valley the whole programme was changed. Now a big battle must be fought against an intrenched position. I will give the scene just west of Resaca as the correspondent presents it. "Next day (the 14th, of May, 1864), wearied and sleepy, he sat on a log, beside a shady tree, to rest himself, and soon fell asleep. He had but a single orderly with him; some man in passing made an insinuating comment, for example, 'A pretty way we are commanded'. Sherman awakened by the noise of passing men overheard the remark: 'Stop, my man, . . . while you were sleeping last night I was planning for you, sir: and now I am taking a nap'".

A little later when several generals had gathered around him, he was told that Johnston had evacuated the Rocky Face Ridge and Dalton, and that Kilpatrick had been wounded. I had the night before brought the first item of this news, so that Sherman already knew it that Dalton had fallen. Now reflecting upon the situation at Resaca, he said, "Well, we must get them out of this too. McPherson, had you held this position when you first occupied it, they (the Confederates) would find themselves in a nice trap". "Yes, General", replied McPherson, "I found my flank exposed and open to them by good roads, whilst I had not a single road by which reinforcements could come up, if attacked; so I fell back to a stronger position". "Oh, pshaw!" said Sherman. "It can't be helped now, though."


General Thomas was with Sherman that morning. The lively Captain looked upon Thomas's sturdy face and wrote, "Major-General Thomas is quite the reverse of Sherman, both in manner and appearance. He is tall, stout, with brawny frame and shoulders. His head is slightly bent forward, as if drooping with care and thought". (This was temporary, for habitually Thomas's head was erect.)



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"His hair and beard, which he wears cut pretty short, are rather dark, and slightly sprinkled with gray. He is about fifty years of age and looks his age fully. . . As a general, Thomas is calm and cautious; does everything by rule; leaves nothing to chance. He makes his arrangements for a battle with caution and foresight, and is sure to have every column and division move with clock-work regularity, and strike at the proper time and place. Nothing disturbs or unnerves him".


I regard this as a fair picture of General Thomas as I saw him that morning when we were bringing our corps in-to position before Resaca, except the idea conveyed that he was a mere machine-man. His intellect was active enough while devising or planning, but firm and steady when a decision had been arrived at. He was ^{however,} ^{always} thoroughly subordinate. He earnestly seconded General Sherman in all his undertakings, whether just in accordance with his ^{own} judgment or not.

While these sketches were being offered and taken on a prominent point of observation between Resaca and Taylor's Ridge, the troops were struggling through the ravines and thickets into a position encircling Johnston's lines, lines which ^{before my arrival} were already firmly established.

Joseph E. Johnston speaking of Resaca says, "The two armies (Sherman's and his own) were formed in front of Resaca nearly at the same time; so that the Federal army could give battle on equal terms, except as to numbers, by attacking promptly, -the difference being about ten to four".

There is evidently a ^{large} mistake in this statement. In all Confederate writings this claim of disparity of numbers is noticeable ^{and difficult to be accounted for.}

General Polk had arrived, and the Confederate army at this




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
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
place ^{was} ~~is~~ admitted by Hood to have been then about seventy-five thousand, ~~and~~ General Sherman's force was at first ^{as we have seen} ninety-eight thousand seven hundred and ninety-seven; then ~~being~~ diminished by a thousand casualties at Rocky Face and vicinity, and increased by Stoneman's cavalry, which did not exceed four thousand, ^{we had} ~~giving~~ a new aggregate of about one hundred and one thousand seven hundred and ninety-seven. It is difficult to understand ^{ten to four or even} how Johnston can make it anywhere near ^{two to one} against him!

It is well, however, to remember, what we have before frequently noticed, that our opponents used the word "effectives", probably counting the actual number of men carrying rifles and carbines, plus the enlisted artillerymen actually with their guns; whereas our officers counted in all present for duty, officers and men, no matter how multitudinous and varied the ^{and details} duties might be. It is ~~therefore~~ ^{however we come to our estimates,} plain ^{actual} that the disparity between the armies was not very great at the battle of Resaca. We could not possibly put into line of battle, counting actual fighting elements, more than four men to Johnston's three.

With regard to "attacking promptly", that is easily said; but to attack at once on arrival at a new place ^{with which no officers are familiar} is seldom practicable. To do so it should require an immediate and thorough knowledge of ^{as well as of the approaches} the strength and position of your opposing forces. On the 14th, of May, 1864, Polk with the new corps had already come up from below and formed to the right of the two Confederate brigades which had been for some time at Resaca, and completely intrenched. For the defensive, in two hours' time that new line could have been extended to the Connasauga, making a beautiful front from the Oostanaula along behind Camp Creek. For defense, the position between these three streams - from the rugged nature of the ground,



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the materials at hand for ^aobstructions, and the grand ^{making}places for ^{positions} locating all ^{of}his artillery - was to the Confederate commander as good as the Fredericksburg Heights to Lee.


Next to Polk's ~~corps~~ ^{corps} came Hardee's, and on Hardee's right the corps of Hood, which was faced west and north, near Huey's house, ^{drawn up} in a strong double line. Hood covered the railway and effectually closed every other ^{possible} approach from that quarter.

Johnston line was now three miles in extent, and curved something like ours at Gettysburg - ^{more} in the shape of a horseshoe, ^{than a fish-hook} so that it was easily reinforced from one part to another and from its reserves. As always in this campaign, this Confederate army was promptly marched into position and ^{without delay} thoroughly intrenched.

On the other hand, our forces approaching Resaca through the Gap on the one side, and from Dalton on the other, ^{to work slowly & carefully} had to feel for the enemy's picket lines and for each other in that blind, rough,

broken, wild, tangled, unknown region. It was near twelve o'clock of the 14th, of May, before we had formed solid junction, ^{with each other} and ^{after that} the lines had to be changed ^{while} we worried forward through troublesome ravines, wooded valleys, hills obstructed by crags, steep rocks, old logs, and underbrush. Sometimes long gaps between brigades troubled the division commanders; and sometimes an astonishing overlapping of forces displaced regiments as they were advanced.

The 14th, then, was mainly spent in placing McPherson on our right near the Oostanaula, Schofield next, and Thomas on the left. My corps, the Fourth, belonging to Thomas, reached the railroad and formed the ^{outer} flank, Sherman's extreme left, and was faced against the strong position of Hood. As the Conasauga ^{beyond Hood} bended off far to the east, ^{it} was quite impossible for my left regiments to reach that river, so that I was again forced to have the left



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
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of my line "in the air". But Stanley's excellent division stationed there, by refusing (drawing back) its left brigade and nicely posting its artillery, formed as good an artificial obstacle against Hood as was possible.

Let us now go to Sherman's southernmost troops, and for a time confine our attention to the operations of the Army of the Tennessee.

The commander

It will be remembered that General McPherson, ~~its commander~~, fell near Atlanta, before the end of this campaign, so that, ~~being~~ ^{as it was} his successor, his dispatches and records ^{naturally} fell to me. In making up my ~~report~~ ^{statement}, I said for the 9th, of May, "The command on the lead (General Dodge's Sixteenth Corps) pushed on, the cavalry in advance, till within about eight and a-half miles of the town

(Resaca), when Kilpatrick encountered considerable infantry force, in charging which he was wounded and obliged to leave the field".

The ~~date~~ ^{date} was an error. This wounding occurred in the manner and at the place described, but near noon ^{on} ~~of~~ ^{of May} the 12th, instead of the 9th of May.

^{some time before transferred to the West} Kilpatrick sustained his usual reputation for boldness and activity in scouting, and for success in promptly clearing away the


enemy's outposts. ~~This~~ ^{his} wound, ~~though severe~~, did not long detain him from the field. ^{He was too ambitious to stay ~~in~~ ^{long} there near.}

The forward movement from the Snake Creek Gap was taken up and completed ^{during} ~~on~~ the 13th, of May. One Corps, Logan's Fifteenth, was


deployed, and General Veatch's division, of the Sixteenth, brought ^{to its} up in support. The resistance of the enemy's skirmishers became

greater and greater as Logan's lines neared Camp Creek and Resaca. Coming to ^{by the} ~~an open~~ ^{a tree-less} field, he discovered beyond the ~~field~~ ^{open stretch} a north

and south ridge ~~of land~~ not more than a thousand yards distant. This ~~ridge~~ ^{high land} was ^{already} occupied by Confederate artillery, and ~~supported~~ ^{held}



of my line in the air. But Stanley's excellent division
stationed there, by refusing (drawing back) its left brigade and
nicely posting its artillery, formed an good an artificial obas-
cle against Hood as was possible.
Let us now go to Sherman's southernmost troops, and for a time
confine our attention to the operations of the Army of the Tennes-
see.
It will be remembered that General Johnson, in command, fell
near Atlanta, before the end of this campaign, so that being his
successor, his dispatches and records fell to me. In making up
my report, I said for the 30th of May, "The command on the lead-
(General Logan's Sixteenth Corps) pushed on, the cavalry in ad-
vance, still within about eight and a-half miles of the town
(Roscoe), when Ripstick encountered considerable infantry forces,
in charging which he was wounded and obliged to leave the field.
The date was an error. This wording occurred in the report and
at the place described, but near noon of the 18th, instead of the
30th of May.
Ripstick sustained his usual reputation for boldness and activ-
ity in scouting, and for success in promptly clearing away the
enemy's outposts. This wound, though severe, did not long detain
him from the field.
The forward movement from the Snake Creek Gap was taken up and
completed on the 18th of May. One Corps, Logan's Fifteenth, was
deployed, and General Vestal's division, of the Sixteenth, brought
up in support. The resistance of the enemy's skirmishers became
greater and greater as Logan's lines moved up Creek and Roscoe.
Coming to an open field, he discovered beyond the field a north
and south ridge of land not more than a thousand yards distant.
This ridge was occupied by Confederate artillery, and supported



by Confederate infantry, moderately intrenched. Quickly Logan ^{taking in the situation} had a battery well placed and put into action, and in a ^{brief} ~~short~~

time succeeded in silencing the opposing cannon; then his brave men, in line, sprang forward ^{determined} to clear the ridge and possess it.

^{In that neighborhood} ~~At this point~~, crossing the Resaca wagon-road, General Logan's

entire corps took permanent position; and one division of the Sixteenth, under ^{the} brave General Dodge, formed line on its right,

and the whole front was speedily covered ^{with} breast-works and ditches. ^{the town} Resaca was now in plain sight; ^{and} ~~so that the town~~ ^{buildings} and the

railway bridge ~~near it~~ were exposed to Logan's ^{ceaseless} ~~perpetual~~ artillery firing.

^{after his arrival}

~~General~~ Sherman had instructed McPherson, just before the remainder of the army joined him, to work towards his left and forward, and make an effort to seize ^{Golubev's line} ~~the~~ railroad north of Resaca.

To this end, during the 14th, of May, several ^{live} demonstrations were made by McPherson's Army ~~of the Tennessee~~ to carry out Sherman's instructions, or at least ^{so much of them as would} ~~to~~ keep Confederate Polk's men so busy

that they could not reinforce Hardee and Hood farther north. ^{There} ~~where, judging~~ ^{should we judge}

by the sound, hard fighting was going on against Thomas and Schofield. ^{Logan, writing of this affair} ~~Logan~~ says: "General Osterhaus (one of his


division commanders) took advantage of the feints to attack the enemy's skirmishers in the heavily-wooded valley near the road.

This was done in the most gallant manner. The bridge over Camp Creek (the stream which separated us from the enemy) was carried,


and the Twelfth Missouri Infantry thrown forward into the woods previously occupied by the enemy, thus forming a living tete-de-

pont, which (operation), in the ensuing movements, proved of great value. From this bridge-head the Fifteenth Corps, sup-

ported by the Sixteenth, both belonging to McPherson's command, made a further move, driving in Polk's advance from the high



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had a battery well placed and put into action, and in a short
time succeeded in silencing the opposing cannon; then his brave
men, in line, sprang forward to clear the ridge and possess it.
At this point, crossing the breast wagon-road, General Logan's
entire corps took permanent position; and one division of the
Sixteenth, under brave General Hodge, formed line on its right,
and the whole front was speedily covered by breast-works and
ditches. Logan was now in plain sight, so that the gun and the
railway bridge had been exposed to Logan's persistent artillery
firing.
General Sherman had instructed Heth, just before the remain-
der of the army joined him, to work towards his left and forward,
and make an effort to seize the railroad north of Hanes.
To this end, during the last of May, several demonstrations were
made by Heth's Army of the Tennessee to carry out Sherman's
instructions, or at least to keep Confederate Polk's men so busy
that they could not reinforce Hanes and Hood further north.
where, judging by the sound, hard fighting was going on against
Thomas and Schenck. Logan saw General Osterhaus (one of his
division commanders) took advantage of the chance to attack the
enemy's position in the heavily-wooded valley near the road.
This was done in the most gallant manner. The bridge over Camp
Creek (the stream which separated us from the enemy) was carried,
and the Twelfth Missouri Infantry thrown forward into the woods
previously occupied by the enemy, thus forming a living bridge-
road, which (operation), in the ensuing movements, proved of
great value. From this bridge-head the Fifteenth Corps, sup-
ported by the Sixteenth, both belonging to Heth's command,
made a further move, driving in Polk's advance from the high



ground east of Camp Creek. The brigades most hotly engaged were those of Generals Charles R. Wood^s and Giles A. Smith.

The new position ^{beyond the bridge} was taken by them. It was most important, ^{and if for,} ~~and~~ ^{the enemy so believed} ~~and~~ ^{kept} ~~and~~ ^{against} ~~and~~ ^{thus} coveted

Polk hotly contested the ground; yet McPherson's men ^{held it} ~~under~~ ^{against} a hot fire, while their pioneers ^{were bringing up} brought up the intrenching tools.

^{which they} ~~which they~~ ^{Assisted} by many willing hands ^{from} in the infantry line, ^{those implements were} used so effectively that in a short time every exposed place was under the ^{shelter} ~~cover~~ of fair intrenchments.

In the early evening, about 7.30, the Confederates made an organized and vigorous assault upon this new line, but they were quickly repulsed. In anticipation of this ^{sweeping entertainment} ~~assaulting business~~, Light-

burn's ~~brigade~~ had been sent to the right of Giles A. Smith's brigade, and other troops ^{new} ^{help} ^{troops} to the ~~support~~ of the ~~brigade~~ of General Charles R. Woods.


These troops were in time to participate in the ^{action} ~~repulse~~ already ^{himself} ~~described~~, and Lightburn, for his promptitude and energy, ^{odd} ^{reported} received high commendation. A hundred prisoners were taken and some thirteen hundred Confederates were killed and wounded on that front

in the skirmishes and in ^{the} ^{of} ~~the~~ combat. The importance of McPherson's capture of the heights ^{as they were} ~~referred to~~, situated between Camp Creek and the Oostanaula, cannot be doubted, for the high ground ^{for confederate transit} spoiled both the railway and the wagon-road bridges, and caused

the Confederates to lay a new bridge of boats farther up the river. ^{to our surprise remarks:}

On this point, General Johnston ~~says~~, "General Sherman was misinformed as to the taking of an important ridge by the advance of McPherson's whole line, and bloody repulses of Confederate attempts to retake it (this on the 15th); there was no such occurrence. But on the 14th, about dusk, the left of our line of skirmishers - forty or fifty men - was driven from a slight

Handwritten annotations:
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thus coveted
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ground east of Camp Creek. The brigades most heavily engaged were

those of General Charles E. Wood's and Giles A. Smith.

The new position was taken by them. It was most important, and

well held by them; yet Matheron's men held it under

a hot fire, while their pioneers brought up the increasing force.

which they, assisted by many willing hands in the infantry line,

used so effectively that in a short time every exposed place

was under the cover of fair instruments.

In the early evening, about 7.30, the Confederates made an organ-

ized and vigorous assault upon this new line, but they were quick-

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burn's brigade had been sent to the right of Giles A. Smith's bri-

gade, and other troops to the support of the brigade of General

Charles E. Wood.

These troops were in time to participate in the repulse already

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high commendation. A hundred prisoners were taken and some thirty

seven hundred Confederates were killed and wounded on that front.

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
tened as to the taking of an important ridge by the advance of

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tempt to retake it (this on the 18th); there was no such occur-

rence. But on the 18th, about dusk, the left of our line of

skirmishers - forty or fifty men - was driven from a slight



elevation in front of our left, but no attempt was made to retake it". General Johnston was certainly mistaken, for there is no conflict in the reports. The number of the prisoners taken by McPherson, and the number of killed and wounded on his front, are too specific to make an error probable.

Besides the official reports, I have ^{testimony of a} ~~the~~ reliable correspondent of the New York Herald, who was present. He [^] ~~writes~~ ^{wrote} respecting McPherson's movement of the 14th: ^{ce} "He (McPherson) had thrown Logan's Corps across the creek and occupied the heights on the east bank of the stream overlooking the town.


This movement had not been accomplished without hard fighting. The rebel batteries along the heights poured a dreadful storm of shot and shell upon Logan's advance. McPherson, in order to neutralize this, had placed batteries on the heights on the west bank of the stream, annoying the rebel batteries and thus giving a chance to Logan to charge across the stream and take possession of the ridge of hills commanding the rebel position around Resaca."

Surely ~~General~~ [^] Johnston must have been misinformed. [^] ~~not Sherman~~

True, these heights were not within ^{Johnston's} ~~the~~ continuous intrenched line, but they were important outworks, eminently so, when we [^] ~~noticed~~ ^{came} ~~that~~ ^{wounded} ~~we~~ ^{in our possession} notice that they so thoroughly endangered his railway communication with Resaca.

Before undertaking to detail the important part borne by General ^{Geo. H} Thomas in the battle of Resaca, we will next follow the movements of General Schofield [^] ~~command~~. ^{he being next in location. His} ~~It~~ was usually called the "Army of the Ohio", but when, as now, separated from its cavalry it

had but one army corps, the Twenty-third. [^] ~~When~~ ^{after his first backward movement} ~~McPherson~~ [^] ~~was~~ ^{pushing} ~~pushing~~ ^{again} straight for Resaca, the two Corps, the Twentieth (Hooker) and Fourteenth (Palmer), of Thomas's army, were to keep abreast of him [^] on his left.



elevation in front of our left, but no attempt was made to retake
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Mobern, and the number of killed and wounded on his front, are
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
Handwritten: *Johnston's army*
Besides the official reports, I have the reliable correspondence
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Mobern's movement of the 10th: "He (Mobern) had thrown
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east bank of the stream overlooking the town."

This movement had not been accomplished without hard fighting.
The rebel batteries along the heights poured a deadly stream of
shot and shell upon Jogan's advance. Mobern, in order to
neutralize this, had placed batteries on the heights on the west
bank of the stream, among the rebel batteries and thus giving
a chance to Jogan to charge across the stream and take possession

of the ridge of hills commanding the rebel position around Hesse's.
Handwritten: *Johnston must have been mistaken.*
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of General Schofield's command. It was usually called the "Army
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Handwritten: *Johnston's army*
had but one army corps, the Twenty-third.
Then Mobern under his orders, was pushing straight for Hesse's,
the two corps, the Twentieth (Hooker) and Fourteenth (Palmer),
of Thomas's army, were to keep abreast of him on his left.



McPherson

As soon as these two corps were in line the whole north and south front of Johnston was covered. But Camp Creek, the dividing ~~line~~ stream between us and our foe, ^{near} Palmer's left, made an abrupt up-stream bend towards the west, and the Confederate lines bent off in the opposite direction towards the Oostanaula. ^{Troops, as I saw them in motion,} Schofield's ~~columns~~


hastened

^{hastened} swept in at this point, General Judah's division turning by a sort of right wheel on a pivot at the bend, and the energetic Cox's division, trying to keep up the right wheel, swept off leftward while continually changing front to the right.


Judah's men came up boldly, but were exposed to a double fire; every step forward brought them under the ~~fire~~ Confederate batteries ^{situated} in elevated salients, ^{GR was worse & worse for Judah as he pushed forward.} which swept their line. Captain Conyngham gives a graphic account of Judah's advance.

He says that before Judah reached an open space which divided him from the enemy "his first line was broken and fell back on his second. This rallied under the fierce storm of shot and shell and advanced, but was also broken". Judah then retired to the woods in his rear. Conyngham further says, "I was then acting aide on General Judah's staff. My horse was lamed by a piece of rock, splintered by a round shot, striking him in the leg, and I was leading him to the rear when I met Major(now Colonel)Wherry of Schofield's staff." The two held here quite a parley.

Wherry wanted to know where were Judah's other aides. The captain pointed them out near a sheltering rock. "He(Wherry)rode over to them; they refused to go in (that is, on to Judah's front), and he turned to me exclaiming, 'What will I do'? 'Well, major, my horse is lame; dismount an orderly, and I will go in'. . . I went in ^{that is up} (under fire to Judah's lines), accompanied by the brave, dashing Major Wherry. We succeeded in reaching Judah's position



As soon as these two corps were in line the whole north and south
front of Johnson was covered. But Camp Creek, the dividing line
between us and our foe, at Palmer's left, made an abrupt up-stream
bend towards the west, and the Confederate lines bent off in the
opposite direction towards the Germanias. Schofield's column
swept in at this point, General Judah's division turning by a
rest of right wheel on a pivot at the bend, and the energetic
Gen's division, trying to keep up the right wheel, swept off
leftward while continually changing front to the right.
Judah's men came up boldly, but were exposed to a double fire;
every step forward brought them under the fire from Confederate
batteries in elevated positions, which swept their line.
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from the enemy his first line was broken and fell back on his
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and advanced, but was also broken. Judah then retired to the
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also on General Judah's staff. My horse was lamed by a piece of
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11

between the contending batteries, though shot and shell were all the time plowing the ranks and mowing down the columns and trees around us". The gallant captain was hurt and stunned for a time in carrying Judah's orders, but succeeded at last in leading up Hovey's division - that is, Schofield's reserve - to Judah's relief and support. Meanwhile Cox's division, somehow separated in the woods from Judah's, met the enemy boldly on his front, seized his intrenchments, as he says in his book, "driving the enemy from them at a charge after a fierce struggle".

By the help of other troops General Cox's division was enabled to hold its ground. His soldiers ^{acted} ~~did~~ as McPherson's ^{did} ~~did~~ later at Atlanta, aligned themselves on the outside of the enemy's trenches and sheltered their front by the small embankment till help came.

I remember that swinging movement of General Cox, for I had a good place for observation. It was the first time that my attention had been especially called to this handsome, ^{young} gallant officer and able man. He was following his troops, and appeared full of spirit and energy as he rode past the group of officers who were with me. I was then watching ^{the movement so as} to find where his lines would finally rest, ^{and in order} ~~so as~~ to deploy and support his left. This part of our work was exciting, for the air was already full of bursting shells and other hissing missiles of death.

At the first Bull Run my brigade was detained for several hours within hearing of the battle field. On an order coming suddenly my command was hurried from behind a screen of thick trees out into the opening. The sound of the cannon, the screeching of the shells, bursting here and there in the air and the great heat of the day ^{then} effected me as never before. I experienced the same effect again ^{here at Resaca} ~~at this point~~ while beholding from a high ground

between the contending batteries, though shot and shell were all
the time blowing the ranks and moving down the columns and trees
around us. The gallant captain was hurt and returned for a time
in carrying Joubert's orders, but succeeded at last in leading up
Hovey's division - that is, Schell's division - to Joubert's re-
lent and support. Meanwhile Cox's division, somewhat separated in
the woods from Joubert's, met the enemy boldly on his front, seized
his instruments, as he says in his book, "driving the enemy
from them at a charge after a fierce struggle".
By the help of other troops General Cox's division was enabled
to hold its ground. His soldiers did as Johnson's did later
at Atlanta, aimed themselves on the outside of the enemy's
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I remember that evening movement of General Cox, for I had a
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and able man. He was following his troops, and appeared full of
spirit and energy as he rode past the group of officers who were
with me. I was then watching to find where his lines would
finally rest, so as to deploy and support his left. This part
of our work was exciting, for the air was already full of burst-
ing shells and other blasting missiles of death.
At the first fall of my brigade was detained for several hours
within hearing of the battle field. On an order coming suddenly
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effect again at this point while beholding from a high ground



General Cox's and General Wood's divisions going into battle.

The noise was deafening, the missiles carried the idea of extreme

danger to all within range; and the air appeared for the time

as if doubly
~~twice~~ heated.

Somewhat

The effect was like that of a startling panorama of which one

forms a part; Of a sense of danger, deep and strong, relieved

by a magnificent spectacle and the excitements of the contest.

The oppression of rarefied air greatly heated ~~relieved~~ by a

quickerened brain and nerves wrought up to a steady tension!

Who can describe it? At any rate moments like those ~~afford~~ *afford unusual*

~~ordinary~~ glimpses of an extraordinary world which leave impres-

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11. P. B. B. B.
Prof. B. B. B.

