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written for
Barbara Harris
of the Pan

Subbies

The struggle for Alaska
THE CONFEDERATE STRENGTH IN THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN.

By E. G. DAWES, Late Major, 93RD OHIO REGIMENT.

In the foregoing paper [see p. 260] General Joseph E. Johnston asserts that on the 29th of April, 1864, the strength of the Confederate army was "37,653 infantry, 2812 artillery with 112 guns, and 2592 cavalry." In all, 42,856. But the return of that army for April 30th, 1864, on file in the War Department, signed by General Johnston and attested by his adjutant-general, shows its "present for duty" almost 53,000:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Infantry</th>
<th>43,379</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cavalry</td>
<td>8,655</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery, 114 pieces</td>
<td>2,677</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The difference between these figures and those given by General Johnston from the same return is that in his paper he gives the feelings of the column of "effective total." This, in all Confederate returns, includes onlyergeants, corporals, and private soldiers "for duty, equipped." But the cavalry of the effective total of 2592 with 8456 officers and men for duty is accounted for by the fact that a large number of horses were grazing in the rear because of the scarcity of forage at Dalton. They were brought to the front and the men became effective when Sherman's army began to advance. General Johnston's statement that his artillery comprised 112 pieces is a manifest error, for the return plainly says 35 companies, 114 pieces.

The battle of Resaca was fought on the 12th, 14th, and 15th of May. Prior to that time the Confederate army was reinforced by General Morgan's brigade of four Georgia regiments, which had been on garrison duty on the Atlantic coast. A foot-note to the return of April 30th records that one of these regiments, the 83rd Georgia, joined the army "since the report was made out," and that its effective total was 814. All of these regiments had full ranks; 2500 is a low estimate of their line-of-battle strength. Cantey's division, two brigades of infantry and two batteries, 5300 for duty, came from Mobile about the 7th of May and was stationed at Resaca. Loring's division, three infantry brigades and two batteries, from General S. D. Lee's command, with 5145 for duty and a detachment of 575 from Lee's division, reached Resaca May 10th, 11th, and 12th. Meantime a regiment of the Georgia State line, estimated at six hundred strong, had been added to Hood's corps.

At Resaca General Johnston had at least 67,000 men for battle and 168 pieces of artillery. General Sherman had at most 104,000; the odds against General Johnston when "the armies were actually in contact" were as 100 to 64, instead of "10 to 1," as stated in his article. On the night of May 11th the Confederate army evacuated Resaca. On the following day, at Adairsville, it was reinforced by General W. H. Jackson's cavalry command, 4477 for duty, which was increased to 5120 by June 10th. On the 10th of May, at Cassville, the division of General French joined the army with 4174 effective, exclusive of the detachment that was at Resaca. Another Georgia State line regiment, estimated at 600, was added to Hood's corps, and Quarries' brigade, 2200 strong, came on the 26th of May at New Hope Church. A comparison of the return of April 30th with that of June 10th shows an increase in the fighting strength of the army of 3350 from the return of men "absent with leave" in the corps of Hood, Hardee, Wheeler, and in the artillery. The return of May 20th is missing, but that of June 10th shows an increase since May 20th of 649 "returned from desertion" and 799 "joined by enlistment." General Johnston has to account, between April 30th and June 10th, for at least the following men available for battle:

- Present for duty at Dalton: May 10th, 39,995
- Mercer's brigade: May 10th, 5,506
- Cantey's division: May 10th, 5,888
- Loring's division: May 10th, 5,055
- French's detachment: May 10th, 556
- French's division: May 10th, 4,771
- Jackson's cavalry: May 10th, 4,477
- Jackson's cavalry increase before June 10th: 325
- Georgia State line: May 10th, 1,200
- Two regiments Georgia State line: May 10th, 1,200
- Recruits: 799
- Returned deserters: 264

All these figures are official except for Mercer's brigade and the two regiments of the Georgia State line.

For Cantey's strength, see General D. H. Munsey's return April 29th, 364. For Loring's strength, see General S. D. Lee's return May 29th, 364. For French's detachment, see General French's report of "effective when joined." E. C. D.

For the strength of Sherman's army at Resaca, add 2500 for cavalry joined between May 1st and 10th to his strength. May 1st, of 85,735. E. C. D.
The difference of over 13,000 is accounted for by losses in battle, desertion, and increase in absent sick. The incomplete return of Medical Director Board shows killed and wounded, May 7th to 20th, inclusive, 3384. The return of June includes 1765 killed in battle and May 20th, indicating fully 6000 wounded. The same return shows 509 deserters. The 1542 prisoners captured from Hood and Hardee, shown by inspection of absent without leave in their corps, account for the remainder, without examining the returns of Polk’s corps and the cavalry.

General Johnston’s returns reached its maximum strength on the New Hope Church line, where he must have had 75,000 for battle when the armies faced each other May 27th. General Sherman’s army, there numbered, of all arms for duty, 95,000 men, and several brigades of this force were employed in guarding trains and watching roads in all directions, so Sherman’s army had no rear. Odds of less than five to four against him is “the great inequality of force” which General Johnston complains compelled him “to employ dismounted cavalry” in holding this line.

In a footnote [p. 374] General Johnston says:

“I have two reports of the strength of the army besides that of April 29th, already given: 1. Of July 1st, 28,730 infantry, 5,155 artillery, and 14,640 cavalry, total, 44,525. 2. Of July 30th, 36,000 infantry, 3755 artillery, and 14,200 cavalry, total, 54,955.”

The report of July 31st shows “present for duty,” all arms, officers and men, 64,578, instead of 54,007. (As in case of the return of April 29th, General Johnston gives only the “effective total.”) The loss since June 10th is accounted for by 1114 dead, 711 deserters, 10,422 increase in absent without leave (prisoners), and 3691 in increase of absent sick and wounded. None of the returns of this army, either under Johnston or Hood, makes any account of the Georgia militia, a division of which under G. W. Smith joined the army about June 20th near Kennesaw, making its available force on that line nearly 70,000 men. [G. W. Smith, p. 231, says the militia were 2000, which would reduce Major Davidson’s total to about 68,000.—Editors.] The return of July 10th gives the present for duty 69,032, instead of 50,926, the loss since July 1st being 1577 deserters, 526 dead, two regiments sent to Savannah, and prisoners and wounded. This with the Georgia militia (increased to about 9000) [G. W. Smith says 8000.—Editors] when the army reached Atlanta, represents the force turned over to Hood, July 1st, viz.:”

- Infantry.............................................. 42,321
- Cavalry........................................... 13,326
- Artillery, 14 pieces............................... 4,344
- Muskets (probable).............................. 5,000

General Johnston asserts that the only affair worth mentioning on his left at Roswell was near the night of May 14th, when “forty or fifty skirmishers in front of our extreme left were driven from the slight elevation they occupied, but no attempt was made to retake it.” In his official report, made in October, 1864, he says that at 9 o’clock at night of May 14th he “learned that Lieutenant-General Polk’s troops had lost a position commanding our bridges.” Comment upon the garrisoned position that would have a position commanding the line of retreat of an army in charge of forty or fifty skirmishers within gunshot of a powerful enemy is unnecessary, for it was not done. The position was held by a line of men. It was carried on the evening of May 14th by gallant charge of two brigades of the Fifteenth Corps of the Union army. Reinforced by another brigade, they held it against the repeated and desperate efforts of Polk’s men to retake it. The battle lasted far into the night. General John A. Logan, in his official report, says that when at 10 o’clock at night “the last body of the enemy retired broken and disheartened from the field, it was evident in the measured comprehension among the rebels that the men who double-quicked across to their hills that afternoon had come to stay.” General Logan also says that by the capture of this position “the railroad bridge and the town were held entirely in our mercy.”

The Fifteenth Corps lost 628 killed and wounded at Roswell. The troops in its front, Lees’s and Canby’s divisions and Vaughn’s brigade, according to their incomplete official reports, lost 698. Much the greater part of this loss must have been on the evening of May 14th, for there was no other line-of-battle engagement on this part of the field.

General Johnston characterizes the battle of May 28th at Dallas as “a very small affair,” in which the Confederates lost about three hundred men and the Union troops must have lost more than ten times as many. This was an assault made upon troops of the Fifteenth Corps by two brigades of Smith’s Confederate division and Armstrong’s brigade of Jackson’s cavalry commanded, supported by Smith’s brigade of Bate’s division and Ferguson’s and Ross’s brigades of Jackson’s cavalry. Lees’s Kentucky brigade attacked the front of Osterhaus’s division without success. Bullock’s Florida brigade charged along the Marietta road and was driven back, with heavy loss, by the fire of the 534 Ohio regiment. Armstrong
THE CONFEDERATE STRENGTH IN THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN. 283

announced the position held by Waite's brigade across the Villa Rica road and met a bloody repulse. General Bate officially reported the loss in his division as 360. General Waite in his official report says that 244 dead and wounded rebels were found in his front, and many were doubtless removed. The Confederate loss in this "very small affair" was, therefore, over seven hundred. The loss of the Fifteenth Corps was 370, or about one-half the Confederate loss, instead of "more than ten times as many."

General Johnston assumes that General Sherman used his entire army in the assault of Kennesaw Mountain, when, in fact, he employed less than 13,000 men. The remainder of the army was not engaged, except in the continuous battle of the skirmish-line. The assaulting column of the Army of the Cumberland, directed against Hardee's corps, was composed of five brigades, about nine thousand strong. The formation was such that each brigade presented a front of but two companies. The leading regiments lost very heavily; those in the rear suffered few casualties. General Thomas reported the entire loss as 1580. The attack of the Army of the Tennessee was made upon the Confederate intrenchments held by French's division and a part of Walker's, by three brigades of the Fifteenth Corps, numbering 5500 men. Their formation was in two lines; their total loss 862, three-fourths of this falling on the regiments in the first line.

General Johnston expresses the belief that Northern soldiers could not be repulsed with casualties so small as reported at Kennesaw. In this he, unwittingly perhaps, compliments Sherman's army at the expense of his own. On the 22d of June, five days before the battle of Kennesaw, he tells us that the divisions of Stevenson and Hixman were repulsed, in an assault on the Union line, with a loss of one thousand men. These divisions, June 10th, numbered over eleven thousand for duty. Their loss, therefore, was but nine per cent., while that of the troops of the Army of the Cumberland engaged at Kennesaw was 17 per cent.; of the Army of the Tennessee, 11 per cent.

In both cases the loss sustained was sufficient to demonstrate the futility of further effort. In neither case was it a fair test of the staying qualities of the troops, who on many fields had shown their willingness to shed any amount of blood necessary when there was reasonable hope of success.

CINCINNATI, September 8th, 1887.

CONFEDERATE DEFENSES AT THE BRIDGE OVER THE BROWNL. FROM A WARTIME PHOTOGRAPH.
THE OPPOSING FORCES IN THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN.

May 3d—September 8th, 1864.

THE UNION ARMY.

Major-General William T. Sherman.


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THE OPPOSING FORCES IN THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN.


THE OPPOSING FORCES IN THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN.


THE OPPOSING FORCES IN THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN.

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Effective Strength of the Union Army.

ARMY OF TENNESSEE, General John J. Johnston, General John B. Hood.

EXECD. Capt. W. C. Barks.


THE CONFEDERATE ARMY.


2 In command of his own and Lee's corps August 11th-September 24th.
THE OPPOSING FORCES IN THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN.


5th Tenn., Capt. F. A. Sanders.


Stevens' Brigade went to Route's division, and Mercer's bri- gate to Stevens's division.

1 Broken up in July and reorganized and assigned to other bri- gades.

2 Discontinued July 24th, Jackson's brigade being consolidated with Olmsted's, and transferred to Chaffin's division;
THE OPPOSING FORCES IN THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN.

Bragg's Division, Maj.-Gen. M. A. Stevenson.


Evans' Division, Maj.-Gen. C. L. Stevenson.


Steward's Division, Maj.-Gen. Alexander P. Stewart.

Steward's Brigade, Brig.-Gen. H. D. Clayton.


Hudson's Division, Maj.-Gen. W. Y. Hardee.

THE OPPOSING FORCES IN THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN.


TRENCH’S DIVISION, Maj.-Gen. Samuel G. French:


CAYALBREY DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. W. H. Jackson:


FIRST DIVISION, Gen. JUBALEA MILITIA, Maj.-Gen. James C. Carlton (who has employed the following paragraph):


Lothers. According to the report of Medical Director A. J. Paun (see Johnston’s “Normative”, 1893, p. 492–493), the losses of the Confederate Army in the Atlanta campaign amounted to 1,110 killed, 13,332 wounded, 21,500. The prisoners including those captured by the Union Army (see Sherman’s “Memoirs” Vol. II, p. 148), numbered 12,000, which gives a total loss of 34,500, the Confederate losses at about 40,500, and the Union loss at about 20,000.

For statements relative to the strength of the Confederates during the Atlanta campaign see General Johnston’s paper, p. 360, and Major E. C. Dawson’s comments, p. 365.

* Tentharmy attacked July 28. *
THE STRUGGLE FOR ATLANTA.

BY OLIVER O. HOWARD, MAJOR-GENERAL, U. S. A.

THE forces under General Grant after his appointment as general-in-chief were, the Army of the Potomac, under Meade; that of the Ohio, near Knoxville, under Schofield; that of the Cumberland, under Thomas; near Chattanooga; that of the Tennessee, under McPherson, scattered from Huntsville, Alabama, to the Mississippi; that of the Gulf, under Banks, in Louisiana; besides subordinate detachments, under Steele and others, in Arkansas and farther west.

Grant took the whole field into his thought. He made three parts to the long, irregular line of armies, which extended from Virginia to Texas. He gave to Banks the main work in the south-west; to Sherman the middle part, covering the hosts of McPherson, Thomas, Schofield, and Steele; and reserved to himself the remainder. The numbers were known, at least on paper; the plan, promptly adopted, was simple and comprehensive: To break and keep broken the connecting links of the enemy’s opposing armies, beat them one by one, and unite for a final consumption. Sherman’s part was plain. Grant’s plan, flexible enough to embrace his own, afforded Sherman “infinite satisfaction.” It looked like “enlightened war.” He rejoiced at “this verging to a common center.” “Like yourself,” he writes to Grant, “you take the biggest load, and from me you shall have thorough and hearty cooperation.”

Sherman made his calculations so as to protect most faithfully our line of supply which ran through Louisville, Nashville, and Chattanooga, guarding it against enemies within and without his boundaries, and against accidents. He segregated the men of all arms for this protection. Block-houses and intrenchments were put at bridges and tunnels along the railway. Loco-
motives and freight cars were gathered in, and a most energetic force of skilled railroad men was put at work or held in reserve under capable chiefs.

Besides an equal number of guards of his large depots and long line of supply, Sherman had an effective field force of 100,000—50,000 with Thomas, 35,000 with McPherson, 15,000 with Schofield.

Sherman was gratified at the number of his force; for two years before, he had been held up as worthy of special distrust because he had declared to Secretary Cameron that before they were done with offensive operations on the line from the Big Sandy to Paducah, 200,000 men would be required.

A few changes of organization were made. Slocum's corps, the Twelfth, and mine, the Eleventh, were consolidated, making a new Twentieth, and Hooker was assigned to its command. I went at once to London, east Tennessee, to take the Fourth Corps and relieve General Gordon Granger, to enable him to have a leave of absence. Slocum was sent to Vicksburg, Mississippi, to watch the great river from that quarter; while Hooker, Palmer, and myself, under Thomas, were to control the infantry and artillery of the Army of the Cumberland. In a few days I moved Wagner's (afterward Newton's) division and T. J. Wood's of my new corps to Cleveland, east Tennessee. Rations, clothing, transportation, and ammunition came pouring in with sufficient abundance, so that when orders arrived for the next movement, on the 3d of May, 1864, my division commanders, Stanley, Newton, and Wood, reported everything ready. This very day Schofield's column, coming from Knoxville, made its appearance at Cleveland. There was now the thrill of preparation, a new life everywhere. Soldiers and civilians alike caught the inspiration.

Ringgold and Catoosa Springs, Georgia, were the points of concentration for Thomas's three corps. We of his army were all in that neighborhood by the 9th of May. It took till the 7th for McPherson to get into Villanow, a few miles to the south of us. Schofield meanwhile worked steadily southward from Cleveland, east Tennessee, through Red Clay, toward Dalton, Georgia. The three railway lines uniting Chattanooga, Cleveland, and Dalton form an almost equilateral triangle. Dalton, its south-east vertex, was the center of the Confederate army, under Joseph E. Johnston. Pushing out from Dalton toward us at Catoosa Springs, Johnston occupied the famous pass through Taylor's Ridge, Buzzard-Roost Gap, and part of the ridge itself; and held, for his extreme outpost in our direction, Tunnel Hill, near which our skirmish-line and his first exchanged shots. His northern lines ran along the eastern side of the triangle, between Dalton and Red Clay.

Johnston, according to his official return for April, had a force of 52,932. At Resaca, a few days later, after the corps of Polk had joined him, it numbered 71,235.† Our three field armies aggregated then, in officers and men, 98,797, with 254 pieces of artillery. The Confederate commander had about the same number of cannon. McPherson had thus far brought to Sherman but 24,465 men.

† See the article by Major B. C. Dawes, p. 281.—Erroneus.
When the Army of the Cumberland was in line, facing the enemy, its left rested near Catoosa Springs, its center at Ringgold, the railway station, and its right at Lee's Tan-yard. My corps formed the left. Catoosa Springs was a Georgia watering-place, where there were several large buildings, hotel and boarding-houses, amid undulating hills, backed by magnificent mountain scenery. Here, on the morning of the 6th, I met Thomas and Sherman. Sherman had a habit of dropping in and explaining in a happy way what he purposed to do. At first he intended that Thomas and Schofield should simply breast the enemy and skirmish with him on the west and north, while McPherson, coming from Alabama, was to strike the Atlanta railroad at least ten miles below Resaca. McPherson, failing in getting some of his troops back from furlough, was not now deemed strong enough to operate alone; hence he was brought to Chattanooga instead, and sent thence to Villanow, soon after to pass through the Snake Creek Gap of Taylor's Ridge, all the time being kept near enough the other armies to get help from them in case of emergency. By this it was ardently hoped by Sherman that McPherson might yet succeed in getting upon Johnston's communications near Resaca. Thomas here urged his own views, which were to give Schofield and McPherson the skirmishing and demonstrations, while he (Thomas), with his stronger army, should pass through Snake Creek Gap and seize Johnston's communications. He felt sure of victory. Sherman, however, hesitated to put his main army twenty miles away beyond a mountain range on the enemy's line, lest he should thereby endanger his own. He could not yet afford an exchange of base. Still, in less than a week, as we shall see, he ran even a greater risk.

Early in the day, May 7th, the Fourth Corps, arranged for battle, was near a small farm-house in sight of Tunnel Hill. Two divisions, Stanleys and Newton's, abreast in long, wavy lines, and the other, Wood's, in the rear, kept on the qui vive to prevent surprises, particularly from the sweep of country to the north of us. The front and the left of the moving men were well protected by infantry skirmishers. It was a beautiful picture—that army corps, with arms glistening in the morning light, ascending the slope. By 8 o'clock the few rifle-shots had become a continuous rattle. First we saw far off, here and there, puffs of smoke, and then the gray horsemen giving back and passing the crest. Suddenly there was stronger resistance, artillery and musketry rapidly firing upon our advance. At 9 o'clock the ridge of Tunnel Hill bristled with Confederates, mounted and dismounted. A closer observation from Stanleys field-glass showed them to be only horse artillery and cavalry supports. In a few moments Stanleys and Newton's men charged the hill at a run and cleared the ridge, and soon beheld the enemy's artillery and cavalry galloping away. "The ball is opened," Stanley called out, as I took my place by his side to study Taylor's Ridge and its "Rocky Face," which was now in plain sight. We beheld it, a craggy elevation of about five hundred feet, extending from a point not far north of us, but as far as the eye could reach southward. Its perpendicular face presented a formidable wall and afforded us no favorable door of entrance. [See also article, p. 278.]
THE STRUGGLE FOR ATLANTA.

Thomas's three corps, Palmer occupying the middle and Hooker the right, were now marched forward till my men received rifle-shots from the heights, Palmer's a shower of them from the defenders of the gap, and Hooker's a more worrisome fusillade from spurs of the ridge farther south. Thomas could not sit down behind this formidable wall and do nothing. How could he retain before him the Confederate host? Only by getting into closer contact.

On the 8th I sent Newton some two miles northward, where the ascent was not so abrupt. He succeeded by rushes in getting from cover to cover, though not without loss, till he had wrested at least one-third of the "knife edge" from those resolute men of gray. Quickly the observers of this sharp contest saw the bright signal flags up there in motion. Stanley and Wood gave Newton all possible support by their marksmen and by their efforts to land shells on the ridge. The enemy's signals were near Newton. He tried hard to capture them, but failed. In the night two pieces of artillery, after much toil, reached the top, and soon cleared away a few hundred yards more of this territory in bloody dispute. On May 9th Thomas put forth a triple effort to get nearer his foe. First, Stanley's division reconnoitered Buzzard-Roost Gap into the very "jaws of death," till it drew the fire from newly discovered batteries, and set whole lines of Confederate musketry-supports ablaze. At this time I had a narrow escape. Stanley, Captain G. U. Kniffin of his staff, several other officers, and myself were in a group, watching a reconnoissance. All supposed there were no Confederate sharp-shooters near enough to do harm, when whoo! came a bullet which passed through the group; Kniffin's hat was pierced, three holes were made in my coat, and a neighboring tree was struck.

Thomas now made a second effort. Palmer sent Morgan's brigade up one of the spurs south of the gap. It encountered the hottest fire, and suffered a considerable loss in killed and wounded. One regiment drove back the enemy's first line, and, like Newton's men, came within speaking distance of their opponents. Here arose the story to the effect that a witty corporal proposed to read to them the President's Emancipation Proclamation, and that they kept from firing while he did so. Still farther south, with Hooker's Twentieth Corps, and almost beyond our hearing, Thomas made his third push. In this action fifty were reported killed, and a larger number wounded; among them every regimental commander engaged. Similarly, but with easier approaches than ours, Schofield kept Johnston's attention at the east and north. Such was the demonstration, while McPherson was making his long détour through Villanow, Snake Creek
Gap, and out into Sugar Valley. He found the gap unoccupied; and so, with Kilpatrick's small cavalry detachment ahead, I followed closely by Dodge's Sixteenth Corps, with Logan's Fifteenth well closed up, he emerged from the mountains on the morning of the 9th, at the eastern exit.

Immediately there was excitement—the cavalry advance stumbled upon Confederate cavalry, which had run out from Resaca to watch this doorway. Our cavalry followed up the retreating Confederates with dash and persistence, till they found shelter behind the deep-cut works and guns at Resaca. In plain view of these works, though on difficult ground, Logan and Dodge pressed up their men, under orders from McPherson, "to drive back the enemy and break the railroad." And pray, why were not these plain orders carried out? McPherson answers in a letter that night sent to Sherman: "They [probably Polk's men] displayed considerable force and opened on us with artillery. After skirmishing [among the gullies and thickets] till nearly dark, and finding that I could not succeed in cutting the railroad before dark, or in getting to it, I decided to withdraw the command and take up a position for the night between Sugar Valley and the entrance to

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† Lieutenant James Oates wrote to the editors on July 8th, 1887, from Cincinnati, Ark., as follows:

"General Howard is in error in the above statement. On May 8th the 9th Illinois Mounted Infantry broke camp at Doosaro, Alabama, to take part in the Atlanta campaign. On the afternoon of May 8th the regiment came up with General McPherson at Villisca. Lieutenant-Colonel J. M. Phillips, who was in command, received orders to take the advance of the Army of the Tennessee, and did so at once, Company K. Lieutenant James Oates in command, taking the lead through Snake Creek Gap. We advanced down into the open country of Sugar Valley on the evening of May 8th. No part of General Kilpatrick's command was here when we passed through Snake Creek Gap. On the morning of the 8th of May our regiment took the advance without any other cavalry support. The infantry was a considerable distance to the rear. Very early in the morning we engaged the Confederate cavalry, losing several men killed and wounded—among the latter, Lieutenant-Colonel Phillips. The infantry came up at double-quick to our support and ended the fight. Our regiment followed up the retreating Confederates with dash and persistence. It was during the advance that day that we came in contact with the Georgia Cadets from the Military Institute at Marietta, who had come out from the woods at Resaca and formed their line behind a rail fence. After a volley from the Cadets, which killed several of our men, our regiment charged them and did not give up the contest until it ran against the works at Resaca."
the gap." At the first news Sherman was much vexed, and declared concerning McPherson's failure to break the enemy's main artery: "Such an opportunity does not occur twice in a single life, . . . still he was perfectly justified by his orders."

Our commander, believing that Johnston would now speedily fall back to Resaca, at once changed his purpose. Leaving me at Rocky Face with the Fourth Corps and Stoneman's small division of cavalry to hold our line of supply, Sherman pressed after McPherson the armies of Thomas and Schofield. But Johnston was not in a hurry. He terrified me for two days by his tentative movements, till our skirmishing amounted at times almost to a battle. But the night of the 12th of May he made off in one of his clean retreats. At dawn of the 13th the formidable Buzzard-Roost Gap was open and safe, and our men passed through. Stoneman rushed into the village of Dalton from the north, and the Fourth Corps, eager and rapid, kept close to the chasing cavalry. Not far south of Dalton we came upon a bothersome Confederate rear-guard, which made our marching all that long day slow and spasmodic, yet before dark my command had skirted the eastern slope of Taylor's Ridge for eighteen miles and joined skirmishers with Sherman, who was already, with McPherson, abreast of Resaca. Thus we ended the combats of Tunnel Hill and Dalton, and opened up Resaca.

As soon as Johnston reached the little town of Resaca he formed a horse-shoe-shaped line, something like ours at Gettysburg. He rested Polk's corps on the Oostella River; placed Hardee's next, running up Milk Creek; and then curved Hood's back to strike the Ocmassa River. After the

EXTREME LEFT VIEW LOOKING SOUTH OF THE CONFEDERATE LINES AT RESACA.
FROM A WAR-TIME PHOTOGRAPH.

The cluster of houses includes the railway station, the railway running generally parallel with the earth-works here seen, which in the distance descend to the Oostella River. The railway and wagon bridges mentioned in the notes on p. 260 are near the railway station.
Confederates had thrown up the usual intrenchments, and put out one or two small advanced forts with cannon. The position was as strong as Marye's Heights had been against direct attack. We spent a part of the 14th of May creeping up among the bushes, rocks, and ravines.

Early that morning, while this was going on, Sherman, who had worked all night, was sitting on a log, with his back against a tree, fast asleep. Some men marching by saw him, and one fellow ended a slurring remark by: "A pretty way we are commanded!" Sherman, awakened by the noise, heard the last words. "Stop, my man," he cried; "while you were sleeping, last night, I was planning for you, sir; and now I was taking a nap." Thus, familiarly and kindly, the general gave reprimands and won confidence.

McPherson rested his right upon the Oostanaula River, opposite Polk. Thomas, with the corps of Palmer and Hooker, came next; and then that brave young officer, Cox, commanding the Twenty-third Corps, against a storm of bullets and shells swung his divisions round to follow the bend in the enemy's line. I watched the operation, so as to close upon his left. T. J. Wood's division moved up in a long line, with skirmishers well out, and then Stanley's carried us to the railway. Stanley's chief-of-artillery arranged two or three batteries to keep the enemy from walking around our unprotected left. The air was full of screeching shells and whizzing bullets, coming uncomfortably near, while line after line was adjusting itself for the deadly conflict. Our fighting at Resaca did not effect much. There might possibly have been as much accomplished if we had used skirmish-lines alone. In McPherson's front Logan had a battery well placed, and fired till he had silenced the troublesome foes on a ridge in his front; then his brave men, at a run, passed the ravine and secured the ridge. Here Logan intrenched his corps; and Dodge, abreast of him, did the same. Afterward, McPherson seized another piece of ground across Camp Creek, and held it. During the evening of the 14th a vigorous effort was made by Polk to regain this outpost, but he was repulsed with loss.

The detailed account gives great credit to Generals Charles R. Woods, Giles A. Smith, and J. A. J. Lightburn. One hundred prisoners and 1300 Confederates hors de combat were on Logan's list. This work forced Johnston to lay a new bridge over the Oostanaula. The divisions of Absalom Baird, R. W. Johnson, Jefferson C. Davis, and John Newton plunged into the thickets and worked their way steadily and bravely into the reentrant angles on Hardee's front. Schofield's right division, under Judah, had a fearful
struggle, losing six hundred men; the others, coming to its help, captured and secured a part of the enemy's intrenchments. Hood assaulted my left after 3 p.m. The front attack was repulsed, but heavy columns came surging around Stanley's left. Everybody, battery men and supporting infantry, did wonders; still, but for help promptly rendered, Sherman's whole line, like the left of Wellington's at Waterloo, would soon have been rolled up and displaced. But Colonel Morgan of my staff, who had been sent in time, brought up Williams's division from Hooker's corps as quickly as men could march. Stanley's brave artillerymen were thus succored before they were forced to yield their ground, and Hood, disappointed, returned to his trenches. The next day, the 15th, came Hooker's attack. He advanced in a column of deployed brigades. Both armies watched with eager excitement this passage-at-arms. The divisions of Generals Butterfield, Williams, and Geary seized some trenches and cheered, but were stopped before a sort of lunette holding four cannon. The Confederates were driven from their trenches; but our men, meeting continuous and deadly volleys, could not get the guns till night. A color-bearer named Hess, of Colonel Benjamin Harrison's brigade, while his comrades were retiring a few steps for better cover, being chagrined at the defiant yell behind him, unfurled his flag and swung it to the breeze. He was instantly killed. A witness says: "There were other hands to grasp the flag, and it came back, only to return and wave from the very spot where its former bearer fell."

While the main battle was in progress, Dodge had sent a division under the one-armed Sweeney, to Lay's Ferry, a point below Resaca. Under the chief engineer, Captain Reese, he laid a bridge and protected it by a small force. Sweeney, being threatened by some Confederates crossing the river above him, and fearing that he might be cut off from the army, suddenly drew back about a mile beyond danger. On the 15th, however, he made another attempt and was more successful; formed a bridge-head beyond the river; threw over his whole force; and fought a successful battle against Martin's Confederate cavalry, before Walker's infantry, which was hastily sent against him from Calhoun, could arrive. Besides Sweeney's division, Sherman dispatched a cavalry force over the pontoons, instructing them to make a wider detour. The operations in this quarter being successful, there was nothing left to the Confederate commander but to withdraw his whole army from Resaca. This was effected during the night of the 15th, while our
THE STRUGGLE FOR ATLANTA.

Weary men were sound asleep. At the first peep of dawn Newton's skirmishers sprang over the enemy's intrenchments to find them abandoned.

In the ensuing pursuit, Thomas, crossing the river on a floating bridge, hastily constructed, followed directly with the Fourth and the Fourteenth corps.

Stanley had some sharp fighting with Stewart's Confederate division, which was acting as Johnston's rear-guard. It was, in fact, a running skirmish, that lasted till evening, at the close of which we encamped for the night near the enemy's empty works at Calhoun. Meanwhile McPherson had been marching on parallel roads to the right toward Rome, Georgia, Jefferson C. Davis's division from Thomas's army sweeping farther still to the right, and Schofield, accompanied by Hooker, to the left toward Cassville.

Our enemy, between these columns with his entire force, made a brief stand on the 17th of May at Adairsville, and fortified. About 9 a.m. Newton and Wood, of my corps, Wood on the right, found the resistance constantly increasing as they advanced, till Newton's skirmishers, going at double-time through clumps of trees, awakened a heavy opposing fire. A little after this, while I was watching the developments from a high point, Sherman with his staff and escort joined me. Our showy group immediately drew upon it the fire of a battery, shells bursting over our heads with indescribable rapidity. Colonel Morgan's horse was very badly lamed; Fullerton, the adjutant-general, was set aboot, and several horses of the escort were killed or crippled. Captain Bliss, of Newton's staff, had one shoulder-strap knocked off by a fragment, which bruised him badly. The skirmishing of Newton and Wood kept increasing. In fact, both parties, though desiring to avoid a general battle, nevertheless reinforced, till the firing amounted to an engagement. It was not till after 9 o'clock that the rattle of the musketry had diminished to the ordinary skirmish, and the batteries had ceased, except an occasional shot, as if each were trying to have the last gun. The losses in my command in this combat were about two hundred killed and wounded. The morning of the 18th found the works in front of Adairsville with few reminders that an army had been there the night before. Hooker and Schofield had done the work. Johnston's scouts during the night brought him word that a large Federal force was already far beyond his right near Cassville, threatening his main crossing of the Etowah; and also that McPherson was camping below him at McGuire's Cross-roads, and that our infantry (Davis's division) was already in sight of the little town of Rome, where, under a weak guard, were foundries and important mills. We began now to perceive slight evidences of our opponent's demoralization. I captured a regiment and quite a large number of detached prisoners. The whole number taken, including many commissioned officers, was about four thousand.

The rapidity with which the badly broken railroad was repaired seemed miraculous. We had hardly left Dalton before trains with ammunition and other supplies arrived. While our skirmishing was going on at Calhoun, the locomotive whistle sounded in Resaca. The telegraphers were nearly as rapid; the lines were in order to Adairsville on the morning of the 18th. While we
were breaking up the State arsenal at Adairsville, caring for the wounded and bringing in Confederate prisoners, word was telegraphed from Resaca that bacon, hard-bread, and coffee were already there at our service.

Johnston, by his speedy night-work, passed on through Kingston, and formed an admirable line of battle in the vicinity of Cassville, with his back to the Etowah River, protecting the selected crossing.

This was his final halt north of that river, so difficult with its mountain banks. Johnston remained here to obstruct and dispute our way one day only, for Schofield and Hooker had penetrated the forests eastward of him so far that Hood, still on Johnston's right, insisted that the Yankees were already beyond him and in force.

Upon this report, about which there has since been much controversy, Johnston ordered a prompt withdrawal. The morning of the 21st of May, bright and clear, showed us a country picturesque in its natural features, with farm and woodland as quiet and peaceful as if there had been no war. So Sherman, taking up his headquarters at Kingston, a little hamlet on the railway, gave his armies three days' rest.

A glance at the map [see p. 251] shows the Etowah flowing nearly west thirty miles from Allatoona to Rome. Sherman's headquarters at Kingston were midway. While the armies were resting, the right (Davis's division) at Rome, the left (Schofield and Hooker) near Cartersville, and the remainder at Kingston, the railroad and telegraph lines were repaired to Kingston; baggage, temporarily abandoned, came back to officers and men; necessary supplies, at the hands of smiling quartermasters and commissaries, now found us. The dead were buried, the sick and wounded were made more comfortable, and everybody got his mail and wrote letters. Meanwhile Sherman and his army commanders were endeavoring to find the location of their enemy.

Johnston was holding the region south of the Etowah, including the pass

\* One of these days was Sunday. My friend E. P. Smith, of the Christian Commission, afterward Commissioner of Indian Affairs, was ringing the church bell at Kingston, when Sherman, being disturbed by the ringing, sent a guard to arrest the supposed "bumer." Smith, in spite of his indignant protest, was marched to Sherman's anteroom and kept under guard for an hour. Then he was taken to Sherman, who looked up from his writing and asked abruptly:

"What were you ringing that bell for?"

"For service. It is Sunday, General," Smith replied.

"Oh! Is it?" answered Sherman. "Didn't know it was Sunday. Let him go."—O. O. H.
of Allatoona, and extended his army along the ridge of Allatoona Creek toward the south-west. He was picketing a parallel ridge in front of his line, along another creek, the Pumpkin Vine. This is substantially where we found this able and careful commander; but he pushed a little to the left and forward as we came on, till Hardee was at Dallas and Hood at New Hope Church. Our march was resumed on the morning of the 24th of May, Thomas crossing on his own pontoons south of Kingston; Hooker, contrary to the plan, went in advance of Schofield’s column over a bridge at Milam’s, east of Kingston; Davis, being at Rome, went straightforward from that place, and McPherson did the same from his position, laying his bridges so as to take the road to Van Wert. Stoneman’s cavalry covered the left; Garrard’s division was near McPherson and Davis, while McCook’s cleared the front for the center. The whole country between the Etowah and the Chattahoochee presented a desolate appearance, with few openings and very few farms, and those small and poor; other parts were covered with trees and dense underbrush, which the skirmishers had great difficulty in penetrating. Off the ordinary “hog-backs” one plunged into deep ravines or ascended abrupt steeps. There was much loose, shifting soil on the hills, and many lagoons and small streams bordered with treacherous quicksands.

Very soon on May 24th the usual skirmishing with the cavalry began, but there was not much delay. Hooker, coming into Thomas’s road the next morning, the 25th, led our column, taking the direct road toward Dallas. It was showery all day, and the weather and bad roads had a disheartening effect on men and animals. To relieve the situation as much as possible Thomas had my corps take advantage of country roads to the right, that would bring us into Dallas by the Van Wert route. McPherson and Davis had already come together at Van Wert. Now, suddenly, Geary’s division found a bridge over Pumpkin Vine Creek on fire, and hostile cavalry behind it. The cavalry soon fled, and the bridge was repaired. Hooker, thinking there was more force in that quarter, pushed up the road toward New Hope Church. He had gone but a short distance before he ran upon one of Hood’s brigades. It was an outpost of Stewart’s division, put there to create delay. Hooker soon dislodged this outpost and moved on, driving back the brigade through the woods, till he came upon the enemy’s main line.

The sound of cannon speedily drew Sherman to the point of danger. He immediately ordered the necessary changes. William’s division, having passed on, faced about and came back. Butterfield’s hastened up. The two divisions, each forming in parallel lines, promptly assaulted Hood’s position. Again and again Hooker’s brave men went forward through the forest only to run upon log-barricades thoroughly manned and protected by well-posted artillery. During these charges occurred a thunder-storm, the heaviest shower of the day. I turned to the left by the first opportune road, and deployed Newton’s division to the right of Hooker by 6 p.m. The remainder of my command came up over roads deep with mud and obstructed by wagons. In the morning all the troops were at hand. On that terrible night the nearest house to the field was filled with the wounded. Torch-lights and
candles lighted up dimly the incoming stretchers and the surgeons' tables and instruments. The very woods seemed to moan and groan with the voices of sufferers not yet brought in.

McPherson, with Davis for his left, took position at Dallas, having Logan on his right, and Garrard's cavalry still beyond. There must have been a gap of three miles between McPherson and us. Schofield was badly injured by the fall of his horse in that black forest while finding his way during the night to Sherman's bivouac, so that for a few days Cox took his command. Cox, with his Twenty-third Corps, and Palmer with the Fourteenth, swung in beyond me, as my men were moving up carefully into their usual positions in line of battle. Now the enemy kept strengthening his trench-barricades, which were so covered by thickets that at first we could scarcely detect them. As he did, so did we. No regiment was long in front of Johnston's army without having virtually as good a breastwork as an engineer could plan. There was a ditch before the embankment and a strong log revetment behind it, and a heavy "top-log" to shelter the heads of the men. I have known a regiment to shelter itself completely against musketry and artillery with axes and shovels, in less than an hour after it reached its position.

It would only weary the reader's patience to follow up the struggle step by step from New Hope Church to the Chattahoochee. Still, these were the hardest times which the army experienced. It rained continuously for seventeen days; the roads, becoming as broad as the fields, were a series of quagmires. And, indeed, it was difficult to bring enough supplies forward from Kingston to meet the needs of the army. Sherman began to pass his
armies to the left. First, I was sent with two divisions to attempt to strike Johnston's right. I marched thither Wood's division, supported by R. W. Johnson's, and connected with the army by Cox on my right. At Pickett's Mill, believing I had reached the extreme of the Confederate line, at 6 P.M. of the 27th I ordered the assault. Wood encountered just such obstructions as Hooker had found at New Hope Church, and was similarly repulsed, suffering much loss. R. W. Johnson's division was hindered by a side-thrust from the hostile cavalry, so that we did not get the full benefit of his forward push. We believed that otherwise we should have lodged at least a brigade beyond Hindman's Confederate division. But we did what was most important: we worked our men all that weary night in fortifying. The Confederate commander was ready at daylight to take the offensive against us at Pickett's Mill, but he did not do so, because he found our position and works too strong to warrant the attempt. With a foot bruised by the fragment of a shell, I sat that night among the wounded in the midst of a forest glade, while Major Howard of my staff led regiments and brigades into the new position chosen for them. General R. W. Johnson had been wounded, Captain Stinson of my staff had been shot through the lungs, and a large number lay there, on a sideling slope by a faint camp-fire, with broken limbs or disfigured faces.

The next day, the 28th, McPherson made an effort to withdraw from Dallas, so as to pass beyond my left; but as Hardee at the first move quickly assailed him with great fury, he prudently advised further delay. This battle
was the reverse of mine at Pickett's Mill. The enemy attacked mainly in
columns of deployed regiments along the front of Dodge's and Logan's corps,
and was repulsed with a dreadful loss, which Logan estimated at two thou-
sand. Now, necessity pressing him in every direction, Sherman, mixing
divisions somewhat along the line, gradually bore his armies to the left. The
1st of June put Stoneman into Allatoona, and on the 3d Schofield's infantry
was across the railroad near Ackworth, having had a severe and successful
combat en route.

Being now far beyond Johnston's right, and having seized and secured the
Allatoona Creek from its mouth to Ackworth, Sherman was ready, from
Allatoona as a new base, to push forward and strike a new and heavy blow,
when, to his chagrin, in the night of the 4th of June Johnston abandoned his
works and fell back to a new line. This line ran from Brush Mountain to
Lost Mountain, with "Pine Top" standing out in a salient near the middle.
He also held an outpost in front of Gilgal Church abreast of Pine Top.
Slowly, with skirmishes and small combats, for the most part in dense woods,
we continuously advanced. On my front we seized the skirmish-holes of
the enemy, made entrenchments for batteries there, and little by little
extended our deep ditches or log-barricades close up to Johnston's. As we
settled down to steady work again, McPherson was near Brush Mountain,
having pushed down the railroad. F. P. Blair's corps (the Seventeenth) from
Huntsville, Alabama, had now joined him, making up for our losses, which
were already, from all causes, upward of nine thousand. This accession gave
heart to us all. Thomas was next, advancing and bearing away toward Pine
Top, and Schofield coming up against the salient angle near Gilgal Church.
To tell the work of these two opposing hosts in their new position is a similar
story to the last. There was gallant fighting here and there all along the
lines. Here it was that my batteries, opening fire under the direct instruc-
tion of Sherman, drove back the enemy from the exposed intrenchments on
Pine Top. It was at this time that General Polk was killed. McPherson,
by overlapping Hood, skirmished heavily, and captured the 40th Alabama regi-
ment entire. Schofield, brushing away the cavalry, penetrated between Lost
Mountain and Gilgal Church, put his artillery on a prominent knoll, and,
with rapid discharges, took Hardee in reverse.

That night, the 16th of June, Johnston again went back to a new line,
already prepared, just behind Mud Creek. Our troops, being on the alert,
followed at once with great rapidity. Just where the old lines joined the new
(for Johnston's right wing was unchanged), I saw a feat of which
never elsewhere fell under my observation. Baird's division, in a compar-
atively open field, put forth a heavy skirmish-line, which continued such a
rapid fire of rifles as to keep down a corresponding hostile line behind its well-
constructed trenches, while the picks and shovels behind the skirmishers fairly
flew, till a good set of works was made four hundred yards distant from the
enemy's and parallel to it. One of my brigades (Harker's), by a rush, did also a
brave and unusual thing in capturing an intrenched and well-defended line of
the enemy's works and taking their defenders captive. Again, another (Kirby's
brigade), having lost Bald Hill in a skirmish, retook it by a gallant charge in line, under a hot fire of artillery and infantry, and intrenched and kept it.

Hood, who had been massed opposite McPherson, made a forced night-march, and suddenly appeared on the other flank fronting Schofield and Hooker. With his known method of charging and firing, he delivered there a desperate attack on the 22d of June. After a hard battle he was repulsed with heavy loss. This was the "Battle of Culp's Farm." Here it was that Hooker received a reproof from Sherman for an exaggerated dispatch, which inferentially, but wrongly, blamed Schofield. Hooker was ever after incensed at Sherman.

Again, by the gradual pressure against Johnston's right and left, Sherman forced him to a new contraction of his lines. This time it was the famous Kenesaw position that he assumed. With his right still at Brush Mountain, he extended a light force over the crest of the Kenesaws, and placed a heavier one along the southern slope, reaching far beyond the Dallas and Marietta road. He drew back his left and fortified. The whole line was stronger in artificial contrivances and natural features than the cemetery at Gettysburg. The complete works, the slashings in front, and the difficulties of the slope toward us under a full sweep of cross-fire made the position almost impregnable.

For reasons similar to those which influenced Lee to strike twice for Little Round Top, Sherman ordered an assault here with the hope of carrying the southern slope of Kenesaw, or of penetrating Johnston's long front at some

—— General Hooker signaled to General Sherman, on the evening of June 22d, that he [Hooker] was uneasy about his right flank, which Schofield had been ordered to protect.—Everts.
weak point. Schofield, well southward, advanced and crossed Olley's Creek, and kept up enough fire and effort to hold a large force in his front. MePherson, on the left, did the same, a serious engagement being sustained by Logan's corps advancing straight against the mountain. Logan lost heavily from the trenches in his front, and from artillery that raked his men as they advanced. Seven regimental commanders fell, killed or wounded. But the dreadful battle, hard to describe, was left to Thomas. He commanded two attacks, one opposite the Confederate General Loring's left, the other in front of Cheatham. Newton's division led my attack, and Davis that of Palmer. Like Pickett's charge at Gettysburg, the movement was preceded by a heavy cannonade. Then our skirmishers sprang forward and opened; and quickly the enemy's skirmish-line was drawn back to their main work. Harker, commanding one brigade, led his column rapidly over the open ground. Wagner did the same on Harker's left, and Kimball put his brigade in close support. The enemy's fire was terrific. Our men did not stop till they had gained the edge of the felled trees; a few penetrated, to fall close to the enemy's parapet; but most sought shelter behind logs and rocks, in rifle-holes, or depressions. Harker, moving with them, cheered on his men; when they were forced to stop, he rallied them again and made a second vigorous effort, in which he fell mortally wounded. Davis's effort was like Newton's; he met the same withering fire from rifle-balls and shells. But his men managed to make a shelter, which they kept, close up to the hostile works. Here they staid and intrenched. Among those who fell were brigade commanders Colonel Daniel McCook and Colonel O. F. Harmon. Our losses in this assault were heavy indeed, and our gain was nothing. We realized now, as never before, the futility of direct assaults upon intrenched lines already well prepared and well manned.

Plainly there was now nothing left for Sherman to do but to send his left army (MePherson's) to follow up the right (Schofield's) across Olley's Creek, and force his cavalry to Sandtown and the Chattahoochee far below Johnston's force. The first sign, namely, MePherson's starting, and Schofield's boldness, set the Confederates again in motion. On the morning of the 3d of July Sherman turned his spy-glass to the Kennesaw crest, and saw our pickets "crawling up the hill cautiously." The strong works were found vacant. Johnston had made new breastworks six miles below, at Smyrna Camp Ground, and another complete set, by the labor of slaves and new levies, where the railway crosses the Chattahoochee. Thomas, taking up the pursuit, followed his enemy through Marietta and beyond. My command skirmished up to the Smyrna works during the 3d. The next day Sherman paid us a Fourth of July visit. He could not at first believe that Johnston would make another stand north of the river. "Howard," he said to me, "you are mistaken; there is no force in your front; they are laughing at you!" We were in a thimble grove of tall trees, in front of a farm-house. "Well, General," I
replied, "let us see." I called Stanley, whose division held the front. "General, double your skirmishers and press them." At once it was done. The lines sped forward, capturing the outlying pits of the enemy, and took many prisoners; but a sheet of lead instantly came from the hidden works in the edge of the wood beyond us, and several unseen batteries hurled their shot across our lines, some of them reaching our grove and forcing us to retire. Sherman, as he rode away, said that I had been correct in my report. While we kept the Confederates busy by skirmishing and battery firing, a set of demonstrations to the north and south of us finally resulted in gaining crossings of the river at Roswell, Soap Creek, Powers's and Paice's ferries. Schofield effected the first crossing by pushing out from Soap Creek boats loaded with men, crossing quickly, and surprising the Confederate cavalry and cannon in his front. This was done on the 9th of July. As soon as Johnston knew of it, he left his excellent works near the Chattahoochee, burned his bridges, and hastened his retreat to Atlanta. The weather had become good, and there was great animation and manifest joy on our side. It was gratifying to escape from such fastnesses and dismal forests as those which had hampered us for over a month, and we now firmly believed that the end of the campaign was sure.

Our armies made a right wheel—Thomas, on the pivot, taking the shortest line to Atlanta; McPherson, on the outer flank, coming by Roswell to Decatur, with Schofield between.

As the several columns were crossing the famous Peach Tree Creek my corps was divided. I was sent, with Stanley and Wood, to connect with Schofield, causing a gap of two miles. Newton remained on Thomas's left; on Newton's right was Ward; next, Geary; then, Williams; last, Palmer's corps; all, having crossed over, were stretched out along the creek. There was at that point but little open ground, mostly woodland, and very uneven with cross-ravines.

Just at this time, much to our comfort and to his surprise, Johnston was removed, and Hood placed in command of the Confederate army. Johnston had planned to attack Sherman at Peach Tree Creek, expecting just such a division between our wings as we made.

Hood endeavored to carry out the plan. A. P. Stewart now had Polk's corps, and Cheatham took Hood's. Hardee on the right and Stewart on his
left, in lines that overlapped Newton's position, at 3 o'clock of the 20th of July, struck the blow. They came surging on through the woods, down the gentle slope, with noise and fury like Stonewall Jackson's men at Chancellorsville. As to our men, some of them were protected by piles of rails, but the most had not had time to barricade.

Stewart's masses advanced successively from his right, so Newton was first assailed. His rifles and cannon, firing incessantly and with utmost steadiness, soon stopped and repulsed the front attack; but whole battalions went far east of him into the gap before described. Thomas, behind the creek, was watching; he turned some reserved batteries upon those Confederate battalions, and fired his shells into the thicket that bordered the deep creek, sweeping the creek's valley as far as the cannon could reach. This was sufficient; in his own words, "it relieved the hitch." The hostile flanks broke back in confusion. In succession, Ward, Geyo, Williams, and Palmer received the on-coming waves, and though their ranks were shaken in places, they each made a strong resistance, and soon rolled the Confederates back, shattered and broken. Hardee would have resumed the assault, but an order from Hood took away a whole division (Cleburne's), for McPherson was too rapidly approaching Cheatham and the defenses of Atlanta from the east.

The battle of the 20th did not end till Gresham's division, on McPherson's left, had gone diagonally toward Atlanta, sweeping the hostile cavalry of Wheeler before it past the Augusta railroad, and skirmishing up against an open knob denominated Bald Hill. General Gresham, a fine officer, was severely wounded during his brisk movement. Wheeler had made a desperate and successful stand here, and soon after, in the evening, the division (Cleburne's) which was taken from Newton's sorely handled front was brought hither and put into the trenches, in order to make secure the right of Hood's line. The Bald Hill was an important outpost.

The 21st, a fearfully hot day, was spent by all in readjustment. Thomas brought his three corps forward, near to the enemy. The gap in my lines was closed as we neared the city. Schofield filled the space between the Fourth (mine) and Logan's corps. McPherson, to get a better left, ordered Blair to seize Bald Hill. General Force, of Leggett's division, supported by Giles A. Smith, who now had Gresham's place, charged the hill and
carried it, though with a heavy loss. No time ran to waste till this point was manned with batteries protected by thick parapets and well secured by infantry supports.

Atlanta appeared to us like a well-fortified citadel with outer and inner works. After Thomas had beaten him, Hood resolved to give up the Peach Tree line; so, after dark, he drew back two corps into those outer works.

Hardee, however, was destined to a special duty. About midnight he gathered his four divisions into Atlanta: Bate led the way; Walker came next; Cleburne, having now left the vicinity of Bald Hill (for he was soon to go beyond it), followed; then came Maney in rear. They pushed out far south and around Grasham's sleeping soldiers; they kept on eastward till Hardee's advance was within two miles of Decatur, and his rear was nearly past Sherman's extreme left. There, facing north, he formed his battle front; then he halted on rough ground, mostly covered by forest and thicket. He had made a blind night-march of fifteen miles; so he rested his men for a sufficient time, when, slowly and confidently, the well-disciplined Confederates in line took up their forward movement. Success was never more
assured, for was not Sherman's cavalry well out of the way, breaking a railroad and burning bridges at and beyond Decatur? And thus far no Yankee except a chance prisoner had discovered this Jacksonian march! The morning showed us empty trenches from Bald Hill to the right of Thomas. We quickly closed again on Atlanta, skirmishing as we went. McPherson's left was, however, near enough already, only a single valley lying between Blair's position and the outer defensive works of the city. The Sixteenth Corps (Dodge), having sent a detachment under General Sprague to hold Decatur, to support the cavalry and take care of sundry army wagons,—a thing successfully accomplished,—had marched, on the 21st, toward Atlanta. Dodge remained for the night with head of column a mile or more in rear of Blair's general line.
 Fuller's division was nearest Blair's left, and Sweeny's not far from the Augusta railroad, farther to the north. McPherson spent the night with Sweeny. His hospitals and main supply trains were between Sweeny and the front. About midnight McPherson, having determined to make a stronger left, had set Dodge's men in motion. They marched, as usual, by fours, and were in long column pursuing their way nearly parallel to Hardee's battle front, which was hidden by the thick trees. Now danger threatened: at the first skirmish shots Dodge's troops halted and faced to the left and were in good line of battle. The Confederate divisions were advancing; fortunately for Dodge, after the firing began Hardee's approaching lines nearing him had to cross some open fields. McPherson was then paying a brief visit to Sherman near the Howard house. The attack was sudden, but Dodge's veterans, not much disturbed, went bravely to their work. It is easy to imagine the loud roar of artillery and the angry sounds of musketry that came to Sherman and McPherson when the sudden assault culminated and extended from Dodge to Blair's left. McPherson mounted, and galloped off toward the firing. He first met Logan and Blair near the railway; then the three separated, each to hasten to his place on the battle-line. McPherson went at once to Dodge; saw matters going well there; sent off aides and orderlies with dispatches, till he had but a couple of men left with him. He then rode forward to pass to Blair's left through the thick forest interval. Cheatham's division was just approaching. The call was made, "Surrender!" But McPherson, probably without a thought save to escape from such a trap, turned his horse toward his command. He was instantly slain, and fell from his horse. One of his orderlies was wounded and captured; the other escaped to tell the sad news. Our reinforcements were on the way, so that Cheatham was beaten back. While the battle raged, McPherson's body was brought to Sherman at the Howard house. I wrote next day: "We were all made sad yesterday by the death of General McPherson,—so young, so noble, so promising, already commanding a department!" I closed my report concerning him thus: "His death occasioned a profound sense of loss, a feeling that his place can never be completely filled. How valuable, how precious the country to us all, who have paid for its preservation such a price!" Logan immediately took the Army of the Tennessee, giving his corps to Morgan L. Smith. As soon as Hood, from a prominent point in front of Atlanta, beheld Hardee's lines emerging from the thickets of Bald Hill, and knew by the smoke and sound that the battle was fully joined, he hurried forward Cheatham's division to attack Logan all along the east front of Atlanta. At the time, I sat beside Schofield and Sherman near the Howard house, and we looked upon such parts of the battle as our glasses could compass. Before long we saw the line of Logan broken, with parts of two batteries in the enemy's hands. Sherman put in a cross-fire of cannon, a dozen or more, and Logan organized an attacking force that swept away the bold Confederates by a charge in double-time. Blair's soldiers repulsed the front attack of Cheatham's and Mancy's divisions, and then, springing over their parapets, fought Bate's and Mancy's men from the other side. The battle continued
till night, when Hood again yielded the field to Sherman and withdrew. The losses on both sides in this battle of Atlanta were probably nearly even—about four thousand each. Our gain was in morale.

Sherman now drew his half-circle closer and closer, and began to manoeuvre with a view to get upon the railways proceeding southward. The Army of the Tennessee (late McPherson's) was assigned to me by the President, and I took command on the 27th of July, while it was marching around by the rear of Schofield and Thomas, in order to throw itself forward close to Atlanta on the south-west side, near Ezra Church. Skirmishing briskly, Dodge was first put into line facing the city; next Blair, beside him; last, Logan, on the right, making a large angle with Blair. He was not at night quite up to the crest of the ridge that he was to occupy. In the morning of the 28th he was moving slowly and steadily into position. About 8 o'clock Sherman was riding with me through the wooded region in rear of Logan's forces, when the skirmishing began to increase, and an occasional shower of grape cut through the tree-tops and struck the ground beyond us. I said: "General, Hood will attack me here." "I guess not—he will hardly try it again," Sherman replied. I said that I had known Hood at West Point, and that he was indomitable. As the signs increased, Sherman went back to Thomas, where he could best help me should I need reinforcement. Logan halted his line, and the regiments hurriedly and partially covered their front with logs and rails, having only a small protection while kneeling or lying down. It was too late for intrenching. With a terrifying yell, Hood's men charged through the forest. They were met steadily and repulsed. But in the impulse a few Confederate regiments passed beyond Logan's extreme right. To withstand them four regiments came from Dodge; Inspector-General Strong led thither two from Blair, armed with repeating-rifles; and my chief-of-artillery placed several batteries so as to sweep that exposed flank. These were brought in at the exact moment, and after a few rapid discharges, the repeating-rifles being remarkable in their execution, all the groups of flankers were either cut down or had sought safety in flight. This battle was prolonged for hours. We expected help from Morgan's division of Palmer's corps, coming back from Turner's Ferry; but the Confederate cavalry kept it in check. Our troops here exhibited nerve and persistency; Logan was cheerful and hearty and full of enthusiasm. He stopped stragglers and sent them back, and gave every needed order. Blair was watchful and helpful, and so was Dodge. After the last charge had been repelled I went along my lines, and felt proud and happy to be intrusted with such brave and efficient soldiers. Hood, having again lost three times as many as we, withdrew within his fortified lines. Our skirmishers cleared the field, and the battle of Ezra Church was won; and with this result I contented myself. One officer, who was a little panic-stricken, ran with the first stragglers to Sherman, and cried substantially, as I remember, "You've made a mistake in McPherson's successor. Everything is going to pieces!" Sherman said, "Is General Howard there?" "Yes; I suppose he is." "Well, I'll wait before taking action till I hear from him!" So Sherman sustained and
trusted me, and I was content. Of General Logan, who has so recently gone from us, I wrote, after this battle:

"Major-General Logan was spirited and energetic, going at once to the point where he apprehended the slightest danger of the enemy's success. His decision and resolution animated and encouraged his officers and men to hold on at all hazards."

For a month Hood kept to a defensive attitude, and, like a long storm, the siege operations set in. Sherman worked his right, with block after block, eastward and southward. Schofield and part of Thomas's command had passed beyond me, digging as they halted. Every new trench found a fresh one opposite. The lines were near together. Many officers and men were
slain and many were wounded and sent back to the hospitals. Dodge, while reconnoitering, was badly hurt; T. E. G. Ransom took his corps, and J. M. Corso a division in it.

Hooker, already vexed at Sherman, was incensed at my assignment, resigned, and went home. Slocom came from Vicksburg to command the Twentieth Corps. Palmer, having a controversy concerning his seniority, left the Fourteenth Corps, and Jeff. C. Davis took his place. Hazen passed from a brigade in the Fourth (Stanley's) to M. L. Smith's division of Logan's corps. F. P. Blair, in a report, condensed the work of his corps in these words: "The command was occupied for 28 days in making approaches, digging rifle-pits, and erecting batteries, being subjected day and night to a galling fire of artillery and musketry."

Sherman now having his supplies well up, beginning on the night of the 25th of August, intrenched Slocom's strong corps across his railroad communication to defend it; then made another grand wheel of his armies. Schofield this time clung to the pivot. My command described an arc of 25 miles radius aiming at Jonesboro', while Thomas followed the middle course. Both southern railways were to be seized, and the stations and road destroyed.

Preceded by Kilpatrick, we made the march rapidly enough, considering the endless plague of the enemy's horse artillery supported by Wheeler's cavalry, and the time it took us to break up the West Point railroad. At Renfro Place we were to encamp on the night of the 30th of August. Finding no water there, and also hoping to secure the Flint River Bridge, six miles ahead, I called to Kilpatrick for a squadron. He sent me a most energetic young man, Captain Estes, and the horsemen needed. I asked Estes if he could keep the enemy in motion. He gave a sanguine reply, and galloped off at the head of his men. Wheeler's rear-guard was surprised, and hurried toward the river. Hazen's infantry followed, forgetting their fatigue in the excitement of pursuit. We reached the bridge as it was burning, extinguished the fire, crossed over in the dusk of the evening under an increasing fire from hostile cavalry and infantry, but did not stop till Logan had reached the wooded ridge beyond, near Jonesboro'. The command was soon put into position,
and worked all night and during the next morning to intrench, and build the required bridges. Hood had sent Hardee by rail, with perhaps half of his command, to hold Jonesboro'. My Confederate classmate, S. D. Lee, who had had the immediate assault at Ezra Church, here appeared again, commanding Cheatham's corps. At 3 p.m. on the 31st the Confederates came on with the usual vigor, but were met by Logan and Ransom, and thoroughly repulsed. Hood now abandoned Atlanta, and united with Hardee in the vicinity of Jonesboro', near Lovejoy's Station. Thomas, joining my left flank, fought mainly the battle of September 1st. During the rest that followed, Blair and Logan went home on leave of absence; the field-force of the Army of the Tennessee was consolidated into two corps, Osterhaus temporarily commanding the Fifteenth, and Ransom the Seventeenth. Thomas went to Chattanooga to defend the communications with Sherman's army. Wagner's division was sent to Chattanooga, and Corse's division to Rome. Colonel John E. Tourtellotte had a detachment garrisoning the works at Allatoona Pass.

Hood had been threatening for some time to break Sherman's long line of communication and supply. Sherman could not divine where the blow would fall. He was already arranging for a campaign southward; but he wanted Grant's formal sanction, and he wished to make proper provision for Hood.
taken command. The popular hymn, "Hold the Fort," was based upon the messages between these chiefs and the noble defense that the garrison successfully made against a whole Confederate division. Sherman was coming,


Under a brisk command, I kept up for nearly two hours, with sharp skirmishing on our south front and our west flank, the enemy pushed a brigade of infantry against us, cut the railroad and telegraphs, severing our communications with Cartersville and Rome. The command and musketry had not ceased when, at half-past 8 A.M., I received by flag of truce, which came from the north on the Cartersville road, the following exchange of salutations:

"AROUND ALLATOONA, OCTOBER 5th, 1864.

"COMMANDING OFFICERS UNITED STATES FORCES, Allatoona.

"Sir: I have placed the forces under my command in such positions (that you are surrounded, and to avoid a needless effusion of blood I call on you to surrender your forces at once and unconditionally. Five minutes will be allowed you to decide. Should you accede to this you will be treated in the most humane manner as prisoners of war, I have the honor to be, very respectfully yours,

S. G. FRENCH.

"Major-General Commanding Forces, Confederate States."

"To which I made the following reply:

"HEADQUARTERS, FOURTH DIVISION, FIFTH ARMY CORPS, Allatoona, Georgia, 8:30 A.M., October 5th, 1864.

"MAJOR-GENERAL S. G. FRENCH, Confederate States Army,

"Your communication demanding surrender of my command I acknowledge receipt of, and respectfully reply that we are prepared for the "needless effusion of blood" whenever it is surrendered to you. I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN M. CORSE.

"Brigadier-General Commanding Forces, United States."

"I then hastened to my different commands, informing them of the object of this flag, etc., and answering the importance and necessity of their preparing for hard fighting. . . . I had hardly issued the incipient orders when the storm broke in all its fury. . . . The fighting up to about 11 A.M. was of the most extraordinary character. . . . About 1 P.M. I was wounded by a rifle-ball, which rendered me insensible for some thirty or forty minutes, but managed to rally on hearing some person or persons cry, "Come firing." which convinced me of the impression that they were trying to persuade the fort. Agents I urged my staff, the few officers left about, and the men around me to renewed exertions, assuring them that Sherman would soon be there with reinforce-

ments. The gallant fellows struggled to keep their heads above the ditch and parapet, and had the advantage of the enemy, and maintained it with such success that they (the Confederates) were driven from every position, and finally fled in confusion, leaving the dead and wounded and our little garrison in possession of the field."

Corse's entire loss, officially reported, was:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Officers</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>23</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>35</th>
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<td>Men</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>672</td>
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<td>Total</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>353</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>707</td>
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General Sherman, in his "Memoirs," says:

"We crossed the Chattahoochee River during the 3d and 4th of October, rendezvous at the old battle-field of Saymm's Camp, and the next day reached Marietta and Kenesaw. The telegraph wires had been cut above Marietta, and learning that heavy masses of infantry, artillery, and cavalry had been seen from Kenesaw (marching north, I inferred that Allatoona was their objective point) and on the 4th of October I signaled from Vining's Station to Kenesaw, and from Kenesaw to Allatoona, over the heads of the enemy, a message for General Corse at Rome, to hurry back to the resistance of the garrison at Allatoona. . . . Reaching Kenesaw Mountain about 8 A.M. of October 5th (a beautiful day), I had a superb view of the vast panorama to the north and west. To the south-west, about Dallas, could be seen the smoke of camp-fires, indicating the presence of a large force of the enemy, and the whole line of railroad, from Big Shanty up to Allatoona (full fifteen miles), was marked by the flames of the burning railroads. We could plainly see the smoke of battle about Allatoona, and hear the faint reverberations of the cannon. From Kenesaw I ordered the Twenty-third Corps (General Cox) to march due west on the Burrick Hickey road, and to burn houses or piles of brush as it progressed, to indicate the head of column, hoping to intercept this corps between Hood's main army at Dallas and the detachment then assaulting Allatoona. The rest of the array was directed straight for Allatoona, north-west, distant eighteen miles. The signal-officer on Kenesaw reported that since daylight he had failed to obtain any answer to his call for Allatoona; but, while

ALLATOONA PASS, LOOKING NORTH.—CORSE'S FORT ON THE LEFT (SEE P. 34). FROM A WAR-TIME PHOTOGRAPH.
and French, several times repulsed with great loss, withdrew and joined Hood at New Hope Church.

Taking up his northward march, Hood avoided Rome and aimed for Resaca. Schofield was warned, and got ready to defend Chattanooga, while Sherman now made forced marches so as to overtake his enemy and force him to battle. Finding us on his heels, Hood, picking up two or three small garrisons, but leaving untouched those that showed great pluck, like that of the resolute Colonel Clark R. Weaver at Resaca, pushed through Sugar Valley and Snake Creek Gap, choking it behind him with trees. My command, following rapidly through the pass (October 16th), cut away or threw the gap obstructions to the right and left, and camped close up to Hood's rear-guard. He again refused battle, and we pursued him beyond Gaylesville, Alabama. Between Rome and Gaylesville, General Ransom, the gallant and promising young officer before mentioned, died from over-work and exposure due to our forced marches. Taking advantage of a rich country, Sherman reenforced his men and moved slowly back to the Chattahoochee. Now, with the full consent of Grant, he hastened his preparations for his grand march to the sea.

I was with him. I caught a faint glimpse of the tell-tale flag through an embankment, and after much time he made out those letters: C 7. B 3. E 8. E 12. E 13. and translated the message: "Corse is here."

It was a source of great relief, for it gave me the first assurance that General Corse had received his orders, and that the place was adequately garrisoned. I watched, with painful suspense, the indications of the battle raging there, and was dreadfully impatient at the slow progress of the relieving column, whose advance was marked by the smoke which were made according to orders, but only about 2 p.m. I noticed with satisfaction that the smoke of battle about Allatoona grew less and less, and ceased altogether about 4 p.m. For a time I attributed this result to the effect of General Corse's march, but later in the afternoon the signal-flags announced the welcome tidings that the attack had been fairly repulsed, but that General Corse was wounded. The next day my aide, Colonel Dayton, received this characteristic dispatch:

"ALLATOONA, GEORGIA, October 20th, 1864, 2 p.m."
"CAPTAIN L. M. DAYTON, Aide-de-camp:"
"I am short a chest band and an ear, but am able to whip all—I yet! My losses are very heavy. A force moving from Salesboro' to Kingston gives me some anxiety. Tell me where Sherman is. JOHN M. CORSE, Brigadier-General."

"Inasmuch as the enemy had retreated north-west, and would probably next appear at Rome, I answered General Corse with orders to get back to Rome with his troops as quickly as possible."

"I set out to the advance of Allatoona as hazardous and important that I made it the subject of a general order, Vth, No. 86, of October 7th, 1864:"

""The general commanding avails himself of the opportunity in the late advance made at Allatoona, to illustrate the most important principles in war, that fortified posts should be protected to the last, regardless of the relative numbers of the party attacking and attacked, . . . The orders of this army are due and are hereby accorded to General Corse, Colonel Turrentaine, Colonel Hewett, officers, and men, for their determined and gallant defense of Allatoona, and it is made as an example to illustrate the importance of preparing in time, and meeting the danger, when present, boldly, manfully, and well."

"Commanders and garrisons of the posts along our railroad are hereby instructed that they must hold their posts to the last possible moment, and that the time gained is valuable and necessary to their comrades at the front. By order of"
"MAJOR GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN,"
"L. M. DAYTON, Aide-de-camp."

EDITORS.

Hood had partly invested Resaca, and on the 12th of October he demanded the unconditional surrender of the garrison, which the commander, Colonel Wever, refused, saying, "In my opinion I can hold the post. If you want it, come and take it."—EDITORS.
HOOSIER'S SECOND sortie AT ATLANTA.

BY W. B. CHAMBERLIN, MAJOR, 115TH OHIO VOLUNTEERS.

General Sherman's line lay east and north-east of Atlanta, with McPherson's Army of the Tennessee forming the extreme left, and extending some distance south of the Augusta railroad. General Logan's Fifteenth Corps, which joined the Army of the Ohio, extended across the Augusta railroad, and General Blair's Seventeenth Corps extended the line southward, touching the McDonough road beyond what is now McPherson Avenue. The Sixteenth Corps, commanded by General Grenville M. Dodge, had been in reserve in rear of the Fifteenth Corps, north of the railroad, until July 21st, when General Fuller's division was placed in the rear of the center of the Seventeenth Corps. On the morning of July 22d a movement was begun, which afterward proved to have been the most fortunate for the Union army that could have been ordered, if the intention of the enemy had been known to us. It was to place the remainder of General Dodge's corps—General Sweeney's division—upon the left of the Seventeenth Corps. General Sweeney's division moved south of the railroad and halted, some time before noon, in open ground, sloping down toward a little stream, in the rear of General Fuller's division, which was in bivouac near the edge of a woods. Here, in the rear of the Seventeenth Corps, lay the two divisions of General Dodge's corps, as if in waiting for the approach of General Hardee's troops who had been marching nearly all night round Blair's left flank, and were even then making painfully slow progress, moving in line of battle through the thickets and obstructions that opposed their march. Our troops were ready in waiting for the order to go to their new position. General Dodge had been out on the left of General Blair's corps to select a place for his troops, and had succeeded in drawing a shell or two from the enemy's nearest earthwork. He had returned to General Fuller's headquarters, and had accepted that officer's invitation to a noonday luncheon with him. In a few minutes his command would have been in motion for the front. If that had happened, and his corps had vacated the space it then held, there would have been absolutely nothing but the hospital tents and the wagon trains to stop Hardee's command from falling unhemmed directly upon the rear of the Fifteenth and Seventeenth corps in line. Upon what a slight chance, then, hung the fate of Sherman's army that day, for though such a catastrophe as this might not have wrought entire destruction, it is plain it would have put an entirely different phase on the battle. Here is a point upon which most of the accounts of the battle are wrong. They represent Dodge's corps to have been in motion. Fuller's order had been given before the previous night. Sweeney's command, while technically in motion, had been halted, awaiting orders.

Just as General Dodge was about to dismount to accept General Fuller's hospitality, he heard firing in a south-easterly direction, to the rear of General Sweeney's division. He took no lunch. He was an intensely active, almost nervously restless, officer. He saw in an instant that something serious was at hand. He gave General Fuller's order to form his division immediately, facing south-easterly, and galloped off toward Sweeney's division. He had hardly reached that command when Hardee's lines came tearing wildly through the woods with the yells of demons. As if by magic, Sweeney's division sprang into line. The two batteries of artillery (Loomis's and Laflamme's) had stopped on commanding ground, and they were promptly in service. General Dodge's quick eye saw the proper disposition to be made of a portion of Colonel Mersy's brigade, and, cutting red tape, he delivered his orders direct to the colonels of the regiments. The orders were executed instantly, and the enemy's advance was checked. This act afterward caused trouble. General Dodge was not a West Point graduate, and did not adhere so highly to the army regulations as did General Sweeney, who had learned them as a cadet. Sweeney was much hurt by General Dodge's action in giving orders direct to regimental commanders, and pursued the matter so far as to bring on a personal encounter a few days after the battle, in which he came near losing his life at the hands of a hot-tempered officer. He was placed in arrest. The court-martial, however, did not consider his case until nearly the end of the war, when he was acquitted.

The battle of General Dodge's corps on this open ground, with no works to protect the troops of either side, was one of the finest of the war. General Dodge's troops were inspired by his commanding personal presence, for he rode directly along the lines, and must have been a conspicuous target for many a Confederate gun. His sturdy saddle-horse was worn out early in the afternoon, and was replaced by another. There was not a soldier who did not feel that he ought to equal his general in courage, and no flight of the war exhibited greater personal bravery on the part of an entire command than was shown here. Nor can I restrain a tribute to the bravery of the enemy. We had an advantage in artillery; they in numbers. Their assaults were renewed, only to be fearfully renewed, until the sight of dead and wounded lying in their way, as they charged again and again to break our lines, must have appalled the stoutest hearts. So persistent were their onslaughts that numbers were made prisoners by rushing directly into our lines.

When General Dodge rode from General Fuller's lunch toward the sound of the firing I rode with him. The first order he gave me was to return to General Fuller and direct him to close up his line on General Sweeney's right. Returning as soon as I could after delivering this order, I met General Dodge riding at full speed. As soon as he got