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SUBJECT.

Atlanta, The Battles of,

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by
General Howard.

Atlanta. The Battles.

It is difficult to answer the question often asked: "When did the Battle of Atlanta begin?" One could begin an account, with Sherman's Spring Campaign of 1864 starting with the first movements, the first of May, or better, skirmishing the battles & combats for sixty days which include Dalton, Resaca, Adairsville, Kingston, Cassville, Dallas, Newhope Church, Pickettsville, Muddy Creek, Pine Top ~~Mountain~~, Kennesaw Mountains, wherein we burrowed & flanked & flanked & burrowed in front of the retreating Johnston till he was ready to cross the Chattahoochee six miles from Atlanta, and come at once to the several actions which more immediately resulted in driving Johnston's army for the famous ~~fourth~~ road from the strong holds of Atlanta. Pursuing the latter course we will take the reader to a place called Smyrna Campground, some sixteen or twenty miles above the Atlanta crossing of the Chattahoochee. It is a bright morning the fourth of July, one year from the close of the battle of Gettysburg and also the anniversary of Pemberton's surrender of Vicksburg. ~~The two~~ Generals Sherman & Thomas had encamped their Head Quarters in rear of the

* Many of the Confederates in Atlanta — or — Stoughton Bank by Bible

the Corps which I was commanding at the time. I had stepped over to the front of Genl Thomas's tent and met himself, General Sherman & several other officers. I was not yet sure how we should celebrate the day. Sherman & Thomas seemed to have been having a discussion concerning the situation of affairs. On my arrival the former Sherman says: "Howard, why don't you go ahead?" I replied: "The enemy is strongly entrenched yonder in the edge of the thicket wood – we have come upon his skirmish line." "Oh, nonsense, Howard, he is laughing at you. You ought to move straight ahead, Johnston's main force must be across the river." I answered: "You shall see General." Then immediately I directed General Stanley who commanded a division to double his skirmishes and move briskly forward with a view to develope the enemy's line with instructions to assault & carry the skirmish line of the enemy. The enemy's outer line was generally strong. Having short deep trenches with twenty or more men in each distributed along the front in places but not more than twenty or thirty yards asunder. There was an open grove of shade trees near us, but between this grove & the enemy's position was quite a large open field. Gens. Wood & Newton commanding the other

divisions of my Corps were to move their skirmishers in conjunction with Stanley on his right & left. All was in readiness before 11 a.m. General Sherman, with an amused & doubtful expression, rejoined with me to his grove of shade trees. Quickly, at a signal, his men sprang up & crossed this open field at a run. Instantly the hitherto silent confederates opened their batteries & musketry all along their concealed line. But our men were too quick for their skirmish trenches. They were captured & many prisoners secured. Just on Stanley's front, their artillery & their wounds. Our main lines moved up & held within short musket range the position gained. This had been the work of the 4th Corps in many an other encounter for the past two months. Soon the enemy's skirmish line, extend their rifle pits, put their batteries under cover at night on that crest and keep blazing away, holding a strong hostile force, for the purpose of facilitating Sherman's flanking operations. The cannonade was perceptibly furious for a time, and the worst most exposed place on our front was our grove of shade trees. The General said as the shot & shell crashed thro' the trees that he was satisfied, so that his generals specially moved to a safer place of observation.

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These trenches were a kind of outpost to Johnston's main works covering the Atlanta Bridge. Referring to this battle Gen. Sherman remarks in his Memoirs - "I confess I had not learned beforehand of the existence of this strong place, in the nature of a tête du pont, and had counted on striking him (Johnston) an effectual blow in the expected confusion of his crossing the Chattahoochee, a broad & deep river then to his rear." While Gen. Thomas with the 4, 14th & 20th Corps was pushing upon against these most formidable works, which had been previously constructed by a large force of slaves, Gen. Schofield with the Army of the Ohio was on his right. and Gen. McPherson with the Army of the Tennessee was beyond & below, at Sarner's ferry. Our lines were also extended by the Cavalry of Stoneman. Still farther to the right Garrard with a portion of the cavalry was sent to cross the Chattahoochee above us at Roswell's Factory. Johnston thus perceived that both his flanks were virtually turned though he could still occupy his magnificent bridge head to which he had withdrawn from Dalton, a distance of 100 miles in length. He would have to leave the field of his concerning the loss of my trains is very note as "leaving the right the enemy again retreated". We pressed his rear guard the next morning as far as Vining Station and passed very near that point. This was

the place where my chief of staff Colonel Frank Sherman while reconnoitering passed through a gap between my corps & the next on my right and was surprised by the enemy calling upon him to surrender ....

For some time the rumor in the Confederate camp was said to be currently that our commander ~~under Maj. Gen. W. T. Sherman~~ had been captured. Fortunately for us the rumor was false, and we had still Sherman's active brain on our side. *

Peach Tree Creek (battle) which has it is a little hard to cross a broad swift ~~with~~ current at any time, but of course very difficult with an enterprising enemy on the ~~opposite~~ adverse bank. Gen. Schofield was moved up to ~~Powell's~~ Pace's ferry ... and I followed in support from Thomas' army. One Division Newton's, & Sunday with Geary's cavalry to ~~effect~~ seem a crossing at Roswell's ... The ~~rest~~ remainder of the army ~~demonstrated~~ ~~to~~ make demonstrations & feints of crossing at Paces Ferry, pressed against Johnston's bridge ~~near or Atlanta~~ were put in motion below the Atlanta bridge. The plan really was to move the left of the army over first. There was little or no trouble at Roswell & when we came at Pace's Ferry

As soon as the upper fords were well over it moved southward in support of the ~~next~~ crossing troops. I sent Gen J. C. Ward with his Division on the 17th to march along the eastern ~~shore~~ bank and monitor Paces Ferry so ~~that~~ a bridge might be put across at ~~that~~ point. ~~My notes say~~ Ward's movement was an important & delicate one; ~~It was satisfactorily executed & without an engagement~~ this was owing to the rugged nature of the country, the want of roads, & the proximity of the enemy's masses to Paces Ferry. It was satisfactorily executed and without an engagement." McPherson now moves from ~~center to left~~ but right of the left crossed his army at Roswell.. Schofield at ~~or near~~ or near the mouth of Soapstone Creek Powers Ferry & Thomas at Pace's & Paces Ferry. It was the night of the 16th ~~that~~ Johnston withdrew his last troops from his bridge head to Atlanta. Our forward movements began in great earnest the 17th & continued during the 18th & 19th. Sherman calls it a general right wheel toward Atlanta. Of course according to Thomas's engineer I moved near the center along the Buckhead & Atlanta road, encountering the usual cavalry opposition, road obstructions & burning of creek bridges. On the 18th

As soon as the rear force was well over it moved southward in support of the next crossing troops. I ~~passed my column on~~ Gen. Howard's Division of my Corps. The 18th of July this day ~~that~~ Gen. Johnston was relieved from the command of the Confederates & Hood placed ~~in command~~ over them. My column reached "Buckhead". The next day ~~the 19th~~ by getting an early start we had struck the crossing of Peach Tree Creek (a stream that has now become of historic importance) before 7 A.M. and found some sort of works, logs & trenches on the other side with an enemy behind them. Howard's Division touched the creek on the Buckhead road, Stanley on the Decatur road & Newton between the ~~other~~ two. Gen. Thomas now orders me to cross this Creek. Howard crosses & turns the small bridge head, puts the enemy to flight & holds the other bank & is supported by Newton. Stanley repairs a bridge that he has partially cured from the flames & secures his crossing in the usual way. ~~Of course~~ all this operations (bonfires & substants) required some skirmishing but this ~~was~~ are only the preliminaries of a battle.

As there appeared to be some conflict in my orders received during the night, I visited General Thomas' Head Quarters at daylight of the 20th. The General then instructed me to push our Division forward on the direct Atlanta road & to move the other two off to the left ~~about two miles~~ to the support (rear)

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of General Schofield's ~~on his~~ right flank.

These instructions which came from Sherman now moving in Kenesaw with Schofield indicated his belief that Hood would give battle to his (Sherman's) left. In fact the obstinacy of the cavalry in our front & our post resistance ~~to prevent our left~~ in the quarter of Jonesboro was of the sort to lead to such a surmise. It would seem Hood's natural plan, to cut the left wing off from our communications toward Augusta & Savannah, which were already held in McPherson's ~~hands~~ possession.

of General Schofield on his right flank. Newton's division was chosen for the direct work, and the other two Stanley's & Wood's for the movement to the left. After giving the general instructions which I had received, I left to report to him to report with Hooker's Corps on his immediate right & the exigences of the day required it to go directly to the General Thomas for orders. I then accompanied the two divisions. As we moved in conjunction with Schofield's command the gap was made wider. When we came upon the enemy in force there was a gap between Wood & Newton of at least two miles. McPherson it will be remembered was still further off to the left moving upon Stone Mountain.

Notice the general position of the troops the morning of the 20th after moving & while moving & just before the battle. On the south bank of Peach Tree Creek below the fork & on the south bank of the south fork above the fork... Palmer's 14th corps made up of Baird's Davis & Johnson's divisions, on the right near the Atlanta & Chattanooga R.R. Hooker's next. Williams', Geary's & Ward's Divisions in order, then Newton's of my corps. Then a gap of two miles then Wood's & Stanley's. Then Schofield's & McPherson's commands. The latter having recently reached the Atlanta & Augusta Railway. Our cavalry was on the flanks. Garrard's division began near McPherson & the rest beyond the right of the general line.

I did not know till after the war that Joe Johnston as he was familiarly called had himself planned the attack the account of which I am about to relate. I have said that Hood had been put into Johnston's place. It was done after Jeff. Davis had visited Atlanta and had expressed his dissatisfaction with the constant retrograde movements of Johnston. The change took place on the 18th two days before. Hood was made known to McPherson, Schofield & myself as we had been cadets with him at West Point Academy. He always had a firm resolute appearance rather enjoyed a fight even while a cadet, not remarkable for flexibility of mind showing no indications of superior genius, but generally was had an honest, manly, square way with him, such as to make us anticipate what occurred. That is, Hood knocked us, as we expected as long as he had breath enough left to give them. Gen. Sherman speaks of Schofield's estimate of Hood. I remember that he had mine also, but I am inclined to think that Sherman anticipated more warmness on Hood's part (than I, who inclined to expect from him) & more maneuvering before battle. Sherman was hardly ready for genuine opposition at Peach Tree Creek. Could Hood like Johnston have seen straight through hills, knolls, woods & trackless wilds thickly set with underbrush and have ascertained just where we were situated, he could have thrown a heavy column into the wide gap between Newton & Wood and put our right into a bad box, & left the rest made outside of the box.. Of course his success would not

(nothing sure in 10 or)

have been sure - for an 10 heavy left, consisting of two armies in front of Atlanta, Hooker hung
fuming around still ~~attacking~~ turning on
Sherman's "Hannah wheel" & this cut off a hand from
his society in the Atlanta market; so that while he
was fighting Thomas desperately (for Thomas
never gives up, he always fights desperately as as
the almost hopeless chicamauga), the rest of us would
have been manning the captured trenches of
Atlanta. His success would not have been sure
because Thomas was indomitable & Sherman clear
headed & full of expedients, but the issue would have been more
~~problematic~~ problematical.

Atlanta being a city of considerable size, & well marked in topography, no one
is likely to have, before visiting it, a correct conception of
the rough character of the approaches. There are no plains appearing.
country is rolling & thickly wooded, with a
few openings for cultivation. The creeks cut deep
& run crooked and there are no regular well defined
topographical features just the country to bring on a rough &
tumble fight between hostile forces, where neither
commander can ~~tell~~ anticipate just, the place or the time of
the conflict.

General John Newton being an engineer officer of merit, has always a vivid
knowledge of the possible & probable approaches of an new hin enemy
and cannot well be surprised. ~~Rather~~ Notwithstanding his orders to

to advance ~~to the crest of~~" toward Atlanta. He does not start from the Creek till his bridges are made, and word of Hooker's corps has come in sight with his division to occupy a ridge on his right. About ~~two~~ one o'clock he begins his movement. Skirmishers in front, to the top of a ridge. Enemy's skirmishers fall back without much resistance at first, but increase their fire & stubbornness as he advances showing the presence of a large support behind them. Newton deploys two brigades to the right and left perpendicular to the road & moves the third along the road in column of fours for support, & places a battery of four guns between his two front brigades. This formation in the shape of the letter T proved a most fortunate one as we shall see. Then he covers his front with rough rail barricades.

Hood's or Johnston's plan of attack was substantially as follows: to concentrate his strongest column opposite our right flank, make a lively demonstration in front of Schofield & McPherson (which Sherman was in person), but retire gracefully & seductively the while Thomas was moving into the prepared ground south of the Peach Tree Creek; then deliver battle with saddleness & fury. Hood's advance extended from & beyond Newton's left far over to the right to cover our brigade of Palmer a distance probably of a little more than a mile. The ground near Newton & Ward was quite open. Geary's right, Williams' left & Ward's, in open ground, beyond ~~and McCook's brigade of Palmer's~~ Robert Johnson's ~~Division~~ were in thickets & woods. I suspect Hood's

starting ~~advance~~ was simultaneous throughout his front. 12 Though Geary & Newton appear to have been first reached. Newton's men had hardly placed their ~~his~~ piles of rails, were still carrying supplies & whole ~~housing~~ their commands, covering them with earth from the inside ~~when~~ in place. A new line of skirmishers, nothing out from them, were creeping cautiously forward. When of a sudden the shrill confederate cry from a host of voices pitched on the highest key rang along the whole front, a fearful yell not easily described but once heard never to be forgotten. ~~not well understood~~ On the enemies come in masses rather than lines. They come upon our men before they are seen. Our skirmishers fire and fall back, coming slowly within the rail piles. Every man gets ready at once. Our ~~lines~~ men on their, theirs on theirs, fire & rapid. This three minutes before battle on the most trying to men like ours, but they do not move. When all are in line & the battery ready, ~~the~~ without the brigades, one ~~words~~ word to his men: ~~of~~ given "Commence firing. Fire steady and low!" At first there is little apparent impression. The enemy comes ~~on~~ pushing & advancing waving his banners. Bluter's & Ferrisball's brigades, on the front, are now hard at work. Our men are sorely pressed. ~~the~~ Walker's confederates ~~in their front~~ confronting them or not. They fall rapidly. ~~the~~ his lines begin to waver ~~&~~ hesitate & seek cover. At this same moment another confederate division turns the flank in the big gap & starts for the bridges in Newton's rear. Brady's ~~the~~ brigade (Newton's ~~troops~~ reserve support) faces it & pours in its fire. This new danger. Newton has some eight no 10

guns in reserve - two good batteries - and what is more they were just where ~~the~~ needed, across the bridge ~~of~~ on the main road ~~on the south side of the creek~~. There, using canister, on Thomas' upon the enemy's flanking Division ~~& made~~ cut little grain before the mowers their dance as they advance ~~with canister~~ toward the Creek. ... This is ~~done~~ battling under the eye of Gen. Thomas & probably by his immediate orders, for he is seen to be at the ~~point~~ most ~~danger~~ threatened point at the right time. The enemy approach within one hundred yards of these guns but no column can live to traverse the remaining distance. Confusion begins, then a staggering, waving motion, then there is a general ~~sometimes~~ break for the rear all along this front. (seen as the smoke is lifting.) One more attempt is made to turn this flank, but Gen. Thomas had had brought up an additional battery & so placed it as to ~~create~~ prevent this advance before any serious ~~damage~~ ~~done~~ ~~done~~ -- Meanwhile Newton's right, as well as his left, so great is the attacking force, is at first turned causing his right brigade to change front, but quickly towards the west, just in the nick of time, gallantly & powerfully, Wood's Division of the 20th Corps appears on the scene. ~~One has~~ You have doubtless often stood on ~~the~~ an irregular sea-shore where there are projecting points of land, rocks of different sizes & inlets with ~~abrupt banks~~ ~~can~~ you have watched the incoming waves - wave following wave breaking at the points, thence in confusion at the rocks & yet sweeping ~~by~~ with resistless momentum within the inlets to

he threw back by the 1st inflexible battles. So shaped was Hood's front, and so came on Hood's men and so did they break at Hooker & Geary ~~to the~~ in front, which masses in crevices & intervals found inlets to surge in. Till met & threw back by Ward, Williams & Johnston. All of this cheaping & surging that was not concealed by the forest, ~~on his~~ ~~[illegible]~~ to right ~~referred to~~ Gen. Thomas could see from his post of observation near the Creek. Under his eye & intuition to secure a closer view (at 2 P.M.) Ward's lines had reached the base of the ridge that Hooker was fortifying. His skirmishers were already on the crest when the confederate battle cry was heard and the enemy with their glistening guns & ~~waving~~ restless flags rolled out of the opposite wood three or four hundred paces off. This time the brave skirmishers held their ground long enough for Ward to unfold his lines & get well in motion. The brave General following the impulse of a true soldiers instinct, did not suffer his men to wait without cover pale & ~~almost~~ sick at heart as men are apt to ~~the~~ do at just such a junction, but put them at once in motion. ascended the hill absorbed his skirmishers and met the charge with a vigorous counter charge. an eye witness says: "so great was the momentum of this counter charge, several regiments became commingled, the rebels in such cases exhibiting the greatest disorder and submitting

to capitulate without defeat.* At other points they went to firing & then delivering volleys of musketry – Wood had no artillery in action here – yet the destruction of life was very great in his front & his losses heavy. He cleared his entire front within a half hour from the commencement of the attack. Upwards of 150 wounded & 300 prisoners fell into his hands. The dead as usual he could only estimate.

General Geary, always on hand for a battle & sure to be in some exposed position, was on a hill quite as far advanced as Newton arranging to reinforce his skirmishers – probably intending to bring hither his main lines. When the shrill cry of battle was heard – part of his line had an open field in front but his right was in a thick wood & rather impeded by underbrush – there was a gap in the woods between Geary & Williams – Geary's Division from right to left was of three brigades, Cobb's, Jones, Ireland & Candy's, with a battery – They had left the bridge head near the Creek & were fortifying a new position considerably in advance when the blow came –

Without skirmishers, without previous warning, in masses with a quick, springy movement they came upon Geary with his skirmishers – the present of one regiment the 28th New Jersey were placed horse de combat –

quickly Geary passes to his main line & battery ~~and~~ where ~~they~~ his left & center brigade check the onset but his right brigade ~~is~~ turned in the woods & part of Ewell's corps are ~~changes~~ front ~~but~~ forced to fall back to the ~~line~~ of the morning. The contest in this front was not more furious but more evenly balanced than elsewhere - it was kept up till nightfall - when the enemy reluctantly withdrew.

We have seen that the ~~enemy~~ enemy's troops pressed Geary's flank - They seem to have struck Robinson's brigade of ~~the~~ Williams's division - ~~Geary's~~ moving by the flank to connect with Geary.. This brigade faced them - received a severe fire ~~but~~ but returned ~~returning~~ the fire with interest - Geary's regiments, ~~too~~, that had retired were returned, doubtless by Hooker, to support ~~Robinson~~ - Williams immediately puts in abundant artillery ~~upon~~ his hill & gets an oblique fire upon the enemy in Robinson's front - As the assault rolls along it touches Williams other two brigades Knipe & Rugers and crushes McCook's of the 12th Corps. ~~I have seen various general accounts~~ an officer presents top of this front -

The awful picture of the battle as it raged at this moment. No pencil can paint & no pen describe ---- Wounded men were borne to the rear by scores, the blood streaming from their lacerated flesh and presenting a sight which

which at any other time would sicken the heart with horror. ~~Each instant some patriot heart, some stoic form, the treasure and light of some distant household~~ ~~+xx~~ The spitting roll of the musketry sounded like the continuous roar of the cataract and was joined by the thunderous clamor of the deep throated cannon which spouted unceasing columns of flames & iron into the faces of the foe. This was Hood's first battle. It was well planned and as well put into execution as could be done; but the steady, fearless resolve of our veteran soldiers won the day against a spirited & well sustained attack...

So that at dark our troops were masters of the bloody field. Our entire loss was not more than 2000 men and the enemy's loss estimated from the fire of our troops in the neighborhood of five thousand. Hood's loss in killed at such times as the Memphis Estimates, not merely wounded, was 4642 during the campaign of 1864 and the success to Sherman was that Hood's attack had failed and "Peach Tree Creek" was to be printed on our victorious banners.

The Battle of the 22nd of July ...

With so many elements to deal with, three simple armies, two columns of Cavalry, marching all together, Army Corps each consisting of 2 to divisions (as the Army General's command) all operating [illegible] give a clear account & yet condense within readable limits. It becomes difficult to [illegible]. On the 20th Hood's Cavalry had been [illegible] relieved from its watch on our left flank & had gone by General Sherman's orders to burn some bridges & destroy the track & material along the Augusta R.R. as far away Covington. Stoneman, with his mounted cavalry, on the extreme right had not yet come to replace Garrard. He was really needed where he was to protect our line of communications against the enemy's interfering raiders. After his unsuccessful raid the night of the 20th had abandoned the South side defences, and apparently drawn within the works close around Atlanta (these works were mainly the ordinary redoubts merely arranged for heavy guns & connected by shallow ditches sometimes called entrenchments, with an abundance of obstacles, such as abatis, chevaux-de-frise & felled trees & brushwood). We pressed up during the day on all the roads, marching in the same general order, coming together so as to close the gap in my corps & to crowd out that portion of

For it may be remembered that when we called in the Army of the Tennessee & initiating the method of telling arrangements to officers & men - (see Appendix H.)

& Rail road tracks broken, cars thrown off in Transit, Sunken bridges burned, trees, logs & stones cast into the way, beef cattle caught & driven off, everything at unexpected times & places - all this is charged up to raiding

the 16th Corps which was with the field army. ~~Was commanded by General Dodge.~~ Schofield & McPherson having turned gradually toward Atlanta from the East had passed Decatur, ~~leaving~~ Gen. Sprague G.W. with his ~~left a~~ brigade ~~and the~~ was left at Decatur by McPherson to replace Garrard at that point & protect the trains. ~~Gen.~~ McPherson following substantially the line of the Augusta R.R. ~~drove~~ moving in a westerly direction overwhelmed the ~~enemy~~ enemy's observers force a few after leaving Decatur and drove ~~them~~ them from the position & brot. up the 17th on its left. Gen. J. P. Blair, ~~after~~ commanding the 17th gives a detailed account of this movement. as it is brief & explanatory I will insert a few passages from his report: "After marching 8 or 10 miles (from Decatur) I struck the road ~~which~~ running nearly North & South in front of Clay's house. At this point the 1st Division, Brig. Gen. Gresham's, discovered the enemy posted half or three quarters of a mile West of Clay's road (nearer Atlanta) in a strip of timber, who immediately opened with artillery upon my advance." Coming upon the enemy drawn up in this order, Blair deployed his lines, replied with artillery & "drove the enemy full a mile & a quarter to a ridge of hills. At this point they rejoined connected with Maj. Gen. Logan (15th Corps)". A bald hill was on the left of this position (See step 19th) from which a sharp skirmish ensued. Gen. Gresham — Blair sent Leggett's Order to assault this hill. This order, for some unexplained reason, Leggett did not get the swinging of the 2d Div. but "with great gallantry carried into

Blair's report of the engagement

officer"

the morning of the 21st. The 2d Division (Leggetts) moved upon the enemy's works at double quick capturing forty or fifty prisoners. The position being important the enemy attempts to regain this hill but is repulsed, Brasheare's division having been brought up to assist.

Gen. Giles A. Smith (a clear headed self possessed soldier & better remembered as Post Master General) was assigned to the division of Brasheare on the latter being disabled by his wound. The ridge terminating in what is since been called Leggetts hill formed the left of the general line. We have now every part of Sherman's force except the army from left to right in position & connected. McPherson from left to right including Blair, Logan & Dodge (mainly in the Cotton's force reserve). Schofield (23d Corps), Thomas (4th 20th & 14th Corps) extending around the open almost in a semicircle, from the Chattanooga & Atlanta R.R. to Leggetts Hill which is just south of the Atlanta & Augusta R.R.

Now is the opportune time for Hood. Garrard's cavalry is away from the left. During the night of the 21st Hood moves leaving a smaller force in the works close around the city to keep our attention & resist any attempt at assault. Moves Hardee & his own corps, by quite a detour to the McDonough & Decatur road, & by this gaining our unprotected left & rear. The forming lines of assault under cover of the night & the favoring

(19½)

Brig.-Gen. Gresham was not only an able & gallant officer in action but excellent in council, his loss from the front at this time was much felt & he was always spoken of after & joined the Army of the Tennessee with respect & affection. He is at this writing (June 1876) a United States judge in Indiana, remarkable for his learning & strength of character.

forest. Through the thick forest & much impeded by ~~[illegible]~~ underbrush the skirmishers had worked their way, skirmishers in front and sprang upon Gen. Giles A. Smith's division without warning, precisely as Stonewall Jackson had led his troops 28000 strong to the attack of the 11th Corps at Chancellorsville ~~the~~ repeln battery, some field hospital material, ~~and a few other~~ ~~prisoners were taken~~ immediately captured, but General Smith's veterans, sprang over & into the ~~[illegible]~~ confederate quarters already in ~~[illegible]~~ waiting for them & ~~[illegible]~~ quickly repelled the first assault. By this time the enemy from the continuous line of attack had swept around to Smith's front so as to come up on the reverse side of the old parapet. Giles' men sprang back to their first position and faced there again, ~~[illegible]~~ fast hard & drove the enemy back from the quarter. Fresh troops with their flank turned in this way by ~~[illegible]~~ an enveloping force ever can be kept in positions. Gen Giles A. Smith & his corps commander Gen Blair were justly proud of this feat of arms, repelling the enemy in two opposite directions with a loss in dis, ~~and~~ gradually withdrawing with comparatively small loss & finally making a strong flank for Geggett at ~~[illegible]~~ at the highest point of the hill. While this struggle was going on Dodge's command was in motion by a ~~[illegible]~~ country road, running south of Frank and, fortunately ~~[illegible]~~ well situated as an effective reserve for this ~~the~~ sudden emergency. They were marching

by the flank so that on the enemy suddenly approaching his rear they simply halted & faced to the left and ~~delivered a~~ ~~thoroughly~~ surprised ~~& order in confusion~~ with an unexpected well directed by ~~a~~ vigorous fire into his swinging flank: ~~as it rolled on sweeping through the trees~~... At the first onset McPherson was with Gen. Sherman not far from the famous "Forward House". Hearing the sharp danger ~~sounds~~ of musketry not far off in the direction of his rear & left flank he immediately mounted & followed by his aids & orderlies rode rapidly toward the sound of battle — Hearing the 14th Corps the noise ~~sounds~~ of artillery & musketry increased so much that he sent off aids & orderlies to the 15th Corps (& elsewhere with information & warnings) for reinforcements in person ~~for the exposed flank~~. He gives orders to Hodge's Corps and the rear passes on up the road, Hodge southward & the rear is following. There is an interval, but not yet close, ~~actually a wide gap~~ in his line of battle but the woods are thick, & it was doubtless inconceivable to McPherson that his 14th Corps flank could be so far pushed by the enemy as to endanger his passage to his own troops on the front. but so it was and he there received the fatal shot. It was probably a volley that was fired as his horse was badly wounded at the same time & ~~[illegible]~~ rapidly bleeding without him.

(22 1/2)

~~Alluding to~~ Mentioning General McPherson in my report I say of him:

"A distinguished officer of the war who has given a noble life to his country and left with his countrymen a ~~[illegible]~~ record of honor and affection, seems to have impressed the citizen and the soldier like him. His death occasioned a profound sense of loss, a feeling that his place can never be completely filled. How valuable, how precious the country to us all who have paid for its preservation so dear a price."

Gen. Logan being the next in rank in the Army of the Tennessee is at once ~~asst~~ assigned by Gen. Sherman to McPherson's place ~~to finish~~ for the battle. Besides putting his left into good practical shape, he sent Martin's brigade from the 15th Corps to further strengthen the exposed flank. The first check by Blair followed by Dodge's successful counter charge from his fortunate position & then by the bloody repulse along Blair's front, only opened the battle. Hardee followed by Lee had marched ~~some~~ many long miles & pressed with extreme difficulty through the thick & tangled wilderness. Hood would never give up, ~~with~~ more over effort. Stephen D. Lee Hood's successor as Corps Commander was noted for his energy & enterprize & Hardee was also a thorough soldier. Having so successfully gained the rear of ~~the~~ exposed flank, We are not surprized ~~the~~ to find this battle renewed again & again at different points. There ~~was~~ came sudden charging & rapid firing, & then a complete charge ground was gained & then lost. The woods kept up a continuous roar from 11 a.m. till 4 P.M. The Confederate Wheeler with his cavalry had made an desperate attempt for the wagons at Decatur. Our Gen. Sprague with his infantry brigade assisted dispersed & drove off this cavalry & sent the train

into safety behind my position in the line.

During the afternoon as I found the battle continued and as I was under orders not only to keep the force already in my front along the strong line of entrenchments heretofore employed, but also to hold myself in readiness to go to Fagan's aid if needed, I rode over to Gen. Sherman's position at the "Howard" house. He & Gen. Schofield were there both mounted & watching the movements of troops which were in plain sight. They were near the right of the 15th Corps. Just before this time Hood's men had broken the line of the 15th Corps at the place which had been weakened by the withdrawal of Martin's brigade, Sigelbaum's brigade near the front, which had been much shattered and drawn back considerably and and De Gress' four gun battery of heavy 32 pounders had fallen into the enemy's possession. The president of battery Captain Dennis was when I came up near Sherman in great distress of his loss. Complaining of his loss. Gen. Schofield had caused several cannon to be so located as to give a sweeping fire at the interval held by the enemy along the line of works, and on the approaches from Atlanta, in order to keep back and slow to bear any more overwhelming volumes of smoke.

These cannon were blazing away with terrific roar. Just then Gen Chas R. Woods (Sherman in the army of Susan Woods, called Susan as Cadets do it

probably because of his unequal like quotations except perhaps his modesty of deportment, for he was the largest & tallest stoutest officer on the ground shewing at all times a serene apparently unconscious of danger.) was drawing out his brave division by the flank in column of fours at right angles to the occupied line of works. He formed this line under cover of the batteries which poured forth solid shot & canister into the gap which he wished to regain. As soon as ready his division moved steadily on till it had swept the lost interval clear of confederates, regained the entrenchments & the guns much coveted battery and brought many prisoners.

Now Gen. Schofield suggests to Gen Sherman that it would be well to follow up these outdrawn enemies with his command & thus interpose a force between the Hood flanking force & Atlanta but Sherman thinks he will not risk it & says let the Army of the Tennessee fight it out this time. The esprit du corps was much increased by these independent successes, but my judgment would have leaned to Schofield's suggestion at this crisis, for it seemed the opportune moment to strike a decisive blow. Still if it had failed

of absolute success it may be said not to have undertaken it. Hood retired into his Atlanta works, carrying several guns & many prisoners & issued confident bulletins as if he had won a victory — but he had not. He had only succeeded in getting his battered army into a good position & was becoming familiar with this rough wilderness around the city. There was great mourning for McPherson who was greatly trusted by his command & much beloved by all who had come into personal contact with him. We now spent four days in renewing supplies, putting batteries into position & covering the troops with good strong earth works. Atlanta could be seen plainly from several points and ~~round shot &~~ shells were easily landed by our rifled cannon within the city limits. It was a partial siege, but like that of Sevastopol under McClellan it would be long, when a complete mastery was impossible, to terminate while the enemy's communications remained intact.

On the 26th I was reconnoitering with Gen. Sherman along my own front (that of the 4th Corps) when he asked me how I would like McPherson's army to command. I remember to have said that I would prefer a good corps & was satisfied, and that as Gen. Howard was senior to me in rank, he might be

deeply offended. Gen Sherman said in substance: Gen. Thomas & I have considered the subject & we think you had better be assigned: I replied again. "General Hooker is a good corps commander & I think will really be truer to you than you think." Sherman with a little of his quick impatience when unexpectedly hindered by opposition said: "Hooker has not the moral ~~character~~ qualities that I want, not those adequate to his command - but if you don't want promotion there are plenty who do." I answered: General Sherman you misunderstand me, I am grateful for your confidence & that of General Thomas & will undertake anything."

No more passed between us till the evening of the 26th Oct. to my tent a dispatch from the President assigning me to the Command of the "Army & department of the Tennessee" i.e. to the place made vacant by the death of McPherson. He was in the class before me at West Point. I followed him in the office of Quartermaster Sergt. of Cadets, the 3d year, also of quartermaster of Cadets the 4th year & was elected to succeed him as President of the Cadets literary society. Now here again in the Providence made me his successor in a more responsible ~~command~~ office. It was at that time

a hard place to fill. Some of his warm friends of McPherson thought I could not ~~fill~~ satisfactorily hold his place. Some of Logan's friends were ambitious for him to continue as they thought he had already shown his adequate ability & was not a "West Point man." Prejudice against officers from the volunteer corps existed to some extent. The personal gossip of mischief makers came in here to make me a great deal of trouble at first, but the kindly confidence of Thomas and Schofield and the ~~gen~~ frank, genuine support of Gen. Sherman - who told objectors & fault finders to "wait & see" then added to his patriotism & loyalty of the former and soon gave me the footing I needed.

4. The Army of the Tennessee was already in ~~motion~~ motion from Decatur, left, toward the right of the general line - where at daylight on the 27th of July I joined its head of column ~~near~~ the Buckhead & Atlanta road. General Sherman rode with me to right of Palmers line and then indicated the ridge on which he wished me to form. He was in hope that I could get hold of ~~the~~ Hood's Rail road before he could so extend his intrenchments as to cover & protect it.

He thought I had better run my line along the ridge which was mostly covered thickly with trees, by continuing the usual plan of march in column of fours. But as the General did not order me to preserve this formation, I said to him that I anticipated

another blow from Hood as I pushed my flanks into the air - and that I would like to unfold by Division - that is by Army Division, with a view of having each Division succeeding the first protect the flanks of the ~~Division~~ one ahead. Sherman said pleasantly: I don't think Hood will trouble you now but would rather you could deploy in your own way.

General Dodge's Corps was on the left. Gen. ~~Gen~~ Corse, who subsequently became distinguished for his indomitable defense at Allatoona Pass, was then in advance ~~of~~ and deployed, on the ridge not far from Palmer's right, getting as near as possible to the enemy's line concealed in the thickets & facing toward Atlanta. General Howard's Division passes beyond Corse & wheels into line. The long march, the preliminary reconnaissance and the difficulties of the ground in the immediate presence of the enemy consumed the day so that Gen. Blair's Corps, following Howard's, was hardly ~~had fall~~ in position at nightfall, with the 15th Corps (Gen. Logan) in reserve. This ~~movement~~ movement was resumed at dawn of the 28th. Logan ~~moved~~ marched slowly & carefully into position, while Blair & Dodge covered their front as well as possible by rails, logs, & by digging & scraping up of soil with the tin of broken canteens, bayonets & hands.

The skirmishers in front of the 15th Corps were ~~passed through & harder~~ resisted more & more as they advanced Eastward - when the last division Gen. Morgan L. Smith's was crossing a ridge in his front, Gen Sherman & Dawson together in rear of it, ~~not far from~~ in the neighborhood of the line of battle. The enemy had opened a battery not far off & ~~the~~ what was apparently ~~grape shot~~ or canister, were shrieking & crashing through the tree-tops over our heads, and occasionally there was the explosion of a shell, uncomfortably near. & the report reached me that the skirmishers could get ahead no farther. I directed that the front be covered as rapidly as possible with rails & logs. There was an open space, not partially cleared of ~~logs~~ old trees & stumps ~~just in rear of our 15th Sugars line~~ and rather a steep slope, just in rear of Logan's line. The ~~officers~~ & men worked rapidly in piling up rails & logs. Batteries were brought up so as to be near at hand, reserves were carefully located & instructed so as to be ready for any emergency. Gen. Sherman, hearing the firing & thinking that a battle was near at hand, ~~had~~ after telling me that Morgan's Division of Blair's corps had been sent by ~~Gen. Blair~~ him to make a reconnaissance to Jones's Ferry beyond my position & would remain as a protection to my right flank, went back to his

(It will be remembered that the Enemy captured pioneers & tools together, belonging to these troops ~~on the~~ when ~~about~~ ~~at the beginning of their last battle~~ ~~turned their position~~ on the 22nd of July.)

road quarter near Gen Thom's position leaving the sights to stay over. Morgan L. Smith had just located a battery to engage the ~~over to~~ troublesome one to which Gen Thom referred placed somewhere in the blind woods in his front, when the well known piercing yell came to our ears with its continuous ~~sound~~ tumultuous increasing sound.

"Be steady boys" passes quickly along the line as every man drops into his place, kneels behind his fragile protection or lies on his stomach with his head raised & musket in hand watching thro. the trees. "Take steady aim & fire low, at the word" is the order.

In three minutes after the charging cry glimpses of the on coming lines are seen in the thickets - gleams of bright bayonets or gun barrels or swords flash thro. to the watching eyes. Then the the fire, nobody knows who began it. Roar of cannon, rattle of musketry, breaking of trees, running back of a few scared men & officers, very very few from the sight flash which is enveloped at the first charge - Sugar brightens always after the battle is really joined. He gives all orders clearly, goes back a little for stragglers &

drives them with voice, horse & drawn saber to duty. The attack burst on the front of Hays, Harrows, Woods & Morgan & Smith's divisions - and feeling the necessity of support, I sent at once to Gen. Blair to give us all the troops he could spare. In response four regiments were sent - in less than twenty minutes from the first assault. Capt Gilbreth of my staff placed two of these regiments on the right. Lt. Col. Strong my Inspector Genl. led two others fortunately with French loading guns in hand to clear the frame plank. Quick into line & quick to commence that fire that never stops till the ammunition is expended - Enemies were close up, some on the right & some on the right, some on the sails already, some past them when these fearful weapons swept this sort of the field & the woods fell where they were. few got back thence. I had batteries put in position by my chief of Artillery ——— a little to the rear of the right flank that could sweep every approach & cover easily a quarter of a circle. A slight abatement is raised up in a few minutes while the guns are already at work. The words of my report made while everything was fresh in recollection bring out the method of this defense: "the one" "The position occupied was a very strong one naturally to resist a front attack; but I supposed that the enemy had now discovered

the right and would push in a body to hold ~~secure~~ these points before making his second assault. Therefore, in order to secure my right more substantially twenty six (26) pieces of Artillery were placed in position in such a way as to sweep the approaches in that direction."

The attack of Hood - or of ~~Em~~ his representative Gen Stephen D. Lee (a classmate of mine at West Point) for he appeared & was recognized by our men urging on his troops, was renewed again & again during the day. It was as severe a musketry engagement as I was permitted to see during the war. Our men being in position had the advantage - the slight cover of rails along was a great protection. They fired low & as I moved along the line, the men cheered ~~me~~ and their officers said all prefered to ~~fight~~ to make a battle against two the battle through without being replaced by others who were anxious as hard to give them a rest & Logan's report says Col H. H Bolknap brought him reinforcements of two regiments from Gen. Blair and Lt. Col Phillips four Regiments from General Dodge. "These troops were received at a time when I much needed them and under the skillful management of the officers who commanded them acted gallantly until the battle was ended."

It was necessary to ~~breast the Hood's~~ assaults all along my line, with active firing, and having

this keeping over & self-possessed

used up all the reserves I had left to send to spare from Blair & Dodge for the 15th Corps front, and finding that the enemy's assaults exhibited singular pertinacity, & repeated, they made me fear that, by continually throwing in fresh troops, he might at last succeed in breaking our line as he had done on the 22nd at one point. For these reasons I asked General Sherman to send me at least a Brigade.

At first Sherman replied "Morgan's Division will be back in time & will come in on your right flank." But Morgan, delayed by the enemy's cavalry, did not appear. Howard sighted Lieut. Col C. H. Howard, then on my staff, to represent the facts to the General. He then sent me a Brigade immediately, & I learned, & think it was thro' Col Howard on his return from Sherman, that those men who had given back at the first onset had fled as far as Sherman's Headquarters & that an officer had headed them in the retreat and had said to the General: "Everything is lost. The troops are missing McPherson. If you don't at once take one of that flank you will be defeated!" Sherman simply asked: "Is Gen. Howard there?" "Yes!" "Then I shall wait for his report."

It is difficult to fight any battle without suffering from at least a few stragglers & crowders. Approaching the battle line

during the progress of an engagement 85

As you near the actual front, the cooler & ~~more~~ steadier you find the men. This was my first trial with these troops and I was delighted with their conduct. Our losses were in the neighborhood of six hundred. In a letter to General Sherman of July 29th (the next day after the battle) I reported the enemy's dead as 642. There were between one & two hundred more bodies subsequently found and two hundred prisoners taken. As ~~the field was for some time~~ it was presumed that many others were removed as also the wounded. Our officers estimated ~~this~~ Hood's loss in this battle as afterwards of 15000 are told.

I meditated sweeping the field after the Rebs repulse and making a bold push for Atlanta, but the troops were tired, Morgan's division was still held back and it was near night, so that I contented myself with the old game viz: strengthen the skirmishes & push them out. This was done as Hood or Lee drew his defeated men within the Atlanta works & opened on our advance with his musketry & artillery reserves. Thus ended Hood's third attempt to defeat & drive him Sherman from Atlanta.

5. An interim of small conflicts (36) changes of ~~the~~ officers.

From this battle till the 26th of August, the enemy stood on the defensive, and our "command", in the words of Gen. Blair, "was occupied in making approaches, digging rifle pits and erecting batteries, being subjected day & night to a galling fire of artillery & musketry." During these operations of pressing up closer & closer to the enemy's lines, putting our batteries in place within 100 or 150 yards of ~~those of the~~ his lines, it was a man could not put up a hand without drawing a fire. The heads of the men were protected by a large ~~log~~ piece of timber laid upon the embankments, which the soldiers named "the Top log". Gen. Dodge was one day seen loitering under this cover when a ball struck his head & gave him a serious & painful wound ~~Gen. S.A.~~, and he retired from the field. Gen. A. C. H. Ransom (#) succeeded him. (#) 26½

Gen. Lightburn was also disabled by a wound & Gen. Hazen, at my request succeeded to his division. Gen. Osterhaus returning from a leave of absence takes Gen. Chas R. Woods' division of the 15th Corps and Gen. Woods passes to the 3d Division 14th Corps.

By lengthening the 14th Corps fronts the 14th & 20th Corps passed beyond me. # Schofield with his command moved from the left to the rights. A little trouble arose during this movement concerning seniority. Gen. Hooker took offence at my assignment because he was senior to me & thought that he should have been chosen. He probably forgot that he had ~~done~~ previously ~~by~~ waived ~~recommended~~ a junior General ~~to~~ command a Corps while his senior was commanding a Division. Sherman i.e. the same thing was subsequently

General Palmer now took offence because Gen. Schofield (recently a junior but actually senior by commanding an army under the President's assignment) was placed by Gen. Sherman in charge of a combined movement to strike the Enemy's communications. Gen. Palmer was thus put under Schofield's command. He gave up his own command & went home. Gen. Jeff. C. Davis (now so well known to the country) succeeded to Palmer's Corps.

6. Grand Flank Movement upon Hood's communications.

I now come to the final movement before the fall of Atlanta .... It will be noticed that Sherman kept withdrawing his forces from the general left and gaining ground to the right both by the transfer & by thinning & extending the lines of his two corps, the fourth & Howard's now Stanley's corps and the 20th Slocum's. We hugged the works of the enemy closely & by sudden movements endeavored to circumvent Hood's left flank & strike the Rail roads to his rear. but he was too wary & active to allow us to do this. He entrenched as rapidly as we did, using the same sort of ditches, completed bastions made epaulements, & revetted with logs, had good flank covers and rivaled the "Gophers" (the men burrowing in rear of their lines) rivaled the "Yankees" even in the size & arrangement of the "hop-logs" for protection. We were having all the exhausting labor & worry of a regular siege without first being able to invest this forest city & failing in

these sufficient attempts. Sherman was more foiled than any other man in expedients, & being now aware that Stoneman's cavalry had failed to make any decided impression in its raid upon Hood's communications which it will be remembered resulted in the discomfiture & capture of Gen. Stoneman himself, determined to move his army in a body across Hood's lines of supply, leaving behind only a detachment of Thomas's Army, Williams's Corps safely intrenched beyond the Chattahoochee.

The manner this movement was effected was somewhat like that of a battalion of three divisions changing faced to the rear on the right division. Gen. Schofield being near at the West Point rail road turns his command & the pivot division. Thomas's Army faces East. My Army is drawn out & marched with orders to concentrate at Renfro Place. Gen. Thomas swings the 14th and the 4th Corps into position midway between Atlanta & Renfro. Kilpatrick with his division of Cavalry reported to me during this march watching my front & right flank. August 16th Gen Sherman issued his Special Field Order No 57. The substance of which I insert as it shows how thoroughly Gen. Sherman made provision for contingencies.

[(Sherman's Field Orders pages 80 & 81)

Here insert from "The movement &c to "all railroad materials)]

~~Gen. Sherman did not at first intend to push infantry past further than the Cavalry~~

Gen. Sherman suspended this order when he learned that Kilpatrick had sent off his Cavalry upon a raid - but it was subsequently put into execution with such modifications from time to time as the actual march necessitated.

Gen. Thomas begins, as clearly shown by his abundant marchings toward the rear & toward our right, the rear movements being much the more exposed. He was completely deceived. Having previously prepared a new left flank, to guard against a ~~enemy's movement~~ sally from Atlanta after Thomas' withdrawal, I had my command in readiness to begin the withdrawal in two columns as soon as it was dark on the night of the 26th. In perfect silence twenty-five thousand men were wakened, each falls into his place. Each column starts quietly following its guide who has familiarized himself with the road that he is to take. Regiment follows regiment & brigade follows brigade till the whole ground is cleared. Even the ordinary battle of Kingsbury & battery & wagons has been muffled by blankets & bundles of straw. Of a sudden, as the rear of our columns was just clearing the old camping ground the enemy appeared to suspect what we were attempting to do & opened fire with artillery - The cannon seemed louder than ever in the stillness of the night, and we found that the suddenness & terrific nature of this firing, the sound

Shot breaking branches & lopping trees in close proximity to the dirt pathway, might throw some of our troops into confusion & create an effective panic in the command. Nothing in the way of confusion & horror can exceed a panic in the woods & in the night in an army with loaded muskets in hand. I was in one near the Chain Bridge in Virginia, when every man was alarmed by a sudden firing supposed to come from an enemy. Men sprang to their feet, brigades were broken, regiments dispersed, some ran & some lay down, but all fired in the wild panic. There was talking on a high key, cursing, pleading, moaning. Many were killed & hundreds wounded during that fearful night, while Sedgwick's division was marching from ~~Vienna~~ Vienna to the Chain bridge after the second Bull Run disaster. But providentially, at Atlanta the enemy's random fire did comparatively little damage ~~at Atlanta~~. One man only was reported wounded. He had a leg broken by a round shot. By the break of day we were far on our way & Kilpatrick who was on the land kept the road pretty well clear of the enemy. Wheeler, his entire pursuing antagonist, had some of his cavalry in our front. At every favorable ground, for example at the crossing of Peachtree Creek large enough to bridge, Wheeler would ~~cross~~ cross over, fire or attempt to destroy the bridge, make a rail-obstruction across the road & on the sides in the timber and fire back upon Kilpatrick's advance. ~~often~~ This was done with carbines, rifles & sometimes with the

pieces of Artillery. When the opposition was too strong the Cavalry would be thrown off to the right & left of the road & a battery brought forward at a trot supported by infantry. This would generally force the enemy quickly to flight & in some cases their positions had to be turned by infantry soldiers working around their flanks before the enemy would abandon their shelter & leave. I never did quite get accustomed to the use of Cavalry. Small numbers of horsemen always took up much space & it was difficult to manoeuvre them in a country as broken & rough as that in central Georgia and when in Camp it always appeared as if it would take too long to get ready for action. In case of surprise owing to so very many articles of equipment as saddles, bridles, blankets, halters, holsters, sabres, carbines &c. and such like scattered around, not easily put into orderly condition except when the cavalrymen & their horses were mounted. My instinctive apprehensions in the presence of Cavalry camps & Cavalry movements I think made me admire the successful Cavalry officer the more. Adieu

Kilpatrick in camp often found all this case & apparently or necessary irregularity to which I have referred. but he was quick to rattle & quick to mount and as I discovered during this march very systematic in massing, deploying or otherwise using his cavalry. In Kilpatrick the apparent recklessness was only in the seeming for his matters were well out & his own eyes always open.

I spoke of two columns. Logan headed one which marched via Utoy to Camp Creek. Blair, followed by Ransom took the other by Lickskillet to the same point. These men, wagons & horses filling the roads were closed up made their silent night march & went into camp or daylight at the place indicated in Sherman's orders. Kilpatrick had encamped for the night not far away on a road to the right of us. Quite early about dawn of the 9th he drove out & cleared our road of the enemy's cavalry & scouts as far as the West Point Rail road. Here he had quite a little cavalry combat which suited his spirit. The enemy vainly attempted to drive him from the Rockery.

After a couple of hours rest I moved on. Blair & Logan marching in parallel columns. Logan cut a new road for most of his way & this was done to enable a quick concentration of force if needed at this point.

By noon the three corps were securely entrenching at the

rail road not far from Hamburg. ~~The 13th~~ Hagan held the right, Blair the left & Hanson was held in reserve, while Kilpatrick pushed his cavalry out on the differing roads approaching the position. With wonderful quickness the different regiments in position along the road & toward any possible approaches threw up fourteen R.R. cuts embankments or take advantage of any already at hand. Then the work of Railway destruction begins. ~~He ties as speedily~~ The men arrange themselves, often 500 at a time, by the side of the road-bed, seize together ~~upon one~~ a set of side rails & lift till the rails & ties are separated & some pile the ties together in heaps & lay the rails across them, while others throw into the heaps dry stuff enough to quicken the ignition, quickly setting them on fire. As the fire burns the rails on heaps & the ends begin to droop - four or more men, two at each end, with hold an iron rail & run quickly in opposite directions around a tree, or telegraph post, thus bending the rail & making it troublesome to straighten. A sort of ~~lever with a~~ handspike with a short hook, at the pulling end, was sometimes in use. The men would hitch one on at each end of a rail & turn twice in opposite ways & then bend the rail like the twist in a New England doughnut. and thus leave it beyond the hope of restification.

Schofield. And made the partial wheel at the pivot. Thomas had come in between Schofield and Red-Oak Station. All our pickets were withdrawn. All spent the remainder of the 27th & all of the 28th of August in this destruction of Railway property. My notes say: "The work was remarkably well done throughout". The rails lent double or crooked, the ties burned and in front of the 15th & 17th Corps. cuts filled up with rocks, earth, trunks of trees and other rubbish."

Brisker and Cody are on the march on the 30th. Logan followed by the trains takes the inner road. Ransom followed by Blair the outer or southern road leading toward Jonesboro. (Jonesboro is a Railway Station & hamlet on a ridge near the Macon & Atlanta R.R. Kilpatrick pushes on under my orders to clear the way - nothing but some skirmishing on front & flanks, which does not disturb the use of the soldiers short pipes & usual marching chats en route - nothing of moment till Logan's & Ransom's roads cross together before crossing Shoal Creek - then the Enemy with artillery & sharp musketry firing brings everything to a standstill. Kilpatrick is supported by two Regiments from Ransom - which Logan sends Stagen's column to pass his flank. This has the desired effect. The temporary barricades are quickly deserted & the Enemy's artillery goes off with speed. The hindrances are now more frequent - quite a delay at the Creek - of precisely the

farm nation as that just described. Just at
night, we rested with this irritating, backing & filling
sort of work ~~[illegible]~~ Posting all day which the
enemy's enterprising cavalry had caused us, we were
glad to reach the destination ~~[illegible]~~ appointed as the night
of our "general line", named in Gen Sherman's
special instructions for the day's march. But at ten several
things pressed themselves upon my attention. Sherman
had said in conversation, "let hold of the rail road as soon as you
can, remember" - I knew this to be the principal object of the large
circuit we had taken - ~~I had to~~ We had been
hearing all day the noise of the engines & cars coming &
going between Martin & Gainsboro. & knew that this meant
Hardee's infantry & artillery in front of us - The Flint River
was five or six miles ahead & between us & Gainsboro.
Now, through weary and isolated and without further more
written permission to go on, as soon as I learned, that
there was no water to refresh the men & animals,
I made up my mind to make an attempt to
get beyond the Flint that night. I sent for
Gil Patrick & said - "Have you an officer General, who
with a small body of cavalry can keep the Rebels in
motion & not allow them to create delay between this
place & the river?" "Just the man, Sir" he
replied & called to him Capt. Estes of his staff.
I then placed a Squadron of horse under Estes - who

quietly led the way. Whether if our enemy was he, had supposed us through with moving for the day & had made no more rail piles & hindrances. He had just time to spring into the saddle & be off as Estes came upon him. Then there was a race for the river. Infantry follows closely. I go ahead with the cavalry to get all the obstruction over before pitch dark. The enemy make a stand at the bridge on opposite bank, & commence firing. What of enemy's cavalry cannot get over flee down river. The bridge is on fire. Estes displays his some of men, & dismount & with Spencer rifles (17 shooters) in hand rush for the rebs' banks & commence their perpetual fire, while others make for the burning bridge stamp out the kindled flame, cross & drive their foe from the other bank. Our infantry steamboats or soon on hand. I cast as they have crossed the Flint I go over with some of my staff. (one of them is Lieut Col. H. M. Stinson, who was so severely wounded at Pickett's Mill near Dallas by a bullet passing quite thro his body. He was partially recovered & back again by my side.) The confederates from the woods on the which seemed at the foot of a steep slope in our front - fired a volley. nobody was hit, for in their hurry they had over-shot us. My eye was resting on Stinson in the dim twilight when at the crack I saw him spring in his saddle - I feared he was wounded again. I cried: "Hurt are you hurt!" He said: "no, sir, the suddenness made me jump." The shock however was too much

for him. That night his old wound in his lung reopened & he bled considerably & was again obliged to leave us. He never fully recovered but died in Atlanta after the war in consequence of this wound. The Skirmish lines as soon as deployed made a dash for the woods & after a stiff fight - The enemy's entire line gave back. But his orders Gen. Sugar seized the crest of the ridge beyond the Flint - worked a part of his men, cold night to entrench, and was ready in the morning for Hardee (for it was his corps & part of S. D. Lee's that were being brot. from Atlanta to head us off).

Kilpatrick pushed off to the right until he came upon the enemy's infantry in a cornfield. When with much skirmishing he held his ground, till the infantry were well in position - Wood & Dumont Wagner & prolongs Sugar's right - Blair gets into position in the morning & prolongs Sugar's left. The Cavalry is withdrawn & sent down the Flint to effect another crossing below to prevent the possibility of surprise from that quarter. This completes the work of preparation for the last struggle for Atlanta. Schofield & Thomas had crossed forward their post & were already upon the generals Rear to place & Atlanta line on the evening of the 30th.

The Army of the Tennessee by its energy, patience & rapid work had now secured a position on the Rocky ridge. The Railroad could be reached with Artillery & even with musketry. So that the trains of cars could not pass up & down. Logan is well entrenched holding the ridge. Wagon & the left of the road, Morgan on the right & Osterhaus mostly in reserve. ~~The battle~~ The battle Commander ~~Osterhaus~~ Dodge had taken great pains to locate a battery well supported by infantry somewhat in advance of the general line facing the rail road & not more than seven or eight hundred yards from it in a direct line – Other batteries were generally well placed under cover of the woods for their own wood entrenchments – Ransom's corps to the right of Logan (Corse's Division on the front line) has built a practicable bridge behind him across the Flint – Reserve wagons of all kinds not forgetting ambulances are well sheltered on the west side – Kilpatrick's bridge (Anthony's) is a mile & a half down river & at first he pushes a female for a guide, this bridge goes to the rail road ~~in a straight~~ by the shortest route & takes up a threatening position. The enemy fearing that his flank might be turned by a larger force attacks Kilpatrick with infantry & forces him with some loss to hand off & recross the Flint following up our Cavalry. Gen. Blair sends Giles A. Smith's division, still in reserve, to check this move. This combatting with the Cavalry on the right, skirmishing & battling firing along the line were going on all the time while we & the enemy were getting ready for one more trial of strength – ~~As~~

Hardee seemed slow to strike, & made my preparation to make a breach after the manner of our Chattanooga battle on a smaller scale. I ordered a reconnaissance. But just before the hour set for it, the enemy as early as three in the afternoon came on with the same old singing tumultuous cry, but opened fire before getting very close. Our men had been for some time all ready, and the fire was returned with the utmost spirit. Two or three times Hardee's men renewed the charge but each time the cry was less vigorous and the charge amounted to little in results. Gen. Logan says: "The most determined part of the assault was sustained by Gen. Hazen. It raged fiercely in front of Harrow & Osterhaus. The enemy approaching at an average distance of 50 to 100 paces." Woods division to the left had grown open & the enemy's heavy loss in front of Col Bryant's brigade indicated a sharp contest there. The charge on Ransom's front was much of the same description. Everywhere the confederates were driven back resolutely but disappointed. My estimate of the time of Hardee's loss was recorded "in killed wounded & prisoners will not vary far from 6000."

We expected a blow at daylight & all the forenoon I buried as we delayed

A bold commander will, after such a repulse of his adversary, stand in his reserves - but from experience I had learned caution & Harder might have a trap for us like that of the Resaca ridge, or of Hooker's disencomfiture after Chattanooga at Taylor's ridge. It was near night and Thomas was not far off. For Garlin's Division, the 14th Corps, that had been sent ahead & was attacking, supporting Hides & Scott's movement at the Anthony's bridge. Gen. Sherman's messenger brought word that Schofield & Thomas had already struck the railroad at several points between us & Atlanta. This seemed to put a complete barrier between them & Harder in my front. I could then wait for Thomas to press ~~the Hitting of the Cor~~ Jeff. C. Davis & Stanley's Corps upon Harder's exposed right flank; hence I decided to ~~and~~ run no risks by a hasty advance. General Sherman who in his Memoirs gives an interesting & graphic account of all these movements kept from this time with General Thomas. He was at Renfro place (he calls it Renfroe) when my battle closed and came up the next morning. Gen. Thomas soon appeared with his men in the best of spirits - Jeff. C. Davis Corps, Carlin's Division being nearest from the right, was placed on my immediate left and Stanley ordered to hasten his march. Gen Sherman says:

"I also dispatched Orders after Orders to hurry forward Stanley so as to lap around Johnsonville on the East, hoping thus to capture the whole of Hardee's corps." Without waiting for Stanley I sent a brigade to reconnoitre. By pressing back the enemy's skirmishers, a point beyond a single Creek in his front occupied by the enemy in force seems to be the present flank. General Davis in his usual complete manner formed his troops for the assault. I saw the movements commence before passing to my right to execute my part of the programme, viz: to keep the enemy in my front employed & send a force to endeavor to turn his left. Von Horne (in his recent history) has given an excellent detailed account of this assault in which he lets Generals Corlin & Morgan & Bain commanding Divisions each successfully perform his part and mentions the distinguished conduct of their subordinates Colonels Edgar, Este, Mitchell & Dilworth, Moore & Grauer also the work of Prescott & Gardiner Batteries preceding the assault. I heard the sound of battle but could see nothing till I followed up Davis' lead, for Blair's command had not time to make the long circuit ordered around the left flank before this forward movement was completed.

Gen. Sherman summarized it in a few words as follows, "Gen. Davis formed his divisions in line about 4 P.M. swept forward over some old cotton fields in full view, and went over the rebel parapet handsomely, capturing the whole of Govan's brigade with two field batteries of ten guns." Now is the time just before sunset when Gen Thomas was said for the first time to have put his horse into a gallop. (Thomas was fleshy & very heavy & it took a pretty good sized horse to carry him at a walk or trot) He went this time as I said to press Stanley's command forward (it had been previously set to destroying the railroad working towards us) and for some reason, probably because just up with us, did not seem to realize the spirit of the ~~situation~~ occasion.. Van Horne says comparing the movements of the 14th & 4th "Equal success on the part of the 4th Corps might have resulted in the capture of Hardee's whole command" but adds in extenuation of Stanley: "but Kimball's and Newton's divisions were so delayed by the thick undergrowth and the enemy's skirmishers that they did not get before his main lines before 5 P.M."

Newton did at last get where Gen. Sherman's orders contemplated, but it was too late, too dark to gain

much except at in the capture of prisoners who ~~which~~ from the situation could hardly escape falling into our hands during Hardee's night March in withdrawing. ~~During the night~~ Gen. Blair promptly withdrew as Gen. Davis relieved his troops by his forward movements & passed back across the Flint & down the river to Anthony's bridge, as far as Vickpatrick's former battle ground. The officer who had been there before sent to guide him. Blair took him by a circuitous route which consumed much time, so ~~that~~ Blair ~~only~~ succeeded in crossing the river & pressing back the enemy sufficiently to gain a good foot hold for further work at daylight. Of course Hardee did not neglect this approach to his rear, so that Blair was sharply resisted. The next morning September 2nd the enemy was already at Jonesboro's station having retired during the night. Hood's dispatches of the 3rd ~~sep~~ notify us that the failure of Hardee on the 31st to dislodge my force caused him to evacuate Atlanta. A Confederate paper said: "Yankee Howard stole a march on Hardee at Jonesboro." Hood with Stewart's corps & the rest of his command

leaving Atlanta, go around by the way of McDonough & join Howard & S. D. Lee at Lovejoy. (Rather known his intention in season. This reunion of forces would have been prevented by battle.)

Gen. Sherman # at the Chattahoochee bridge had heard the sounds of explosion ~~of~~ at Atlanta during the night. They had been heard by all who were awake ~~at~~ even at Jonesboro. We surmised but could not be certain what had happened. Gen. Sherman says he called up a ~~foraging~~ near his bivouac & questioned concerning the reverberations heard. He said it was in the direction of Atlanta & sounded like a battle (he had probably heard such sounds often within the past two months). Sherman's note dated at Atlanta reached us after our arrival at Lovejoy's Station for of course we promptly followed Hardee thither during the morning of the second of September. Sherman had moved his corps up to occupy the city. The rousing cheers that greeted the news told how ~~much~~ our men felt. Gen. Moore used to say, at every new success "Fait accompli!" Sherman & pithily puts it: "Atlanta is ours & fairly won." The great joy & thanksgiving at Washington & City Point on Sherman's letters of Sept 3d & 4th of President Lincoln & Gen Grant

(Sherman had gained victory. The 20th Corps & other commands offer the Clark Monuments Cyclopedia)

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As they will cease repeating many times & quote them in full:

Here insert letter Sherman's memoirs pg. 110 = 2nd vol.

a Besides the battles which I simply named in the beginning of this article, there were several cavalry raids and engagements of more or less magnitude under Stoneman, Garrard, Kilpatrick & (Rousseau?). These have passed into history. I could not give any new facts. I knew all these leaders. General Stoneman was a brave and loyal cavalry officer but judging by his misfortunes which resulted in capture & confinement in the South, a judgment that may be very unfair, I would now say that it would have been better that he should have had an infantry command. It requires unusual enterprise to manage a Cavalry Corps, good sound health, sleepless activity and the ability to organize & direct operations on a very large scale. Stoneman had sufficient native talent but he suffered from a sad physical disability, apparently experiencingly the extraordinary exertions devolved upon him in the Cavalry Service.

Garrard was wholly calculated for the steadiness & regularity of infantry or artillery movements & he is a man of high tone, pure truth & great fidelity. but had not the dash of Sherman & J. H. Wilson.

Kilpatrick was found to have the temper that

to
sister General Sherman. Kilpatrick, never could
believe himself defeated. He was of sanguine
temperament, had good powers of endurance,
would undertake any enterprise however difficult
and his reports were always spirited.
If the enemy surprised him in camp, he
rather liked it if he could recover himself
and snatch victory from apparent defeat.
There was a pleasant humor not only in what
Kilpatrick would say but in his deeds of
hardihood as he ran tilts against his "friend
Wheeler" who became celebrated for his
unceremonious appearance upon our fronts &
flanks.

Again besides the Cavalry work, our
very possession of Atlanta was disputed by a
raid of Hood in force around our rights flank
endeavoring "to row" us back to the place of
beginning even to Chattanooga. This caused the

most vigorous & trying campaign we had.
It was in this that General Corse & Colonel
Foster distinguished themselves at
Allatoona, This is where Gen. Sherman sent his
message from Kenesaw, at least 16 miles
in a straight line, by the Signal flags &
receive Corse's well known reply, stating
that wounds, loss of blood & his inferior force
could not make him surrender. That
beautiful "Hymn" "Hold the Fort for I
am coming" sprang from this incident.

The youthful Ransom's death
was caused by this campaign. He rode his
horse till very weak, night & day. Then rode in an
ambulance till strength was going beyond recovery
& then, bless his patriotic soul, he had himself
carried by four strong men on an army
stretcher at the head of his command.
He succumbed after Hood had been finally

d

driven beyond the Blue ridge and diro which extends from ~~Gaber~~ Gaylesville Ala. to Rome Ga.

When this successful supplementary campaign was in progress, ~~Oard~~ Corps was kept steadily at Atlanta. And really Atlanta which was fairly worn was fairly kept.