

Yemen, backed the Iraqi invasion of Iran and facilitated Soviet bloc military supplies to Iraq.

Eleventh. Signed the infamous, anti-American report of nonaligned nations which accused us of "aggression" and the Israelis of "barbarism" and which our U.N. Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick branded "vicious lies."

Twelfth. Boycotted Sadat's funeral, thus showing yet again their disrespect for those who take risks for the sake of peace.

Thirteenth. Accused the United States of "medieval piracy" in North Africa.

Fourteenth. Bankrolled the terrorist PLO to the tune of \$400 million a year—most of the money that keeps it going.

Fifteenth. Bankrolled Syria to the tune of nearly \$800 million per year to support Syria's occupation of parts of Lebanon, to support Syria's backing of the most terrorist factions of the PLO, to support Syria's threatening move against Israel—with whom Syria maintains a state of war—through placement of surface-to-air missiles in Lebanon. Syria maintains a treaty of friendship with her major arms supplier, the Soviet Union, and unconfirmed reports indicate Saudi financing of a massive new Soviet-Syrian arms transfer.

Finally, despite special treatment in State Department human rights reports that whitewash Saudi behavior, the State Department admits instances of stonings, beheadings, severances of the hand, a "heavy stress on obtaining confessions," and the lack of habeas corpus or right to counsel. The Saudis do not permit freedom of speech, press, or assembly, political parties or labor union activities.

And the people who rule Saudi Arabia are guilty, according to Israeli Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir, of a "deeply rooted . . . fanatic hatred of Jews and Israel."

That is the "cooperative," "moderate" regime we are being called upon to support.

What have we gotten in exchange for our past help to Saudi Arabia? Some support in temporarily cooling tensions in Lebanon, but little else. What will they give us in exchange for the F-15 enhancement and the AWACS? Lower oil prices? No. Air bases? No. Peace with Israel? No. Repudiation of PLO terrorism? No.

This year, when President Reagan said the Saudis need AWACS because of the Soviet threat, the Saudi Oil Ministry, Sheik Yamani, said:

"No, the main threat is Israel." And a member of the royal family Chief of Planning for the Saudi Air Force, recently said in Los Angeles, "If we can't get what we want from America, we may turn to the Soviet Union to get it."

The administration has tried to "put a guilt trip" on the public and the Senate—to use popular vernacular—in the course of the current debate. We are made to feel that America's dependability, America's reliance as a friend and purveyor of weapons is at stake.

I think the emphasis has been wrongly placed. We should be concerned less with our reliability and our dependability and

more concerned about the dubious governments on whom we shower our military arms and technology.

It is their reliability, their dependability which I would question.

CONCLUSION

In the final analysis though, the issue is simply this: What are the long-term national security interests of the United States?

I am firm in my personal conviction that our national security interests demand that the Senate disapprove the proposed arms sale to Saudi Arabia. I will vote against this sale, with the hope that a sufficient number of my colleagues will join with me, and with the strong antisale majority in the House, to block its consummation.

Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I yield 5 minutes to the distinguished junior Senator from Maine.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine is recognized.

Mr. MITCHELL. I thank my friend from Rhode Island.

Mr. President, the proposed sale to Saudi Arabia of \$8.5 billion in advanced military equipment should be rejected.

Although press and public attention has focused almost exclusively on the five radar warning planes—the AWACS—the proposal involves much more. Each of the three major parts of the package deserves attention and analysis.

First. The President proposes to include in the sale fuel packs and other equipment for the 62 U.S.-made F-15 fighter aircraft sold to the Saudis in 1978. When that sale was first proposed, President Carter promised the Congress that these fighters were to be used for defensive purposes only. Thus, the fuel packs and other equipment—which will more than double the range of the F-15 from 450 miles to over 1,000 miles—were not included. That promise is now being broken by the Reagan administration. If the sale goes through, the F-15's will be transformed from a defensive weapon into an offensive striking force capable of hitting any part of Israel from deep within Saudi territory.

Second. The second major component of the proposal is the advanced version of the Sidewinder missile. This is the most advanced air-to-air missile in the world. It has only recently been deployed on our own F-15's. It is so new that we have fewer than 5,000 of the missiles. Yet the President proposes to sell 1,177 of them, or the equivalent of 25 percent of our current national inventory, to Saudi Arabia.

The value of the Sidewinder to our Navy and Air Force aviators is great. It is such an effective weapon that 12 Air Force F-15 pilots saw fit earlier this year to urge a California Representative, Tom Lantos, to oppose its sale. In a letter they stated:

We do not want the technology of the AIM 9-L to leak to the Soviets through lack of security in Saudi Arabia or through some closed door bargaining session. We at the user level can attest that the AIM 9-L thrusts the American fighter pilot a very large step ahead in air combat over any other military force. The AIM 9-L is superior

because it is a point and shoot weapon with excellent probabilities of success. The AIM 9-L is so superior that it gives the American fighter pilot a believable chance of survival when confronted with the overwhelming numbers of Soviet aircraft we must face. If we, as a military force, are to maintain a credible deterrent defensive posture with a minimum of dollars, why give our technological edge away? Certainly, we as pilots cannot be expected to fight against the overwhelming numbers of Soviet aircraft equipped with a compromise version of our AIM 9-L when we know how effective the missile is. We object to the sale of the AIM 9-L to Saudi Arabia.

The Navy's highest ranking officer, the Chief of Naval Operations, also believes that the distribution of the Sidewinder missile should be limited. On two occasions last year, he stressed to the Department of Defense the importance of this weapon. In one instance, he recommended that the Sidewinder be sold only to those close allies currently allowed to purchase it. In the second instance, he pressed for rejection of a Sidewinder sale requested by our most important ally in the Arab world, Egypt.

Just last month, the Secretary of the Navy sent a memo to the Secretary of Defense, in which he urged that the highest possible level of review be held in the future when our Government receives a request for the Sidewinder. The Navy Secretary stated:

The technology of the AIM 9L/9M series is too advanced to be given to countries who could compromise its effectiveness or endanger U.S. military or allied aircraft with direct use. If the Libyans had had the AIM-9L, the recent incident in the Mediterranean could have had a much different outcome.

The Secretary's fear that this U.S. equipment might fall into the wrong hands should not be taken lightly. The lesson of Iran is clear. We sold advanced U.S. weaponry to the Shah and much of it was lost when he was overthrown. Our Government in 1977 even agreed to provide him with the AWACS system. Fortunately for the United States, these planes had not been delivered prior to his downfall.

Third. The five airborne warning and control—AWACS—aircraft constitute the final component of the package. The AWACS utilize highly sophisticated radar technology that permits the aircraft to serve as both a warning and air control center. It took years and billions of dollars for the United States to develop. No one else in the world possesses equipment of comparable quality, especially the computer software. According to a recent report by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, one of the highest priorities of Soviet intelligence is to gain access to the full AWACS technology.

The United States does not now permit any other nation to own and control AWACS aircraft. Our oldest, closest and most trusted allies—Britain, France, and other European nations—are permitted use of such aircraft only within NATO. There the AWACS are operated as part of a regional defense alliance. But the planes are always under ultimate U.S. command and control.

If we insist on a regional alliance and

ultimate American command and control when dealing with our closest allies, all with stable democratic governments in a relatively stable part of the world, it makes no sense to insist on anything less when dealing with Saudi Arabia—a feudal monarchy in the most volatile part of the world, subject to the intense and sometimes conflicting pressures of rapid industrialization and Islamic fundamentalism.

It should be emphasized that the United States already operates six AWACS in the Middle East—four over the Arabian peninsula and two over Egypt. Selling five of these planes to Saudi Arabia will gain us nothing in the way of intelligence or early warning against attack.

The administration argues that providing this vast quantity of military equipment to Saudi Arabia will contribute to stability in the Middle East. But recent history is to the contrary.

Our decade-long response to the weapons demands of the Shah did not bring stability to Iran, or to the region. It could not keep the Shah in power. It did not prevent violence in the Middle East.

During the decade of the seventies, the requests to Congress for more arms for Iran were invariably couched in terms of regional stability and American policy interests.

Today, the request for authority to sell very sophisticated weapons to Saudi Arabia is also being urged as necessary to maintain our mutual friendship, necessary to give the Saudis the means to protect stability in the region, and necessary to send a clear signal to the Soviet Union that we will not tolerate adventurism in the Middle East.

But the facts of this situation reveal no such imperatives.

There is certainly no reason to believe that the Saudis wish to embrace the Soviet Union in preference to ourselves, or that they would do so because of a failure to sell these weapons to them.

And there is surely no reason to believe that Saudi Arabia will stop selling us oil. National commercial interests appear to have a life of their own, virtually independent of other policies.

Take, for example, Libya. There is no nation on Earth more hostile to the United States. Every day, wild denunciations of our leaders and our policies originate there. Understandably, our response has not been friendly. U.S. fighters recently shot down two Libyan jets over the Mediterranean. Yet, to this very day, the United States purchases nearly half of all the oil produced in Libya. Even as he denounces us, Libya's dictator, Colonel Qadhafi, accepts our dollars and uses them to finance propaganda and terrorism throughout the world.

We need a program under which the importation of Libyan oil into the United States will stop. Such a program ideally should be part of a comprehensive U.S. Middle East policy.

In the absence of a policy which concentrates on the primary sources of tension in the region, Congress should take the initiative to insure that dollars originating in the United States are no longer

used to finance terrorist acts against our country and its allies.

We should also be engaged in an oil conservation and production effort which will reduce our reliance on foreign oil.

The importance of Saudi Arabian oil resources to our Nation's economic well-being has been dangerously exaggerated. We are led to believe that virtually all of our imported oil originates in the Middle East; that our national strength would be sapped if Saudi Arabia or other Middle East nations decide to cut off our supply.

The facts simply do not bear this out:

Today, we produce domestically between 60 percent and 65 percent of the oil we consume;

Saudi oil accounts for about 9 percent of our total oil consumption, and in fact, all Mideast nations provide only 16 percent of this Nation's total oil needs;

The remainder of the oil we import comes from other nations, friendly to the United States.

Consider a second example relating to economics, which is closer to home. No world leader is as regular or as strong in denouncing the Soviet Union as is President Reagan. Yet, one of his early acts after assuming office was to end the embargo on grain sales to the Soviets, imposed by President Carter after the invasion of Afghanistan. So we are once again bailing out the Soviets, permitting the failure of communism to be less evident than it otherwise would be.

The point is that just as consumers need someone to sell them goods, so also do producers need someone to buy their goods. This is true of our relationships with Libya and Saudi Arabia, especially Libya. Although the oil we buy from Libya meets less than 2 percent of our needs, it represents fully 40 percent of their production. In the case of Saudi Arabia, their oil meets about 9 percent of our needs, it represents 12 percent of their production.

As to the Saudi's "moderation" which the sale is supposed to insure, let us not forget that when we sold the Saudis 62 F-15 fighters in 1978—a major development at the time—the price of oil was \$12 a barrel. It reached \$36 a barrel this year. How "moderate" is a tripling of the price in 3 years? Especially following upon a quadrupling of the price (from \$3 to \$12 a barrel) in the previous 5 years?

The sale of the military equipment contained in this package will set a precedent filled with potential dangers. Once this sale occurs, how will we insure that the arms will not fall into the hands of our adversaries? How will we guarantee that the AWACS and F-15 equipment will not be used in a coordinated attack against an American ally?

The President's assurances in response to these questions are inadequate. No treaty relationship exists between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and our Government which will allow us to protect U.S. interests. President Reagan has publicly stated that we will not permit the U.S. equipment in Saudi Arabia to be compromised, but he gives no details as to how this would be accomplished.

The President provides no details because there are none to give. In fact, we

have no defense arrangements with the Saudi Kingdom.

The final argument made for the sale is that once the President makes an important foreign policy decision, we should support him; to do otherwise, it is said, will diminish his credibility abroad. Of all the arguments made in behalf of the sale, this is the weakest.

It is essentially an argument that in foreign affairs we cannot afford to be a democratic society. It urges Senators and Congressmen to abandon their independent judgment. It is, in the last analysis, contrary to our system of government and our national heritage.

At times democracy seems inefficient and disorganized. But one of its great strengths is that in an open society, where power is not wholly centralized, national policies cannot be adopted without free and critical debate. In this process, foolish and wrong ideas can be weeded out and rejected. Dictators have an easier time getting their policies adopted. But, without the healthy clash of ideas in an open society, they are deprived of an important safeguard against unwise policies. Thus, although their policies are easier to adopt, they are also much more likely to be wrong. For us to abandon this healthy process in foreign affairs would be shortsighted and ultimately costly.

This argument comes with particular bad taste from President Reagan. As candidate Reagan, he urged Senators to vote against both the Panama Canal and Strategic Arms Limitation Treaties when President Carter presented them for ratification. He told Senators then that they had a legal and moral obligation to oppose the President when they felt he was wrong. On this point, candidate Reagan was right and President Reagan is wrong; equally wrong is former President Carter, who makes the same argument, and who of all people, should know better.

The minority leader of the Senate, ROBERT C. BYRD, on October 21 discussed the sales package on the Senate floor. In his remarks, Senator BYRD forcefully called the President to task for proposing this sale prior to articulating his administration's Middle East policy.

A Middle East policy—by definition—is a policy which focuses on the major problems in the region. Any Israeli, any Egyptian, and any Saudi will tell you that the major problems in the Middle East emanate from the Arab-Israeli conflict. An effective Middle East policy must first and foremost address these problems and provide a framework for resolving the conflict.

President Reagan does not agree. To date his statements, his activities, indeed his Saudi arms sale proposal, are made not in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict, but in terms of the differences between East and West, between the United States and the Soviet Union.

To quote Senator BYRD:

The central issue for American policy in the Middle East is the Arab-Israeli dispute, and not the Soviet threat to the region. This is not to say there is not a Soviet threat. Soviet influence, direct and indirect, is a primary destructive force throughout the region. The Soviets, through their proxies

and clients . . . are promoting instabilities which could be a primary cause of major war there. The American answer can only partly be the arming of our friends, for this does nothing to resolve the central irritation which is the Arab-Israeli dispute. We must take immediate action to settle the issues in that dispute, including the breathing of new life into the Camp David peace program.

President Reagan would be wise to heed these views which are shared by many Senators, including many of those who reluctantly will support his arms sale package.

The vote in the Senate will be very close, as the President, who is obviously very persuasive, pulls out all the stops. As a result, unfortunately, the Senate vote is becoming less a decision on the merits of the sale and more a decision based upon whether one supports or opposes the President.

The vote in the House of Representatives, where there was little Presidential lobbying, and where as a result the Members could vote solely on their best judgment, was instructive. There the sale was rejected by a vote of 301 to 111. Significantly, fully 60 percent of the Republicans in the House voted against the sale. Every Member of the Maine Congressional Delegation—both Representatives and both Senators—opposes the sale.

I oppose this sale first and foremost because it is not in the overall interests of the United States, and because it is unnecessary, it will not advance the cause of peace, and it is strategically unsound.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's 5 minutes have expired.

Mr. MITCHELL. May I have just 1 more minute, Mr. President?

Mr. PELL. As a matter of policy, Mr. President, I am trying not to yield any more time, so I cannot do that.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

Mr. PELL. At this time, Mr. President, I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from New York (Mr. D'AMATO).

"WHY I AM VOTING AGAINST THE AWACS SALE"

Mr. D'AMATO. Mr. President, I am casting my vote for the resolution of disapproval and against the proposed \$8.5 billion arms sale to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. I urge my colleagues in the Senate to do the same.

Some say that a loss on this sale would do irreversible harm to the President. On the contrary, it will strengthen the President's hand in dealing with the Saudis. Now, it looks as though we have knuckled under to Saudi pride; once Congress has spoken, the President can respond to the Saudis with a unified nation behind him.

We all agree that we must pursue a Middle East policy founded upon a clear understanding of the national interest of the United States. Our national interests in the Middle East are prevention of Soviet expansion into the area, and promotion of regional peace and stability in an atmosphere favorable to the West. Our policy seeks to serve those national interests by supporting democratic pro-Western nations, deterring adventurism on the part of radical regimes, and forging permanent friendly links between neighbors.

Mr. President, this is not a choice between Begin and Reagan, as some have put it. It is not now a choice between Israel and oil. Rather, it is a choice between courses of action which will either strengthen or weaken our country's security. I have studied all aspects of this proposal with deep concern. I have carefully weighed the arguments for and against the sale, and I have concluded that the sale undermines our policies and threatens our national interests.

I urge my colleagues to vote to disapprove the sale because it neither works to prevent Soviet penetration of the area, nor enhances regional stability. Simply stated, this weapons package does not give Saudi Arabia a credible capability to resist any major Soviet attack on their oilfields. There are too few AWACS to maintain 24-hour coverage for more than a few days. Then, all aircraft must be on the ground at the same time for required maintenance, making the system vulnerable to easy destruction. Also, even if the AWACS are flying, the 62 F-15 fighters form too small a force, even when combined with the F-5's the Saudis already have, to present more than token resistance to a major attack.

The package is more sophisticated than it needs to be to deal with threats from Iran, Iraq, or Yemen—a combination of Grumman E-2C Hawkeyes and ground radars could do that job. It endangers the already shaky stability of the Saudi regime. It also endangers regional peace.

Mr. President, in the last two Arab-Israeli wars, Saudi Arabia has participated by financing the Arab war effort. They were able to excuse themselves from any more than symbolic military participation because of their clear military impotence. Once we have sold them the most lethal and sophisticated military technology in the West, they will no longer have that excuse, assuming they would use it. Now, when the radical regimes come calling, asking the Saudis to demonstrate their allegiance to the Arab cause, the Saudis will probably agree to join in combat against Israel, using all of these fine new weapons we have supplied.

People say that the AWACS is not an offensive weapon, and that F-15's do not have bomb racks. That is a misleading argument, Mr. President. The AWACS is the best battle management system in the world. It can direct fighters on offensive as well as defensive missions. It is a true airborne command post, able, thanks to its advanced radar, computers, and communications equipment, to control an air battle. This gives its owner a tremendous advantage in war. Ask the U.S. Air Force. We plan to use AWACS that way, and it works like a charm in training.

The F-15's may not be able to drop bombs themselves, but they can certainly fly top cover for other Arab aircraft on strike missions. F-15's are the finest air superiority fighters in the world. Equipped with the conformal fuel tanks we are selling the Saudis, and the deadly AIM-9L Sidewinder missiles, they will have both the reach and the punch to successfully escort fleets of Arab Migs to their targets in Israel.

The proponents of the sale say that because there are no digital data links between the AWACS and the Arab forces, and because the Saudis and their Arab brothers do not share the same secure voices communication equipment, a coordinated attack is not possible. Maybe they could not do it the way the U.S. Air Force manuals say it should be done, but they can figure out ways to work around their problems. If they cannot figure out workable methods on their own, they certainly have enough money to hire experts to solve their problems for them. Given the recent example of American technicians working for Colonel Qadhafi in Libya, I am sure there will be no shortage of Western applicants for those positions.

At this point, Mr. President, we may have achieved what we should by trying hardest to avoid—a situation in which both combatants in a future Middle East war would be armed with American weapons, and would demand that we renounce our support for the other side. In other words, by selling this equipment to Saudi Arabia, we could well be setting up a future American foreign policy disaster—a forced choice between Israel and oil. I very strongly believe that now is the time to act to prevent us from ever having to make that choice. A Saudi Arabia armed with Nimrods and Mirages does not force us to make that choice in the event of another war. A Saudi Arabia armed with AWACS and enhanced F-15's will.

I cannot overstate, nor should we underestimate, the magnitude of the impact of having to make that choice. True, Israel could probably defend itself against a combination of an American-equipped Saudi Arabia and the radical Arab states. Israel would probably have to do as it did in the 1967 war—stage a preemptive strike. The AWACS would be destroyed on the ground, American personnel present to perform maintenance and training might be killed, and our domestic public opinion would be divided and inflamed. Do we want this? Is there any way we can afford to let this happen? I say no. This sale is an act of shortsighted foolishness, and one for which we could pay dearly in the not far distant future.

Indeed, the preemptive strike need never happen to put us in a terrible position. Once it is clear that a new war is possible, Saudi possession of these weapons gives them very, very great leverage over our policies. We do not have to stretch our imaginations far at all to envision the pressures and threats the Saudis could bring to bear on us. A simple shift in the deployment of AWACS or of their F-15's could provoke a major diplomatic crisis. We would be faced with fighting political and diplomatic battles like this one every few months. This sale greatly reinforces the power of the Arab oil weapon in Middle Eastern diplomacy. It provides the potential enemies of the West with a sensitive pressure point which can be used to our great disadvantage.

Remember, Mr. President, we are trying to use this sale as a political and diplomatic device to advance our interests.