

of a postage stamp to commemorate the 70th anniversary of the founding of the Girl Scouts of the United States of America.

SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION 84

At the request of Mr. DECONCINI, the Senator from Montana (Mr. BAUCUS), the Senator from Louisiana (Mr. LONG), the Senator from Tennessee (Mr. SASSER), the Senator from Indiana (Mr. LUGAR), and the Senator from Tennessee (Mr. BAKER) were added as cosponsors of Senate Joint Resolution 84, a joint resolution to proclaim March 19, 1982, as "National Energy Education Day."

SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION 87

At the request of Mr. MATHIAS, the Senator from Rhode Island (Mr. CHAPPEE), the Senator from New Jersey (Mr. WILLIAMS), and the Senator from Maine (Mr. COHEN) were added as cosponsors of Senate Joint Resolution 87, a joint resolution to authorize and request the President to designate September 13, 1981, as "Commodore John Barry Day."

SENATE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 24

At the request of Mr. GLENN, the Senator from Minnesota (Mr. BOSCHWITZ), the Senator from Rhode Island (Mr. PELL), the Senator from Maryland (Mr. MATHIAS), and the Senator from Nebraska (Mr. ZORINSKY) were added as cosponsors of Senate Concurrent Resolution 24, a concurrent resolution submitting a proposal to improve the international nonproliferation regime.

SENATE RESOLUTION 74

At the request of Mr. MOYNIHAN, the Senator from Louisiana (Mr. JOHNSTON) was added as a cosponsor of Senate Resolution 74, a resolution relating to actions taken by the Foreign Ministers of the Nonaligned Movement at their recent concluded meeting in New Delhi.

AMENDMENT NO. 99

At the request of Mr. LUGAR, the Senator from Connecticut (Mr. WEICKER), the Senator from Colorado (Mr. ARMSTRONG), and the Senator from New York (Mr. MOYNIHAN) were added as cosponsors of amendment No. 99 intended to be proposed to S. 884, a bill to revise and extend programs to provide price support and production incentives for farmers to assure an abundance of food and fiber, and for other purposes.

AMENDMENT NO. 489

At the request of Mr. WILLIAMS, his name was added as a cosponsor of amendment No. 489 proposed to House Joint Resolution 266, a bill to provide for a temporary increase in the public debt limit.

At the request of Mr. MOYNIHAN, the Senator from Montana (Mr. BAUCUS), the Senator from California (Mr. CRANSTON), the Senator from Maine (Mr. MITCHELL), and the Senator from Arkansas (Mr. BUMPERS) were added as cosponsors of amendment No. 489 proposed to House Joint Resolution 266, *supra*.

At the request of Mr. SASSER, his name was added as a cosponsor of amendment 489 to H.J. Res. 266, *supra*.

UP AMENDMENT NO. 208

At the request of Mr. TOWER, the Senator from Texas (Mr. BENTSEN), the Senator from Nevada (Mr. CANNON), the Senator from Maine (Mr. COHEN), the Sena-

Senator from Alabama (Mr. DENTON), the Senator from Arizona (Mr. DECONCINI), the Senator from Illinois (Mr. DIXON), the Senator from Arizona (Mr. GOLDWATER), the Senator from Alabama (Mr. HEFLIN), the Senator from New Hampshire (Mr. HUMPHREY), the Senator from Washington (Mr. JACKSON), the Senator from Louisiana (Mr. JOHNSTON), the Senator from Montana (Mr. MELCHER), the Senator from South Dakota (Mr. PRESSLER), the Senator from South Carolina (Mr. THURMOND), the Senator from Nebraska (Mr. ZORINSKY), and the Senator from North Dakota (Mr. ANDREWS) were added as cosponsors of UP amendment No. 208 proposed to S. 1377, an original bill to provide for reconciliation pursuant to title III of the first concurrent resolution on the budget for fiscal year 1982 (H. Con. Res. 115, 97th Congress).

UP AMENDMENT NO. 208 TO S. 1377

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, on Thursday, June 25, I along with a number of my colleagues offered an amendment to the reconciliation bill which was adopted by the Senate and which provided \$500 million in impact aid funding for fiscal year 1982. I noted that the names of only 4 of the 24 cosponsors of this amendment were reflected in the Record for June 25. In order to insure that all of the cosponsors are properly credited for their support on this very important issue, I ask unanimous consent that the names of each of my colleagues, who prior to the amendment's adoption indicated to me their willingness to cosponsor, now be added as cosponsors.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

COSPONSORS

Mr. Andrews, Mr. Bentsen, Mr. Cannon, Mr. Cohen, Mr. DeConcini, Mr. Denton, Mr. Dixon, Mr. Goldwater, Mr. Hefflin, Mr. Humphrey, Mr. Jackson, Mr. Johnston, Mr. Melcher, Mr. Pressler, Mr. Thurmond, and Mr. Zorinsky.

SENATE RESOLUTION 177—SUBMISSION OF A RESOLUTION RELATING TO THE IMPORTATION OF POTATOES FROM CANADA

Mr. COHEN (for himself and Mr. MITCHELL) submitted the following resolution, which was referred to the Committee on Finance:

S. RES. 177

Whereas potato imports from Canada have increased dramatically during the past three years as a result of the decrease in tariff rates provided for under the Trade Agreements Act of 1979;

Whereas such imports are likely to continue to increase since tariff rates on Canadian potatoes will be equalized at 35 cents per hundredweight on fresh potatoes by 1987;

Whereas the currency exchange rate between Canada and the United States has placed domestic producers of potatoes at an additional disadvantage in competing with Canadian produced potatoes;

Whereas there is evidence that the production of Canadian potatoes is being subsidized directly and indirectly by the Canadian Government;

Whereas increased potato imports place a severe burden on domestic producers who must compete in a market that already suffers periodically from domestic overproduction;

Whereas the President is authorized by section 204 of the Agricultural Act of 1956 to negotiate with representatives of foreign governments to obtain agreements limiting the import of agricultural commodities into the United States: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that the President should, and is hereby urged and requested to, negotiate with representatives of the Canadian Government in an effort to obtain an agreement limiting the export from Canada to the United States of both seed and tablestock potatoes and to issue regulations under section 204 of the Agricultural Act of 1956 governing the entry or withdrawal from warehouse of such commodities to carry out any such agreement.

Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, I am pleased to submit this sense of the Senate resolution which I hope will provide the impetus for the administration to seriously address the problem of imported Canadian potatoes into the United States. This resolution will urge the President to negotiate with representatives of the Canadian Government in an effort to obtain an agreement limiting the export from Canada to the United States of both seed and tablestock potatoes and to issue regulations under section 204 of the Agricultural Act of 1956 governing the entry of such commodities to carry out such agreement.

For the past 3 years, fresh potato imports from Canada have increased dramatically. In the past year alone, there was nearly a 300 percent increase in both potato seed and tablestock shipments. This increase is partly a result of gradual reductions of tariffs under the Trade Agreements Act of 1979. Existing quotas on imports from Canada will be eliminated entirely in 1987, further exposing the industry to Canadian potato shipments.

Another significant advantage to the Canadian exporter is the monetary exchange rate, which has fluctuated from 15 to 20 percent in the past year. At this rate, the importer pays, in effect, 20 percent less to purchase Canadian potatoes, a product indistinguishable from those produced on U.S. farms. This situation could be acceptable if the consumer were benefiting from this cost saving. However, this is not the case. Evidence indicates that the Canadian producer, at the farm gate, receives even less for his product than does his U.S. counterpart. Last year, the consumer witnessed record high potato prices at the supermarket, indicating that neither the producer nor the consumer was benefiting from this trade. Indeed, both the taxpayer and the consumer are paying through the weakening of our domestic industry.

Administrative remedies available to assist domestic horticultural industries are limited and costly. For example, after 2 years of frustrating dialog with Federal agencies, the Maine and New York potato interests are contemplating filing a countervailing duty petition with the International Trade Commission.

The producers complain that the Federal agencies in place to assist them can only offer a sympathetic ear, yet can offer no realistic alternatives to this pressing problem. For example, some alternatives, such as instituting a marketing order for protection, directly con-

tradict administration policy to remove existing marketing orders.

In Canada, subsidies at both the Federal and provincial levels are known to exist. Additional inequities in energy costs, transportation subsidies, and restrictions on U.S. potatoes entering Canada only add to the frustration of U.S. producers.

Mr. President, I support free trade. However, I feel that this is an example where trade is not, in fact, fair. The Canadian Government has targeted the Eastern U.S. market for its potato production, utilizing extensive marketing and promotional programs. Similar programs for our horticultural industries do not exist. Potatoes and other perishable fruits and vegetables do not even have the protection of section 22 provisions of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, since they are not covered under Federal price supports. I firmly believe that the voice of the small horticultural industries in this country must be heard and that the authority provided by section 204 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act is an appropriate mechanism for addressing the problem of potato imports.

It is clearly in our national interest for the Federal Government to insure that the potato industry, as well as smaller horticultural industries, are not in fact, traded away. The Northeastern consumer should not be dependent upon a foreign country for a substantial portion of perishable fruits and vegetables. These small, dispersed industries, with no strong lobbying voice, should not be faced with competing against both foreign producers and foreign governments.

Mr. President, this is a nonbinding resolution.

Notwithstanding, I would sincerely hope that the administration will address this problem adequately, thus removing the need for more drastic legislative measures.

I urge my colleagues, especially those from fruit and vegetable producing States, to support this resolution.

Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, this resolution addresses a serious problem facing the potato industry, a key sector in the economy of Maine and other States. The problem is the surge of Canadian imports into U.S. markets, and the tremendously disruptive effect this surge has had on domestic growers. Canadian potato imports have increased substantially for 3 consecutive years. Last year alone saw a 300-percent increase in imports. Canadian potatoes entering the country through Maine ports of entry are expected to equal 25 percent of the total volume of Maine tablestock potatoes. This has had a devastating impact on the U.S. industry, which is already suffering from excess capacity.

The potato industry is particularly disadvantaged in seeking relief from disruptions caused by changing trade patterns. Most agricultural products are covered by section 22 of the Agriculture Adjustment Act, which gives swift and effective relief from excessive imports competing with price-supported products. Potato growers receive no subsidy, either through price supports or any

other avenue. Thus, the swift relief under section 22 is not available for this product.

We are therefore seeking relief through section 204 of the Agriculture Act of 1956. This section extends a more general remedy, allowing the President to negotiate with foreign governments to limit agricultural imports to the United States. The resolution urges the President to use this remedy in dealing with the problem of Canadian potato imports.

There are several reasons for the recent surge in imports from Canada. A major cause is the concerted effort by both the Federal and provincial governments in Canada to increase potato production in order to increase their exports to traditional U.S. markets. This effort has led to a number of subsidies, in the form of low-interest loans, substantial transportation subsidies, and stabilization payments for crop production. Recently, the Canadian Government approved a \$3 million promotion program for potato exports.

Another cause of the surge in Canadian imports is the depressed value of the Canadian dollar, which gives Canadian growers a significant exchange rate advantage. The exchange differential can account for as much as 20 percent discount for the Canadian product—a price advantage that no domestic producer can overcome.

A third cause of higher imports is the tariff concessions made by the United States in 1979. The reduction in tariff-rate quotas negotiated in 1979 was substantial, and has contributed to increased efforts to target U.S. potato markets.

Taken together, Canadian Government subsidies, the exchange rate and our own efforts to free trade have all had the end result of driving our producers into bankruptcy and of helping create a Canadian industry whose only goal is to produce potatoes for export to the U.S. market.

A number of other problems plague Maine growers and represent an advantage for Canadian growers are not permitted to use. Inadequate inspections allow lower quality Canadian potatoes to be graded higher. Many Canadian potatoes enter the United States as seed potatoes, which have a lower tariff rate quota than tablestock potatoes, but are eventually used for human consumption, not for planting.

All these problems aggravate an already serious situation. It has led to much unrest in the potato growing areas in Maine. If nothing is done, the prospect is for even more serious disturbances in the next marketing season.

Maine growers are pursuing several avenues to deal with the various problems. Administrative remedies are being sought, but these are time-consuming and potentially very expensive. The purpose of this resolution is to encourage the President to examine every possible solution, and to express congressional support for a negotiated solution, should the administrative remedies fail to correct the problem.

AMENDMENTS SUBMITTED FOR PRINTING

ECONOMIC RECOVERY TAX ACT OF 1981

AMENDMENT NO. 491

(Ordered to be printed and to lie on the table.)

Mr. MATHIAS submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the joint resolution (H.J. Res. 266) to provide for a temporary increase in the public debt limit.

AMENDMENT NO. 492

(Ordered to be printed and to lie on the table.)

Mr. NUNN (for himself and Mr. CHILES) submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by them to the joint resolution House Joint Resolution 266, supra.

AMENDMENT NO. 493

(Ordered to be printed and to lie on the table.)

Mr. BENTSEN submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the joint resolution House Joint Resolution 266, supra.

AMENDMENT NO. 494

(Ordered to be printed and to lie on the table.)

Mr. BENTSEN (for himself, Mr. BORN, Mr. JOHNSTON, Mr. TOWER, Mr. BURDICK, Mr. MELCHER, Mr. CRANSTON, Mr. ANDREWS, Mr. NICKLES, Mr. STENNIS, Mr. SIMPSON, Mr. DIXON, Mr. HUDDLESTON, Mr. INOUE, Mr. DeCONCINI, Mr. SASSER, and Mr. CANNON) submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by them to amendment No. 493 to the joint resolution House Joint Resolution 266, supra.

AMENDMENT NO. 495

(Ordered to be printed and to lie on the table.)

Mr. MATSUNAGA submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the joint resolution House Joint Resolution 266, supra.

NOTICES OF HEARINGS

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL FINANCE

Mr. HEINZ. Mr. President, I would like to announce that the Banking Committee's Subcommittee on International Finance and Monetary Policy will hold a hearing on S. 868, the Competitive Export Finance Act of 1981.

The hearing will be held at 2 p.m. in room 5302 of the Dirksen Senate Office Building on Monday, July 20, 1981.

Representatives of the administration, the Eximbank, industry, and outside experts will testify on S. 868 and the current status of export credit negotiations.

Mr. President, the purpose of S. 868 is to provide a \$1 billion "war chest" to the Eximbank to be used as leverage to induce trade competitors to reach an international agreement on official export credits. The current competition in officially subsidized export credits has reached cutthroat and cutthroat proportions, and this bill was introduced as part of an overall strategy to end this self-defeating competition.

Those who wish further information concerning the hearings may contact Dr. Paul Freedenberg at (202) 224-0891.

SUBCOMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS

Mr. GARN. Mr. President, the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions has now scheduled the final day of hearings on S. 1406, the "Credit Deregulation and Availability Act of 1981" and on S. 963. The hearing will be held on July 21, 1981, at 10 a.m. in room 5302 of the Dirksen Senate Office Building.

For additional information contact Beth L. Climo, counsel to the committee, 5300 Dirksen Senate Office Building, Washington, D.C. 20510, (202) 224-1565.

COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE, NUTRITION AND FORESTRY

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I wish to announce that the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry has scheduled hearings on the nomination of John V. Graziano to be Inspector General of the U.S. Department of Agriculture. The hearing will be held on Monday, July 20, beginning at 10 a.m. in room 324, Russell Building.

Anyone wishing to testify should contact Denise Alexander of the Agriculture Committee staff at 224-0014.

COMMITTEE ON SMALL BUSINESS

Mr. WEICKER. Mr. President, I would like to announce for the information of the Senate and the public that the Senate Small Business Committee will hold a full committee field hearing on July 24, 1981 in San Francisco, Calif.

This will be a continuation of hearings that the committee has held to receive testimony concerning S. 881, the Small Business Innovation Research Act of 1981.

The hearing will convene at 10 a.m. in room 417, city hall, Van Ness Avenue and McAllister, San Francisco, Calif. Senator HAYAKAWA will chair the hearing.

For additional information please contact Anne Sullivan of the committee staff at 224-5175 or Grace Hussie, legislative assistant for Senator HAYAKAWA at 224-3841.

ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS

SUPPORT FOR STEALTH BomBER

● Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, in the very near future Congress will be asked to make two of the most important defense program decisions in our Nation's history—how to base the MX intercontinental ballistic missile and whether to procure one or two manned bombers to modernize the air-breathing leg of the strategic Triad.

As a member of the Armed Services Committee, I have spent many hours studying these issues, and I would like to take this opportunity to share with my colleagues my thoughts on the bomber choice—which basically comes down to the question of whether we should press ahead with the advanced technology, Stealth bomber, or build B-1-type aircraft now and Stealth bombers later.

I believe it would be a grave mistake for the national security of the United States if the executive branch and the

Congress decided to procure outdated, B-1-type bombers for the late 1980's.

My reasons for supporting the Stealth bomber for the late 1980's instead of the B-1, which would postpone such a deployment until the next decade, are outlined in a "Letter to the Editor" I wrote recently to the Detroit News. The letter states as follows:

SENATOR FAVORS STEALTH OVER B-1

President Reagan has before him a proposal to replace our aging B-52 bombers with yet another version of the B-1. If he approves that proposal he will make a major error. The B-1 costs too much and does too little. And there is a better way to fill the gap in our defenses created by the projected obsolescence of our B-52s.

As a member of the Armed Services Committee, I have been examining the options open to us. I began by questioning the need for a new bomber. While the basic design of our B-52s is old, they have consistently been modified to incorporate current technology. As a result, they are still capable of penetrating Soviet air defenses, still able to accomplish their basic strategic mission.

But despite this current capability, careful study convinced me that we could not count on the continued effectiveness of the B-52s beyond the '80s. Soviet advances will, by then, be able to prevent our B-52s from penetrating their air defenses, even though the planes' cruise missiles could still be launched from outside Soviet air space against critical targets effectively until about the end of the century. But the loss of a penetrating capacity would constitute an unacceptable weakening of our strategic posture.

There is, then, a need to develop a new bomber. The question that confronts us is what kind of bomber it should be. One opinion is to resurrect the B-1 whose basic design we discarded in 1977. Another is to intensify our work on the "radar invisible" stealth design. And finally, some suggest we ought to pursue both of these options simultaneously—deploying the B-1 by the end of this decade and phasing in the stealth during the 1990s.

While there is a loud public relations campaign for the B-1, the truth is that as a bomber for the future, the B-1 is a pummer. In fact, its highwater mark appears to have come and gone during the 1980 campaign when President Carter's decision to cancel its development was used by his opponents as a symbol of his "weakness" on defense issues.

Despite its past political value to some, the B-1 has little potential military value. In at least two ways, it fails to meet the minimum standards we should require of a new strategic bomber.

First, it is unlikely that it will be able to penetrate Soviet air defenses for the 30 years which constitutes the normal life span of a strategic system. B-1 advocates themselves are generally willing to concede that its long-term penetrating capability is uncertain at best. They suggest, however, that the B-52s must be replaced as soon as possible and that the B-1 offers the best short-term alternative.

That argument, however, is flawed. The B-52s will retain their strategic power during the time frame that Stealth can be developed and deployed. While there are, of course, uncertainties associated with the development of any new system, the progress we have made on stealth technology to date is encouraging enough to justify the conclusion that it can be deployed by the end of the decade.

Second, the B-1 simply will not be able to fulfill its assigned mission for a long enough period of time. It is absurd and tragically wasteful to build a new bomber which will

not be able to carry out one of its critical missions: penetrating Soviet air space.

I know there is a notion in the land that suggests we spend as much as we want for defense. I reject that notion. We can—and should—spend as much as we need for defense—no more, no less. The B-1 will cost the American taxpayers between \$20 and \$23 billion—about as much as it would cost to buy a superior and longer-life stealth-equipped bomber. We simply cannot afford to buy a B-1; at least not if we are serious about making real improvements in our defense rather than just increasing our defense budget.

The B-1 adds too little to our strategic strength and too much to the deficit. I think the choices are clear: Spend \$20-\$23 billion to buy a bomber that works—stealth; spend the same amount of money to buy a bomber that doesn't work—the modified B-1; spend \$40 billion for both bombers; but waste the \$20-\$23 billion spent on the B-1 (because it will not be able to penetrate), thus diverting scarce defense dollars from other military programs.

If President Reagan looks beyond his campaign rhetoric and focuses on the real defense needs of this nation, then we will abandon once and for all the B-1 and get on with the task of developing and deploying the more capable and cost-effective stealth technology as soon as possible.

CARL LEVIN,
U.S. Senator, Washington.

Mr. LEVIN. I also would like to take this opportunity to call to the attention of other Senators a recent column in the Washington Star written by our colleague, Senator BUMPERS, on this same issue. With his usual eloquence, the distinguished Senator from Arkansas has also concluded that it, and I quote, "makes no military sense" to build the B-1.

I commend Senator BUMPERS' thoughtful analysis to my colleagues. The article follows:

"INTERIM" BomBER JEOPARDIZES STEALTH (By Senator DALE BUMPERS)

Last month, with virtually no debate, the Senate authorized \$2.4 billion in the fiscal year 1982 Defense budget for development and initial procurement of a new Long-Range Combat Aircraft to replace our B-52 strategic bombers. This money is the down payment on a program that makes no military sense, will cost at least \$20 billion for 100 planes, and is likely to delay development of a truly advanced-technology strategic bomber.

It is important to understand that the long-range bomber the Air Force wants now is not the "Stealth" cruise-missile carrier bomber we've heard so much about. Rather, what is being proposed is an "Interim" bomber, for use until the Stealth is available.

The candidates are a variant of the B-1 bomber that was canceled in 1977 and a stretch version of the existing FB-111 fighter-bomber. Neither aircraft could be adapted to incorporate the technologies and materials of "Stealth," which will make aircraft virtually invisible to enemy radar. Moreover, the interim bomber would not be operational until the late 1980's, almost precisely the time when Stealth is supposed to begin coming off the assembly line.

Why, then, build it? Proponents argue that the B-52 can no longer penetrate Soviet air defenses, but that a B-1 variant or new FB-111 could. What they don't mention is that while the interim bomber might be able to penetrate the Soviet Union's current air defense system, it would not be able to evade detection from the system likely to be in place at the time it is finally deployed. This fatal flaw was a major reason the B-1 was